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A  UTHOR: 


THALHEIMER,  ALVIN 


TITLE: 


THE  MEANING  OF  THE 
TERMS:  'EXISTENCE'  .. 

PLACE' 

PRINCETON.  N.  J. 


DA  TE: 


[1920] 


COLUMiUA  UNIVERSITi'  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 


Master  Negative  // 


BiliHOGRAPliiC  MICROFORM  i  A R G ET 


Original  Material  as  Filmed  -  Existing  Bibliographic  Record 


Kestrictioiis  on  Use: 


►  1  T  •> 

■       MKl  iJk  -f*,^ 

'    T  'X  *">  1 

A,  O  tt   I 


I        I    mm 


^■Miqp 


Thalhoimf>r,  Alvln,  1894- 

The  meaning  of  the  tarns  'exiutenoe'  and  'reali- 
ty -  A  dlB3nrtation  ...  by  Alvln  Ihalheimor  ...    ! 
rrincoton,  N.J.,  1  rinoeton  Univorolty  press, jl9S0,i 


1  1  -^"^   T 


^  P«    23  cm. 


TheelB,  Johns  Hopkinn  Univ.  1918. 


•      ) 


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MRNUFPCTURED   TO   PIIM   STflNDfiRDS 
BY   fiPPLIED   IMRGE,     INC. 


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52618^  iO" 


ii 


THE  MEANING  OF  the  TERMS: 
^EXISTENCE'   AND   ^REALITY^ 


A  DISSERTATION 

Submitted  to  the  Board  of  University  Studies  of 

THE  Johns  Hopkins  University  in  conformity 

WITH  THE  Requirements  of  the  Degree 

OF   Doctor  of  Philosophy 


BY 


ALVIN  THALHEIMER 


'■  •~i«s? 


BALTIMORE 
1918 


PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
PRINCETON.  N.  J. 


h 


I 


» 

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Columbia  ^Hnibfrsitp 

intljeCitpof^etogorb 


LIBRARY 


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THE  MEANING  OF  the  TERMS : 
'EXISTENCE'   AND   'REALITY' 


%, 


A  DISSERTATION 


Submitted  to  the  Board  of  University  Studies  of 

THE  Johns  Hopkins  University  in  conformity 

WITH  THE  Requirements  of  the  Degree 

of   Doctor  of  Philosophy 


BY 


ALVIN  THALHEIMER 


BALTIMORE 
1918 


PRINCETON  university  PRESS 
PRINCETON.  N.  J. 


f 
t 


(5 


Published    igj* 
IVnUea    in    the    United    States   of   Amtr 


Ka 


.>j. 
s 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Chapter  I                                          page. 
The  Nec<i  for  a  Definition  of  ''Existence"  and  Reality"  5 

Chapter  II 
The  Reai  ?«  the  Permanent  '9 

Chapter  III 
The  Real  as  the  Sensible  ^^ 

Chapter  IV 
The  Real  as  that  which  is  Related  ^' 

Chapter  V 
The  Problem  of  the  "Real  Centaur ;"   Belief  and  Existence  85 

Chapter  VI 
The  Authors  Definition  of  "Existence"  and  "Reality"  99 


sj 


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I 


.^> 


CHAPTER  I 

The  Need  for  a  Definition  of  ''Existence''  and 

^^Reauty." 

Not  long-  ago  it  was  characteristic  of  philosophers  to 
deal  with  the  world  as  a  whole.  To  determine  the  funda- 
mental nature  of  the  heterogeneous  experience  with  which 
wc  are  confronted,  to  draw  unity  out  of  diversity,  was 
supposed  to  be  the  business  of  philosophy.  All  the  world 
was  found  to  be  "will"  or  ^'intellect"  or  '^spirit,"  and  a  way 
was  thereby  opened  by  which  the  individual  was  enabled  to 
feel  at  home  in  his  environment  and  in  sympathy  with  it. 
The  aim  of  philosophy  was  to  discover  the  fundamental 
character  of  ''reality  in  general,"  and  at  the  same  time  to 
offer  consolation  to  the  individual  by  showing  that  the  world 
fundamentally  is  akin  to  himself. 

But  now,  if  we  cannot  say  that  all  this  has  been  changed, 
we  can  at  least  note  a  strong  movement  in  a  different  direc- 
tion. We  can  note  a  tendency  to  consider  the  parts  before 
the  whole,  to  use  James's  phraseology ;  a  tendency  to  busy 
ourselves  with  some  specific  part  of  the  world  and  to  let  the 
world  as  a  whole  take  care  of  itself.  Specific  problems,  we 
find,  have  become  interesting  and  worthy  of  attention  for 
their  own  sake.  Less  value  is  being  put  upon  the  broad 
vision  necessary  for  synthesis  and  generalization,  and  more 
value  upon  the  exercise  of  keen  and  concentrated  intellectual 
effort  of  the  sort  that  is  required  for  analysis.  To  this 
renewed  interest  in  analysis  the  movement  known  as  neo- 
realism  has  offered  the  most  organized  support.  But  the 
method  of  analysis  is  by  no  means  tied  up  with  one  epistemo- 
logical  doctrine  or  with  one  theory  of  consciousness.  It  is 
the  method  of  all  those,  and  their  number  seems  to  be  grow- 
ing, who  are  interested  in  specific  problems  for  their  own 
sake,  who  do  not  consider  all  philosophizing  merely  a  means 
to  some  generalization  as  to  the  nature  of  the  universe,  and 
who  rate  high  among  the  charms  of  philosophy  the  alertness 
required  to  dissect  intricate  concepts  and  to  avoid  lurking 
confusions. 

It  is  as  an  attempt  at  such  analysis  that  the  present  dis- 
sertation is  conceived.    We  are  frequently  asserting  of  some 

5 


entity  that  it  exists  or  that  it  does  not  exist.  What  then 
does  it  mean  to  "exist''  ?  That  is  the  question  with  which 
we  are  to  deal.  And  we  are  to  deal  with  it  without  concern 
for  the  future  of  our  souls.  We  are  to  deal  with  it  by  con- 
centrating our  attention  upon  the  concept  "existence/'  by 
analyzing  out  various  senses  in  which  the  term  has  been 
used,  and  by  making  each  of  these  senses  of  the  word 
definite,  precise,  and  meaningful. 

Indeed,  if  we  are  to  come  to  close  quarters  with  any  con- 
cept, "existence"  is  the  one  that  requires  our  attention.  For 
we  have  here  a  concept  that  is  particularly  important  in  our 
judgments.  In  nearly  everything  we  say  we  are  implicitly 
saying  something  about  existence.  Except  for  a  few  classes  v 
of  judgments,  each  judgment  we  make  is  an  assertion  of 
the  existence  or  of  the  non-existence  of  some  entity ;  it  is  '' 
an  assertion,  that  is  to  say,  that  can  be  turned  into  an  exist- 
ential proposition.  It  has  sometimes  been  said  that  when- 
ever we  make  a  judgment  we  imply  the  existence  of  the 
subject  of  that  judgment.  But  that  this  is  not  the  case  it 
has  not  been  hard  to  show.  We  need  only  think  of  an 
hypothetical  proposition  of  the  form :  If  A  is,  B  is.  Here 
neither  A  nor  B  is  said  to  exist,  but  the  existence  of  B  is 
said  to  be  contingent  upon  the  existence  of  A.  Exactly  the 
same  interpretation  holds  when  the  proposition  is  thrown 
into  the  categorical  form:  A  implies  B.  And  since  per- 
haps the  most  important  judgments  we  have  are  judgments 
of  this  latter  form,  judgments  in  which  the  existence  of  the 
subject  is  not  asserted,  we  cannot  accept  the  thesis  that  in 
all  judgments  the  existence  of  the  subject  is  assumed.  But 
though  it  cannot  be  maintained  that  a  judgment  assumes  the 
existence  of  its  subject,  it  does  not  follow  that  judgments 
as  a  rule  have  no  existential  import.  Indeed,  nearly  all 
propositions,  it  seems  to  me,  can  be  turned  into  propositions 
having  a  reference  to  existence.  And  it  may  be  worth  while 
to  show  this  in  some  detail  in  order  that  the  importance  of 
the  concept  "existence"  may  be  realized. 

Let  us  start  with  the  proposition:  "Some  men  are  bald.'* 
Here  I  am  asserting  the  existence,  not  only  of  men,  but  of 
bald  men.  "Bald  men  exist"  is  exactly  equivalent  to  "Some 
men  are  bald."  There  is  the  same  assertion  of  existence 
when  the  particular  proposition  is  negative.  "Some  men 
are  not  patriotic"  means  that  some  unpatriotic  men  exist. 

6 


ij  In  most  particular  propositions,  consequently,  we  are 
\  making  assertions  that  are  equivalent  to  assertions  of 
h  existence.  Singular  judgments,  on  the  other  hand,  are, 
■  if  they  are  negative,  equivalent  to  assertions  of  non-exist- 
ence. "George  is  not  at  home  today"  means  that  a  George 
I  who  has  the  quality  of  being  home  today  is  a  non-existent 
entity.  When  I  think  of  such  a  George  I  am  thinking  of 
something  that  doesn't  exist.  And  when  I  assert  that 
George  is  not  at  home  today  I  am  asserting  the  non-exist- 
ence of  this  object.  In  the  case  of  affirmative  singular 
propositions  there  is  a  two-fold  reference  to  existence. 
Suppose,  for  example,  I  make  the  judgment :  "John  Smith  is 
now  eating  his  dinner."  I  mean  that  a  John  Smith  who  is 
now  eating  his  dinner  is  a  real  object:  when  I  think  of  such 
a  John  Smith  I  am  thinking  of  an  existing  entity.  And  a 
John  Smith  who  is  not  now  eating  his  dinner  is  a  myth,  a 
non-existent  entity.  When  I  lay  down  the  affirmative  sin- 
gular proposition :  A  is  B,  I  am  asserting  that  the  A  which 
is  B  is  an  existing  entity,  and  that  the  A  which  is  not  B  is  a 
non-existing  entity.  And  I  am  saying  nothing  more  than 
this.  It  is  in  this  way,  then,  that  we  find  the  existential 
import  of  most  particular  and  singular  propositions.  Par- 
ticular propositions  are  exactly  equivalent  to  assertions  of 
existence.  Negative  singular  propositions  are  exactly 
equivalent  to  assertions  of  non-existence.  And  affirmative 
singular  propositions  are  equivalent  to  propositions  that 
attribute  existence  to  one  entity  and  non-existence  to 
another. 

With  universal  propositions  the  transformation  is  slightly 
more  involved.  Suppose  my  judgment  is  that  all  men  are 
mortal.  Then  what  my  judgment  amounts  to  is  the  asser- 
tion that  immortal  men  do  not  exist.  To  attribute  mor- 
tality to  all  men  is  to  attribute  non-existence  to  the  class  of 
immortal  men.  When,  on  the  other  hand,  I  say :  "No  stone 
is  alive,"  my  assertion  means  that  living  stones  do  not 
exist.  With  these  examples  of  Brentano's^  I  quite  agree. 
I  believe  Brentano  is  correct  in  holding  that  universal  cate- 
gorical propositions,  and  hypothetical  propositions  that  can 
be  thrown  into  categorical  form,  may  be  transformed  into 
assertions  of  non-existence.    When  we  say  "2  and  2  are  4," 

'  Brentano — Psychologic  vom  cmpirischcn  Standpwnkie,  1874,  vol.  i, 
P-  283. 


I  think  we  mean  that  a  collection  of  two  entities  together 
with  two  other  entities  such  that  the  collection  does  not  con- 
tain four  entities  is  a  non-existent  object.    And  I  think  that 
there  is  nothing  more  that  the  proposition  in  question  does 
mean      A  proposition  of  this  kind  does  not  assert  that  the 
subject  exists ;  but  it  does,  nevertheless,  make  some  assertion 
about  existence,  or,  rather,  alwut  non-existence.    It  may  1^, 
as  Holt  says,  that  most  propositions  are  about  entities  that  do 
not  physically  exist.-'     But  it  does  not  follow  that  the  dis- 
tinction between  existence  and  non-existence— in  some  sense 
of  "existence"— makes  no  difference  to  these  proiwsitions. 
It  may  be.  as  G.  E.  Moore  says,  that  2  and  2  are  4  "whether 
there  exist  two  things  or  not."'''    But  it  does  not  follow  that 
mathematics  is  a  non-existential  science,  if  we  mean  by  a 
non-existential  science  one  that  has  no  use  for  the  concepts 
"existence"   and   "non-existence"    in   any  of   their   senses. 
Indeed    if  "non-existemial"  is  defined  in  this  manner,  an 
existential  science  is  precisely  what  mathematics  is.     And 
not  only  mathematics  but  almost  all  scientific  propositions, 
and  indeed  almost  all  judgments,  are  existential. 

Of  course,  it  may  be  said  that  these  categorical  proposi- 
tions are  not  equivalent  to  propositions  asserting  non-exist- 
ence in  general,  but  to  propositions  asserting  non-existence 
in  some  definite  realm,  as,  for  example,  in  the  realm  of 
mathematics.      But  at   least  they   assert   non-existence   of 
some  sort.    Let  us  then  l>e  content  with  this  for  the  present^ 
We  have  shown  that  almost  all  propositions  are  equivalent 
to  propositions  asserting  existence  or  non-existence  of  some 
sort     We  have  shown  that  existence  is  a  vitally  necessary 
concept,  that  no  science  can  hope  to  escape  a  reference  to  it. 
The  distinction  between   various   realms  of   existence   we 

shall  consider  later  on.  •     ,     *.  .^ 

Our  thesis  is  not  that  all  propositions  are  eqmva  ent  to 
propositions  asserting  existence  or  non-existence,  for  th  re 
are  some  propositions  of  which  this  is  not  true.  When  the 
proposition  with  which  we  are  deahng  defines  a  word  th 
meaning  of  this  proposition  will  not  be  exhausted  f  we 
transform  it  into  the  existential  proposition  into  which  we 
should  normally  transform  it.     If  a  pentagon  is  a  plane 

(1899).    P-     1^-  g 


I 


figure  bounded  by  five  straight  lines,  no  doubt  a  pentagon 
that  is  not  a  plane  figure  bounded  by  five  straight  lines  does 
not  exist.  But  the  proposition  in  which  the  word  "|)enta- 
gon"  is  first  introduced  means  more  than  this.  Something 
similar  might  no  doubt  be  said  of  such  a  proposition  as : 
''this  is  a  rose,"  where  the  meaning  of  the  word  "rose"  is 
given  by  pointing  out  one  of  the  objects  to  which  it  refers. 
A  more  important  limitation,  however,  that  must  be  put 
upon  the  theory  that  has  preceded,  comes  when  we  are  deal- 
ing with  predications  of  existence  and  of  the  concepts  that 
are  prior  to  existence.  When  existence  is  explicitly  predi- 
cated of  an  entity,  there  is  no  reference  to  existence  other 
than  that  which  is  explicit.  If  we  were  to  transform  ''All 
A's  exist''  as  we  have  transformed  ''All  A's  are  B,"  we 
should  find  ourselves  saying :  "A's  that  do  not  exist  do  not 
exist" ;  and  we  should  be  involved  in  a  hopeless  regress  of 
tautological  propositions.  Similarly  when  we  predicate 
"non-existence",  or  a  term  equivalent  to  "non-existence", 
there  is  no  reference  to  existence  other  than  that  which  is 
explicit.  Again,  in  dealing  with  the  predication  of  concepts 
prior  to  the  distinction  between  existence  and  non-existence, 
this  reference  to  existence  cannot  be  found.  Let  us  call 
"subsistence"  that  which  may  be  predicated  of  any  entity. 
Then  subsistence  and  the  qualities  in  terms  of  which  exist- 
tence  is  defined  are  prior  to  existence.  When  I  attribute 
one  of  these  qualities  to  an  entity,  there  can  be  no  reference 
to  existence;  otherwise  we  could  never  open  our  mouths 
without  being  presumed  already  to  know  the  meaning  of 
existence. 

Before  leaving  this  subject  perhaps  I  ought  to  show  how 
I  should  meet  an  objection  that  might  be  raised  against  the 
theory  that  has  been  put  forth.  I  have  said  that  particular 
propositions  and  affirmative  singular  propositions  imply  the 
assertion  of  existence.  It  may  be  objected,  consequently, 
that  propositions  such  as:  "  Some  Greek  Gods  acted  im- 
morally" and  "Ivanhoe  lived  under  the  Plantagenets"  make 
no  assertion  of  existence.  It  seems  to  me,  however,  that 
such  propositions,  taken  in  the  usual  sense  of  their  terms, 
do  make  this  assertion  of  existence,  and,  since  what  they 
assert  to  have  existed  did  not  exist,  these  propositions  are 
false.  If  they  are  meant  to  be  true,  they  are  worded  incor- 
rectly.   The  one  about  Ivanhoe  should  read :   "Ivanhoe  is  a 

9 


fictitious  character  who  is  supposed  to  have  lived  under  the 
Plantagenets."     In  this  proposition,  however,  there  is  no 
assertion  of  existence  according  to  the  theory  I  am  defend- 
ing;   for  we  are  dealing  with  one  of  the  cases  that  have 
been  expressly  excepted.     We  are  dealing  with  a  case  in 
which  non-existence  is  explicitly  l^eing  predicated ;    for  to 
call  Ivanhoe  a  fictitious  character  is  to  call  him  non-existent. 
Apart  from  the  classes  of  propositions  that  have  been  ex- 
cepted, all  categorical  propositions  can  be  transformed,  and 
transformed  without  loss  of  meaning,  into  assertions  of 
existence  or  of  non-existence.    And  since  most  of  the  judg- 
ments we  make  are  of  this  form  or  can  be  put  into  this 
form,   we  see  that  we  are  engaged   for  the  most  part  in 
making  assertions  that  are  equivalent  to  existential  judg- 
ments.    In  science,  in  mathematics,  in  daily  life,  the  propo- 
sitions  with  which  we  deal  are  equivalent  to  propositions 
asserting  existence  or  non-existence  of  some  kind.     Our 
knowledge  is  built  up  of  propositions  that  are  equivalent  to 
existential  propositions.     And  so,  though  we  do  not  always 
mention  the  word  "existence,"  the  assertion  or  denial  of 
existence  is  implied  in  nearly  all  of  the  propositions  with 
which  we  usually  concern  ourselves. 

''Existence"  consequently  is  a  most  important  word.    The 
term  we  may  avoid  mentioning,  but  the  concept  will  be  lurk- 
ing in  the  background.     We  may  attempt  to  develop  a  doc- 
trine that  shall  be  purely  a  Gegenstandstlieone,  but  as  soon 
as  we  advance  beyond  the  most  fundamental  concepts,  our 
assertions  will  be  equivalent  to  assertions  predicating  an 
existence  or  non-existence  of  some  sort.     A  concept  so  im- 
portant in  our  thinking  certainly  merits  our  attention.    And 
It  merits  our  attention  all  the  more  because  its  meaning  is 
so  vague  and  chaotic.     When  we  first  ask  ourselves  what 
the  difference  is  between  an  entity  that  exists  and  one  that 
does  not,  no  clear  and  unambiguous  answer  comes  to  our 
minds.     We  seem  to  be  given  no  additional  information 
about  an  entity  when  we  are  told  that  it  exists.    Indeed  there 
have  been  many  writers  who  have  said  that  to  think  of  an 
entity  and  to  think  of  it  as  existing  is  one  and  the  same 
thing.     They  have  been  able  to  put  forward  such  a  thesis 
because  the  word  as  we  first  meet  it  seems  to  be  almost  com- 
pletely without  meaning.     If  we  look  to  the  ordinary  usage 
of  words  to  solve  our  problem,  we  look  in  vain.     We  can 

10 


find  little  meaning  in  the  word  simply  -by  observing  how  it  is 
used  in  our  every-day  language,  for  in  common  speech  the 
word  "existence"  is  applied  in  a  most  haphazard  manner. 
We  look  through  a  microscope  and  we  say  that  what  we  see 
exists;  we  press  our  eyeballs  and  we  say  that  what  we  see 
does  not  exist.  In  both  cases  we  are  supplementing  our 
native  powers  of  observation  and  gaining  an  experience  that 
contradicts  the  experience  we  gain  through  exercising  our 
unaided  vision.  The  two  operations  have  nearly  all  char- 
acteristics in  common.  And  yet  we  say  that  the  one  opera- 
tion puts  us  in  contact  with  existing  entities  and  the  other 
with  non-existing  entities.  As  to  the  existence  of  other  en- 
tities, such  as  God,  we  find  the  greatest  diversity  of  opinion. 
And  we  find  little  more  than  the  dogmatic  assertion  of  exist- 
ence, or  the  equally  dogmatic  assertion  of  non-existence. 
We  find  no  simple  definition  of  existence  by  the  application 
of  which  we  might  tell  whether  God  does,  or  does  not,  exist. 

The  use  of  the  term  is  in  the  highest  degree  chaotic.  Two 
entities  may  stand  in  practically  the  same  position  with 
regard  to  all  the  marks  that  w^e  might  take  to  be  marks  of 
existence;  and  yet  one  may  customarily  be  called  existent 
and  the  other  non-existent.  Furthermore,  the  term  at  first 
sight  lacks  meaning  to  such  an  extent  that  the  proposition : 
"the  Pope  exists"  is  only  slightly  more  informative  than  the 
proposition :  "the  Pope  is  an  Abracadabra" ;  that  is  to  say, 
"existence"  is  almost  as  meaningless  a  predicate  as  the 
typically  meaningless  term  Abracadabra.  It  is  evident,  con- 
sequently, that  if  the  term  is  to  be  used  at  all,  it  must  be 
defined.  The  concept  which  it  represents  must  be  given 
some  more  definite  meaning;  it  must  be  rendered  richer  in 
content.  It  is  this  that  we  shall  attempt  to  do.  We  shall  try 
to  find  out  what  some  of  the  more  important  philosophers 
have  meant  by  "existence"  when  they  have  used  the  term. 
And  as  a  result  of  such  historical  inquiries  we  shall  see  what 
may  be  said  as  to  the  way  in  which  the  term  may  or  should 
be  defined. 

When  we  come  to  consider  the  term  "existence,"  there  are 
a  whole  host  of  related  terms  that  come  to  mind.  There  are 
"essence,"  "being,"  ''subsistence,"  and  "reaHty"  in  English; 
"Sein;'  "Dasein;'  'Wirklichkeit/'  and  ''Realitaf  in  Ger- 
man;   and  a  similar  array  of  terms  in  other  languages. 

II 


"Essence/'  I  suppose,  may  be  described  as  that  part  of  an 
entity  which  remains  when  we  remove  existence  from  the 
concept  of  it.  It  is  a  term  that  should  be  quite  easily  dis- 
tinguished from  "existence,"  and  so  will  cause  us  little  con- 
cern. To  be  sure,  in  the  writings  of  some  philosophers, 
notably  in  the  case  of  Spinoza,  the  relation  between  essence 
and  existence  offers  difficulty.  But  the  source  of  confusion 
is  the  failure  to  give  "existence"  a  definite  and  limited  mean- 
ing: when  "existence"  is  made  meaningful,  it  is  not  difficult 
to  see  what  is  meant  by  "essence." 

"Subsistence"  is  a  term  that  has  recently  become  popular. 
And  deservedly ;    for  it  is  a  term  that  is  quite  serviceable. 
It  is  that  which  may  be  predicated  of  any  entity,  of  an  exist- 
ing entity  as  well  as  of  a  non-existing  one.     "Being"  is 
frequently  used  in  the  same  sense.     For  example,  Russell* 
says :    "  'Being'  is  that  which  belongs  to  every  conceivable 
term,   to  every   possible   object   of   thought — in   short,   to 
everything    that    can    possibly    occur    in  any   proposition, 
true  or  false,  and  to  all  such  propositions  themselves  . 
Numbers,  the  Homeric  Gods,  relations,  chimeras  and  four 
dimensional   spaces  all  have  being,   for  if  they  were  not 
entities  of  a  kind,  we  could  make  no  propositions  about 
them.     Thus  being  is  a  general  attribute  of  everything,  and 
to  mention  anything  is  to  show  that  it  is."    It  is  in  this  sense 
that  I  shall  use  "being;"  I  shall  treat  it  as  a  synonym  of 
"subsistence."     And  when  I  find  it  given  a  more  limited 
scope,  I  shall  assume  that  the  writer  with  whom  I  am  dealing 
is  talking  about  what  I  am  calling  "existence." 

Existence  is  not  the  same  thing  as  subsistence  or  being. 
If  it  were,  non-existence  would,  of  course,  be  a  self-contra- 
diction ;  it  would  be  as  impossible  to  think :  "Jupiter  does 
not  exist"  as  it  is  to  think :  "Jupiter  does  not  subsist."  And 
yet  we  frequently  find  assertions  that  imply  just  this  identi- 
fication of  existence  and  subsistence.  According  to  Hume, 
"there  is  no  impression  nor  idea  of  any  kind  of  which  we 
have  any  consciousness  or  memory,  that  is  not  conceived  as 
existent."^  Existence,  accordingly,  is  a  predicate  that  be- 
longs to  any  object  of  which  we  may  think.  It  belongs  to 
the  centaur  just  as  subsistence  does.  And  just  as  a  non- 
subsisting  object  is  a  self-contradiction,  so,  it  would  seem, 

*  Russell:   Principles  of   Mathematics,  vol.   i,  p.  449. 
'Hume:   Treatise  of  Human  Nature;   Bk.  i,  Pt.  2,  Sec.  6. 

12 


is  a  non-existing  one.  "Existence,"  in  short,  comes  to  be 
equivalent  to  "subsistence."  Now,  when  we  are  engaged 
in  introspection,  we  seem  to  find  some  basis  for  making 
"existence"  as  broad  in  extension  as  "subsistence,"  and  as 
devoid  of  intention  as  the  latter  is.  "Existence"  is  a  rather 
meaningless  word  as  we  first  meet  it,  and  adds  almost  noth- 
ing to  the  concept  to  which  it  is  joined.  But  it  is  not  to  be 
assumed  that  "existence"  is  to  be  left  in  this  condition. 
We  have  enough  words  to  act  as  universal  predicates ;  "ex- 
istence" should  be  redeemed  and  rendered  definite. 

Indeed,  it  is  usually  recognized  that  "existence"  is  not  to 
be  attributed  to  everything.  And  so  we  are  only  following 
customary  modes  of  speech  when  we  say  that  some  entities 
exist  and  others  do  not  exist.  However,  not  only  is  it  cus- 
tomary for  "existence"  to  be  given  a  limited  application; 
it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  "existence,"  or  some  term 
like  it,  have  a  limited  application  if  we  are  to  have  any 
knowledge  at  all.  For  nearly  all  of  the  propositions  we  use 
can,  as  we  have  seen,  be  transformed  into  existential  propo- 
sitions. If  now  to  attribute  existence  to  an  entity  is  to 
attribute  nothing,  or  nothing  specific,  to  it,  all  of  these 
existential  propositions  are  meaningless.  And  some  of 
them  become  worse,  for  those  in  which  non-existence  is 
predicated  of  some  entity  come  to  be  self -contradictory. 
Knowledge  depends,  consequently,  on  the  use  of  a  concept 
like  "existence"  that  shall  be  a  quality  of  only  some  entities 
and  not  of  all.  We  must,  therefore,  reject  the  view  that 
identifies  "existence"  with  "subsistence."  "Subsistence"  or 
"being"  is  one  thing,  and  "existence"  is  another. 

Of  the  other  terms  I  have  mentioned  it  is  hard  to  dis- 
tinguish one  from  another.  There  have  been  attempts  to 
distinguish  "existence"  from  "reality,"  but  the  majority  of 
writers  I  have  examined  make  no  clear  distinction  between 
the  two.  In  German,  where  there  are  the  four  terms  :  '^Ex- 
istenz:'  ''Dasein;'  ''Wirklichkeit;'  and  "Realitat:'  there 
have  ]yttn  similar  attempts.^  But  the  result  has  been  merely 
a  collection  of  verbal  distinctions  that  finds  no  justification 
in  the  previous  history  of  these  words.  I  shall,  therefore, 
group  them  all  together  and  shall  use  "existence"  and 
"reality"  interchangeably.     I  shall  be  dealing  with  the  con- 

"  Friedrichs :    Bcitrdf^c  211  einer  Geschichtc   iind   Thcorie   des  Hxis- 
tential-urteils,  p.  13. 

13 


cepts  that  are  called  concepts  of  ''existence,"  those  that  are 
called  concepts  of  ''reality,"  and  those  that  are  called  con- 
cepts of  "being,"  where  "being"  does  not  mean  mere  sub- 
sistence. And  I  shall  call  them,  now  concepts  of  "exist- 
ence," and  now  concepts  of  "reality."  If,  in  the  absence  of 
any  generally  recognized  distinction  between  these  terms, 
I  were  to  be  especially  careful  which  term  each  individual 
author  preferred  to  use,  I  should  be  laying  too  much  stress 
on  peculiarities  of  terminology.  And  I  should  end  by 
drawing  up  a  list  of  senses  in  which  "reality"  has  been  used 
that  would  almost  exactly  duplicate  a  list  of  senses  in  which 
"existence"  has  been  used.  For  me,  then,  "existence" 
means  "reality,"  and  "reality"  means  "existence."  And 
the  concepts  which  I  shall  principally  be  engaged  in  dis- 
cussing, I  shall  call  now  by  one  name  and  now  by  the 
other. 

It  is  settled,  then,  that  we  shall  talk  about  "existence"  or 
"reality,"  and  that  what  we  shall  mean  by  these  terms  will 
not  be  mere  subsistence.  We  may  be  asked,  however,  with 
what  sort  of  existence  we  are  concerned.  There  is  existence 
in  the  realm  of  mathematics,  existence  in  the  realm  of 
scientific  theories,  existence  in  the  pliysical  world,  existence 
merely  in  thought.  We  shall  be  told,  in  short,  that  "exist- 
ence** is  a  term  that  by  itself  is  quite  incomplete.  When- 
^ever  we  predicate  existence,  we  must  predicate  existence  in 
some  realm,  if  our  assertion  is  to  be  useful.  All  entities 
exist,  but  they  do  not  exist  in  the  same  realm.  Therefore, 
it  is  nothing  to  predicate  existence,  but  it  is  useftil  to  predi- 
cate existence  in  some  specific  realm.  Zeus  does  not  exist 
in  the  physical  world  :  he  does  exist  in  Greek  mythology. 
Consequently,  wlien  we  read  "Zeus  exists,"  we  do  not 
know  whether  the  proposition  is  true  or  false,  for  we  do 
not  know  what  realm  of  existence  is  understood.  If  the 
world  of  Greek  mythology  is  referred  lo.  the  proposition  is 
true:  if  it  is  the  physical  Vvorld  that  is  meant,  it  is  false. 
At  times  some  of  these  realms  of  existence  are  graded 
according  to  their  importance.  Fritz  Medicus,"^  in  dealing 
with  mathematical  objects,  distinguishes  between  the  reahn 
of  concrete  objects,  the  realm  of  abstract  objects,  and  the 
realm  of  pure  extension.     To  say  that  an  entity  does  not 

'  Mediais:    Bcmcrkumjcn  cum  Problem  dcr  Exisieuz  mathcmatischer 
Gegenstande ;   Kantstiidien,    1914,   p.    i. 

14 


i 


, 


- 


exist  is  to  assert  that  it  exists  only  in  a  realm  lower  down  on 
the  scale  than  that  realm  about  which  we  are  talking.  If 
we  say  the  number  two  does  not  exist,  we  mean  that  it  does 
not  exist  in  the  realm  of  concrete  entities,  but  has  only  an 
abstract  existence.  If  we  say  four-dimensional  space  does 
not  exist,  we  mean  that  it  does  not  exist  in  the  realm  of  ab- 
stract entities,  but  belongs  only  in  the  realm  of  pure  exten- 
sion. At  other  times  the  various  realms  of  existence  are 
not  graded.  It  is  insisted  that  existence  is  always  relative 
to  .some  realm  of  entities,  to  some  "universe  of  discourse" 
or  "situation,"  but  there  is  no  attempt  to  compare  these 
various  "universes  of  discourse"  and  these  various  "situa- 
tions." 

There  is  for  F.  H.  Bradley  this  multiplicity  of  worlds. 
There  is  for  him  "my  present  actual  world,  and  the  am- 
biguous existence  of  what  has  been  and  is  about  to  be. 
There  are  the  worlds  of  duty  and  of  religious  truth,  which 
on  the  one  side  penetrate  and  on  the  other  side  transcend 
the  common  visible  facts.  .  .  .  Above  the  sensible  sphere 
rises  the  intellectual  province  of  truth  and  science,  and, 
more  or  less  apart  from  this,  the  whole  realm  of  the  higher 
imagination.  Both  in  poetry  and  in  general  fiction,  and 
throughout  the  entire  region  of  the  arts  and  of  artistic  per- 
ception, we  encounter  reality.  .  .  .  Because  there  are  many 
worlds,  the  idea  which  floats  suspended  above  one  of  them 
is  attached  to  another.  .  .  .  And  hence  when  an  idea  floats 
above,  or  is  even  repelled  by,  one  region  of  the  world,  there 
is  available  always  another  region  in  which  it  inheres  and 
to  which  as  an  adjective  it  is  attached."^  There  is,  in  short, 
always  some  world,  some  universe  of  discoiu'se,  in  which 
a  given  entity  is  real. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  there  is  something  attractive  in 
this  view.  It  enables  us  to  go  behind  any  question  as  to 
an  entity's  existence  by  making  a  distinction.  We  can  say : 
"In  one  realm  it  exists;  in  the  other  it  does  not  exist." 
And  this  usage  finds  some  support  in  everyday  langtiage. 
We  do  sav  of  a  lunatic  that  his  million  dollars  exist  in  his 
head.  But  in  our  ordinary  speech  we  also  recognize  an 
existence  that  is  absolute  existence.  If  we  ask  the  man  in 
the  street  whether  the  lunatic's  million  dollars  exist,  he  will 
answer  immediatelv  that  thev  do  not  exist.     He  will  not  ask 


8  i:* 


F.  H.  Bradley:    Essays  on  Truth  and  Reality,  pp.  31-32. 

15 


us  to  specify  which  reahn  of  existence  we  are  discussinP- 

■^  Co;r;:ahfo";  '^-t  ^^^"-  °*'  -^-:~s 

course  th^f  ic  ft.         •  always  one  universe  of  dis- 

course that  is  the  universe  of  real  obferfQ      q..        j      . 

wuh  Bradley.     There  is.  he  reco.;  IS^  a  s  en^  tti  ch 
e  tsTa™,:,'"'^^-  'fr'^  ^""  ^'^^''""-  ™^"e?s  and  d:;.'  i' 

extet  Tetruro„r:'  i:i;:.f  ;,e:.j^„^-^:  r  ^  t' 

worlds  of  unreal,  o^  only  part.anJC,  enm£    1^  ilt: 
h.m  a  reahn  of  reality  in  xvlnch  there  is  absolute  real  tv      A 
a  ..atter  of  fact,  we  only  obfuscate  the  c^   stionfto  a, 
uuuy  s  e.x.stence.  and  n.ake  a  solution  more  remote    when 
ve  talk-  about  various  realms  of  existence.     VVl  en  .'-e  a  k 
uhether  an  entUy  exists,  we  are  asking,  u hether  i    exSL    n 

ence  ni  thought  or  ui  pure  extension  ,loe.  not  concern  „■ 
And  It  ,s  to  be  noticed  that  when  we  insist     >    ,T 
account  various  reahns  of  existence,  tet^fa  To"  'e" 
meanmg  of  existence  is  no,  solved,  but  is  r'epla  e"  Uy      hos 
of  new  questions.     We  have  now  to  ask  what  k   neam  bv 

■n  the  r::t.Mn;r:r:!    .::;--,-- ,;^  -'-.e 

reahn  of  .ciencc      It  seem-  ,   T  ■   ^•^'■''^■"'-'-'  '"  t''^ 

concentr-.,/  't;^c^"'^  to  be  u'lse.st.  consequentlv,  to 

iiitans  to  exist  in  the  one  r<")lTii  f]-..,t   • 

,       .  ^  ^^'^^  uajin  that  ]>  most  iniuort'inr    in 

;;;':  "h":  ^^""'  ■"'  '"^'  ""■'^•^■'^  ^■•^'-  "■  -  ^'"  -  er 

e  es^vl  ■^'"^'  °^";.'"^'"'-'  ^"''  -^-  l'l^-<-'l.v  to  content  our- 
^ehes  u  th  si^ccous  d.stmctions  that  do  not  otter  a  solution 
but  merely  cover  up  the  difticultv.  --oiution 

I  shall  be  e.igaged  in  the  main,  therefore,  in  considering 
«  hat  .t  means  to  extst  absolutely,  to  exist  ,n  general     Whe,, 

ent  t  es  hat  ,s  not  a  co  lecfon  of  four  entities  does  not  exist 
and  th  s  ,s  what  1  have  said  the  as.sertion  that  two  and 
t  vo  are  four  cotnes  to-it  is  about  this  .sort  of  existence 
It  scents  to  me.  that  we  are  talk.ng.  We  are  .savm^ t"u  t' 
-ch  a  cotnb.nat.on  does  «.,  exist  absolutely,  .n'the  way 
"'  -'>^cn  the  world  of  Platonic  tdeas  or  the  Inminiferoul 

9     r  f     •    ■% 


^  Ibid,  p.  31. 

"F    H.  P>radley:    Appearance  and  Reality,  ch.  24. 

16 


,< 


ir% 


th 


ether  has  been  asserted  to  exist  absolutely.     It  is  possible, 
of  course,  to  say  that  what  is  asserted  of  such  a  combination 
is  non-existence  in  the  realm  of  mathematical  entities.     But 
it  seems  to  me  unnecessary  always  to  be  bringing  in  a  refer- 
ence to  some  particular  universe  of  discourse.     Existence 
in  an  a'bsolute  sense  can,  we  shall  see,  be  made  meaningful. 
And  when  this  has  been  done  we  can  determine  how  many 
realms  of  existence  are  to  be  recognized  and  what  each  of 
these  types  of  existence  is  to  mean.    After  all,  thev  are  all 
species  of  one  existence  that  is  absolute  existence.     And  if 
we  insist  on  always  being  mindful  of  these  various  species, 
we  complicate  our  subject  unnecessarily.      I   shall,   conse- 
quently, consider  all  assertions  of  existence  merely  as  asser- 
tions of  an  absolute  existence.    Existence  of  some  kind,  and, 
consequently,  absolute  existence,  is  implicitly  being  predi- 
cated in  nearly  all  judgments.     Notwithstanding  this  fact, 
existence  as  generally  used  is  quite  deficient  in  meaning.     It 
follows  that  this  state  of  affairs  must  be  remedied,  that  we 
must  learn  what  absolute  existence  is,  in  order  that  these 
judgments  may  be  meaningful. 

In  order,  too,  that  we  may  solve  those  questions  that  are 
explicitly    questions    of    existence,    we    must    know    what 
absolute  existence  is.     Let  me  suppose  that  as  I  walk  along 
a  road  I  see  something  lying  on  the  ground  ahead  of  me 
that  I  take  to  be  a  snake.    As  I  approach  nearer,  I  conclude 
that  I  was  mistaken  and  that  what  lies  on  the  ground  is 
really  a  piece  of  cord.     I  am  interested  in  determining  what 
really  is  there.     Is  it  a  snake  or  a  piece  of  cord?     When, 
now,  I  ask  myself  whether  or  not  a  snake  is  really  there  and 
whether  or  not  a  piece  of  cord  is  really  there,  I  am  dealing 
with  the  same  question.     I  am  dealing  with  the  same  alterna- 
tive:   snake  or  cord?     For  to  decide  in  favor  of  the  cord 
is  to  judge  that  the  snake  that  seems  to  be  there  is  unreal 
and  the  cord  that  seems  to  be  there  real.    Whenever  we  ask 
7vhat  is  real,  we  are  asking  whether  some  seeming  entity  is 
real.     And  whenever  we  ask  whether  an  entity  is  real,  we 
are  asking  what  is  real.    For  when  the  question  is  answered 
in  the  affirmative  the  content  of  reality  is  different  from 
what  it  is  when  the  question  is  answered  in  the  negative. 
To  ask  whether  an  entity  is  real  is  consequently  no  less  prac- 

17 


tical  and  no  more  artificial  than  to  ask  what  is  real.^'  To 
answer  either  we  need  to  know  w^hat  it  means  to  Ixi  real. 
We  cannot  tell  whether  an  entity  deserves  the  predicate 
"real"  unless  we  know  the  meaning  of  this  predicate.  And 
we  cannot  determine  the  content  of  reality  without  reality 
being  a  meaningful  term.  It  is  quite  necessary,  then,  that 
the  term  he  made  meaningful.  And  this  task  of  making 
explicit  itF  meaning — or  rather  its  meanings — is  the  one  to 
which  we  are  to  address  ourselves. 

*^  Dewey:    Essays  in  Expcrimenlul  Lo^ic,  p.  8,  note. 


i8 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Real  as  the  Permanent 

No  question  in  Occidental  philosophy,  so  far  as  we  know, 
is  older  than  this  question:  What  is  it  to  be  real?  It  was 
recognized  from  the  start  that  in  it  lies  the  beginning  of 
philosophical  wisdom.  For  when  the  Milesians  looked  out 
and  found  themselves  confronted  by  a  world  of  infinite 
variety  and  ceaseless  change,  they  asked  themselves  what  the 
meaning,  the  ''nature,"  of  all  this  is.  That  is  to  say,  they 
asked  what  is  fundamental  and  'Veal"  in  all  this  hetero- 
geneity. They  desired  to  separate  out  the  w^heat  from  the 
chaff,  to  find  out  what  truly  exists,  so  that  they  might  cling 
to  this  and  disregard  the  rest.  For,  as  long  as  we  occupy 
ourselves  with  illusory  objects  we  have  no  knowledge;  it 
is  only  when  we  limit  our  attention  to  objects  that  are  "real" 
that  we  can  build  up  knowledge  and  science.  This  funda- 
mental truth  was  recognized  in  the  early  stages  of  Greek 
philosophy ;  and  so  these  early  Greeks  set  about  finding  out 
wliich  one  or  more  of  the  objects  confronting  them  w^as 
"real." 

The  real  for  them  is  that  w^hich  is  permanent  and  abiding.  \ 
"As  Anaximandros  and  most  of  the  physicists  say,"  it  is 
that  which  "is  immortal  and  indestructible."^-  It  is  that  "of 
which  all  things  consist,  the  antecedent  from  w^hich  they 
have  sprung  and  into  which  they  are  finally  resolved. "^^ 
That  which  is  permanent  and  enduring  alone  is  real;  the 
rest  is  mere  unintelligible  becoming.  This  is  the  interpre- 
tation that  has  been  put  upon  these  Ionics  by  Aristotle  and 
most  subseqtient  philosophy.  There  have  been  some,^^  how- 
ever, who  have  asserted  that  what  these  Milesians  wanted 
to  know  when  they  inquired  into  the  "nature  of  things*' 
was  not  the  permanent  entity  underlying  all  the  changing 
ones,  but  was  the  origin  of,  and  process  implicit  in,  the 
changing  world  we  usually  have  before  us.     They  are  said 

'*  Aristotle  :    Phys.  iii,  4  ;    203b  7. 
"Aristotle:  Met.  i,  3;  983b  6. 

"  Woodbridge :     The    Dominant    Conception    of    the    Earliest    Greek 
Philosophy;    Philosophical  Review,  vol.  10  (1901),  p.  359- 

19 


" 


to  have  wanted  to  know  how  the  worlfl  works,  how  and 
whence  becoming  becomes.  Rut  they  are  more  usually  held 
to  have  been  eni^aged  in  in([uiring  into  the  nature  of  the 
permanent  fact  amid  so  much  chani^e.  in  attempting  to 
discover  the  underlying  reality  which — as  real — must  he 
permanent.  However  that  may  be,  when  we  come  to  Par- 
menides  we  meet  the  clear  and  unequivocal  assertion  that 
that  which  is  "real"  is  permanent  and  abiding.  His  muse 
tells  him:  "There  is  left  but  this  single  path  to  tell  thee  of: 
namely,  that  being  is.  And  on  this  path  there  are  many 
proofs  that  being  is  without  beginning  and  indestructible; 
it  is  universal,  existing  alone,  immovable  and  without  end; 
nor  ever  was  it,  nor  will  it  be,  since  it  now  is,  altogether, 
one  and  continuous. "^^  Other  entities  appear  and  then 
vanish;  that  which  is  real  persists  forever.  It  is  in  this 
sense  that  "reality"  is  used,  not  only  by  Parmcnides,  but 
by  almost  all  the  Pre-Socratic  philosophers.  From  Par-  ^ 
menides  to  Anaxagoras  the  real  is  that  which  persists 
unchanged,  unaffected  by  the  lapse  of  time.  There  is  dis- 
agreement as  to  the  number  of  such  permanent  entities  and 
the  qualities  that  they  possess,  but  there  is  no  one  to  deny 
that  whenever  such  permanent  entities  are  found  they  are 
to  be  called  "real."  W'e  have  here  in  the  concept  of  per- 
manence, consequently,  what  so  far  as  we  can  determine  is 
the  original  meaning  of  the  term  "reality."  All  other  mean- 
ings of  "real"  have  supervened  upon  it  and  are  probably  in 
some  way  derived  from  it.  ^ 

But  why  should  stich  unanimity  give  way  to  subsequent 
diversity?  Primarily  it  is  because  "permanence"  and  its 
antithesis  "change,"  like  most  concepts,  are  stibject  to  analy- 
sis, and  on  analysis  they  each  yield  new  meanings  which 
are  not  equivalent  to  one  another.  Some  particular  kind  of 
permanence  is  hit  upon,  and  reality  is  made  to  consist  of 
entities  that  have  as  an  attribute  this  sort  of  permanence; 
or  some  particular  kind  of  change  is  hit  upon,  and  unreality 
is  made  an  attribute  of  entities  that  exhil)it  this  sort  of 
change.  One  way  in  which  an  entity  can  change  is  by 
appearing  in  one  form  to  one  person  and  then  appearing  in 
a  changed  form  to  another.  And  so  entities  that  in  this 
way  change  their  appearance   from  person   to  person,   or 

''  Parmcnides :  On  Nature,  vv.  57-63. 

20 


I 


i 


change  tlie  way  in  which  they  appear  to  the  same  person 
from  time  to  time,  come  to  l)e  called  unreal.    They  are  not 
permanent;    they  vary  from  subject  to  subject  and  from 
tmie  to  tmie.     Consequently  they  are  unreal.     Quite  early 
does  relativity  thus  come  to  mean  unreality.     "By  use  there 
is  sweet."  says  Democritus,  "by  use  there  is  bitter:  by  use 
there  is^warm.  and  by  use  there  is  cold;  bv  use  there  is 
C(jlor.     But  m  sooth  there  are  atoms  and  the  void.'"*    Now 
when  permanence  has  come  to  mean  freedom  from  this  sort 
of  relativity  its  meaning  has  changed.     What  we  usually 
thmk  of  as  permanence  is  a  qualitv  in  the  object  itself  and 
has  no  relation  to  the  number  of  ways  in  which  the  object 
IS  perceived.    And  so  when  reality  is  limited  to  objects  with 
this  new  sort  of  permanence,  the  term  is  being  used  in  a 
new  sense. 

Or,  again,  permanence  is  made  to  consist  in  a  sort  of 
logical  permanence,  in  immutabilitv  of  attributes.    An  entitv 
cannot  be  permanent  if  it  has  a  quality  that  varies  according 
to  the  entity  with  which  it  is  compared.     A  tall  man,  to  be  • 
permanent  and  real,  must  always  be  tall;   he  cannot  be  tall 
as  compared  with  one  man  and  short  as  compared  with 
another.     -Slx."  to  be  real,  must  always  be  "more  by  a 
half;     ,t  cannot  be  "more  by  a  half"  as  compared  with 
tour  and    less  by  a  half  as  compared  with  twelve  '^    Such 
an  opinion  is  sometimes  attributed  to  Protagoras     He  and 
other  Sophists  are  sometimes  said  to  have  held  all  entities 
unreal  whose  qualities  are  in  this  sense  relative.    For  them 
that  IS  to  say,  there  were  included  among  unreal  entities 
those  with  this  .sort  of  relativity. 

Cleavage  along  another  line"  is  more  fundamental  Two 
very  different  senses  of  "real"  are  the  natural  result  of  two 
very  different  senses  of  permanence.  In  one  sense  an  entitv 
IS  permanent  that  persists  through  time,  that  exhibits  a  per- 
durance  that  knows  no  end.  But  using  the  word  in  another 
sense,  entities  have  been  called  permanent  that  are  entirely 
outside  the  realm  of  time.  Being  entities  to  which  time  is  ' 
not  applicable,  they  too  are  free  from  change  and  in  this 
sense  permanent.  During  the  greater  part  of  Greek  phi- 
losophy permanence  means  perdurance.  The  permanent 
and  real  entities  are  those  that  were  at  the  start  and  will 

"  Democritus,  fr.  125. 

"Plato:    Theaetatiis.  154,  157-160. 

21 


continue  forever.     But  the  "Bein^"  of  Parmenides  abides 
in   the   sense   that   it   is   out   of   time   entirely.      From   the 
"Timaeus"  also  we  can  derive  the  notion  of   a   Being-  to 
whom  time  is  not  applicable.     And  it  is  this  timeless  sort 
of  permanence  that,  partly  as  a  result  of  the  ''Timaeus." 
was  conceived  by  some  of  the  Schoolmen  to  be  an  attribute 
of  real  Being.     The  essence  of  reality,  however,  cannot  be 
both  perdurance  and  timelessness.     The  two  concepts  are 
at  war  with  one  another.     We  are  face  to  face  with  two 
contradictory  notions  of  what   it   is  to  be  permanent  and 
real.     "Real"  is  applied,  now  exclusively  to  those  entities 
that  perdure,  now  exclusively  to  those  that  are  timeless. 
When  it  is  used  to  point  to  perduring  entities  alone,  the 
timeless  ones  are  unreal,   for  they  manifestly  do  not  per- 
dure.    This  is  one  of  the  points  Plato  makes  against  the 
timeless  Being  of  Parmenides.     It  is  unreal  because  it  is 
not  in  time  as  an  entity  must  be  to  be  real.^^    When,  on  the 
other   hand,    ''real"    points   to   timeless    entities   alone,    the 
perduring  ones  are  unreal.     The  two  senses  quite  evidently 
are  mutually  exclusive. 

And  so  ''reality"  has  come  to  mean  very  different  things. 
Used  in  one  sense  it  is  equivalent  to  timelessness ;  used  in 
another  it  is  equivalent  to  perdurance  through  time.  Fur- 
thermore, the  meaning  of  permanence  is  often  modified  so 
that  what  we  have  in  mind  is  not  the  unchanging  character 
of  the  object  in  itself,  but  the  stability  and  permanence  of 
its  relations  to  the  sentient  organism  or  to  other  entities. 
As  we  have  seen,  at  times  entities  that  appear  differently 
from  subject  to  subject  are  called  unreal  and  at  times 
entities  with  qualities  that  vary,  entities  with  relative  quali- 
ties, are  unreal.  But  while  some  have  identified  reality 
with  permanence  when  its  meaning  is  modified  in  one  of 
these  two  ways,  others  have  identified  reality  with  perma- 
nence taken  in  its  normal  sense.  That  is,  they  have  meant 
by  a  perm.anent  entity  one  that,  regardless  of  the  changes 
in  its  relations,  is  itself  unaffected  by  the  lapse  of  time. 
And  using  "real"  in  this  sense,  the  relativity  of  sense-per- 
ceptions is  no  sign  of  unreality.  Everything  depends  upon 
the  sense  in  which  the  word  is  being  used. 

Let  us  suppose  that  by  permanence  we  mean  this  intrinsic 
permanence,  and  that  it' is  with  this  that  we  are  identifying 

'*  Plato:    Parmenides,  141,  152. 

22 


• 


reality.^    Which,  then,  are  the  entities  that  we  are  calling 
''real"?     It  is  possible  that  our  antithesis  between  the  per- 
manent and  the  impermanent  refers  to  a  distinction  among 
the  objects  of  our  perception.    Mountains,  rocks  and  tower- 
mg  trees  seem  to  last  indefinitely.     They  are  there  to  greet 
our  vision  whenever  w^e  turn  our  eyes  their  way.     But  frail 
flowers  and  beautiful  sunsets  must  be  enjoved  when  they 
are  given,   for  they  are  short-lived  and   soon  pass  awav. 
It  is  possible,  accordingly,  that  we  are  using  "real"  to  point 
to  the  mountains  and  "unreal"  to  point  to  the  sunsets.     But 
if  w^e  use  these  words  in  this  way,  we  are,  it  seems  to  me, 
diverging  quite    far   from   the   usage   of   common   speech! 
There  is  to-day,  so  far  as  I  can  judge,  no  tendency  in  com- 
mon si>eech  to  call  mountains  real  rather  than  sunsets,  and 
Gothic  cathedrals  real  rather  than  soap  bubbles.     It  is  not 
only,  however,  that  such  a  definition  of  reality  would  give 
the  term  an  unusual  meaning.     The  more  serious  objection 
is  that  such  a  definition  is  as  yet  by  no  means  precise.     For 
there   is   no   sharp   distinction   between  short-lived   entities 
and  long-lived  entities :    on  the  contrary,  there  is  a  gradual 
transition  from  the  lightning  flashes  and  soap  bubbles  to 
the   mountains   and   stars.      Consequently,   permanence   is,  f 
after  all,  relative:    and  to  say  merely  that  an  entity  to  be 
real  must  be  permanent  is  not  to  tell  us  just  how  long  an 
entity  must  last  to  be  real  and  just  how^  evanescent  it  must 
be  to  be  unreal.     It  is  a  definition,  in  short,  that  cannot  be 
applied  with  any  definiteness  and  precision. 

But  when  we  contrast  the  permanent  with  the  imperma- 
nent, we  may  not  be  pointing  to  the  qualities  that  are  given 
us  in  perception.     Instead  we  may  be  referring  to  a  "sub- 
stance" that  stands  behind  these  qualities.     This  substance 
may  be  conceived  to  be  permanent,  and,  since  permanence 
means  reality,  this  substance  may  be  conceived  to  be  real. 
With  a  view  of  this  kind  we  can  associate  the  name  of    ' 
Herbert  Spencer.     For  Spencer  objects  consist  of  qualities 
that    change    and    an    unsensed    substratum    that   endures,    v 
"The   most    conspicuous    contrast    presented    in    the   vivid 
aggregate  as  a  whole,  as  well  as  in  each  of  its  parts,"  he 
says,  "is  the  contrast  between  that  which  perpetually  changes 
and  that  which  does  not  change,  between  each  ever-varying 
cluster  of  vivid   states   and   their   unvarying   nexus.      This 
transcendent  distinction  needs  a  name.     I  must  use  some 

23 


mark  to  imply  this  duration  as  disting-uished  troni  this 
transitoriness — this  permanence  in  the  midst  of  that  which 
has  no  permanence.  And  the  word  existence,  as  apphed 
to  the  unknown  nexus,  has  no  other  meanini;-.  It  expresses 
nothing  beyond  this  primorchal  fact  in  my  experience."^ ^ 
It  is  to  be  questioned,  however,  whether  "existence"  does 
ofenerallv  refer  to  this  nexus.  No  dou])t  "existence"  can 
be  used  to  refer  to  substances  and  "non-existence"  to  refer 
to  qualities,  but  certainly  when  we  use  these  words  in  this 
sense  we  are  giving  them  an  unusual  meaning.  When  we 
say  that  an  entity  does  not  exist,  we  certainly  do  not  usually 
mean  that  this  entity  is  merely  a  quality  and  not  a  substance. 
Furthermore,  such  a  definition  does  not  enable  us  to  dis- 
tinguish between  such  substances  as  phlogiston  and  the 
gods  and  goddesses  of  mythology  on  the  one  hand,  and 
such  substances  as  trees  and  men  on  the  other.  We  can 
think  of  a  persisting  substratum  called  Diana  that  supports 
an  ever-changing  group  of  qualities.  Now  she  is  hunting 
with  bow  and  arrow,  now  she  is  driving  the  silver  chariot 
of  the  moon.  She  is  conceived  as  a  substance  just  as  this 
desk  is.  And  so  a  definition  of  this  kind  does  not  assist  us 
in  makme  a  distinction  between  the  two.  To  be  sure,  a 
similar  objection  can  be  made  to  any  definition  of  existence. 
No  definition  will  be  able  to  determine  the  content  of  exist- 
ence with  absolute  precision."^  But  this  definition  leaves 
the  content  undetermined  just  where  we  are  looking  for 
help.  What  we  want  is  a  definition  that  wdll  make  a  dis- 
tinction between  dififerent  kinds  of  substances,  one  that  will 
definitely  rule  out  such  entities  as  Diana  and  Zeus  and 
fairies  and  centaurs,  as  they  are  usually  conceived.  We 
want  to  be  told  what  kinds  of  substances  are  real ;  we  do 
not  want  to  be  told  simply  that  an  entity  to  exist  must  be  a 
substance  of  some  sort. 

One  of  the  most  important  of  all  the  senses  of  reality  has 
arisen,  most  probably,  directly  out  of  this  notion  of  i)er- 
manence  that  we  have  just  been  discussing.  To  be  real  an 
entity  must  persist.  But  to  persist  means  to  i)erdure  through 
all  time.  Consequently,  a  real  entity  must  persist  at  the 
times  when  I  am  not  thinking  of  it.  It  must,  that  is  to  say, 
be  independent  of  my  consciousness  of  it.     And  so  reality 

'"  Herbert  Spencer :     Principles  of  Psychology,  2d  ed-,  1877.  §467-     Cf. 

also  §  59- 

--' Infra,  cb.  5- 

24 


\ 


comes  to  mean  independence  of  consciousness  and  inde- 
pendence of  consciousness  comes  to  mean  reality.  This 
meaning  of  reality  is  already  peeping  out  of  a  passage  in 
Democritus.  "By  the  senses,"  he  says,  ''we  in  truth  know 
nothing  sure,  but  only  something  that  changes  according 
to  the  disposition  of  the  body  and  of  the  things  that  enter 
into  it  or  resist  it,"-^  If  we  could  get  at  something  that  con- 
tinues on  its  way  regardless  of  the  percipient,  w^e  should  be 
getting  at  reality.  But  we  cannot  arrive  at  such  real  enti- 
ties through  the  senses ;  through  them  we  can  only  arrive 
at  entities  that  depend  upon  the  body.  And  it  is  the  inde- 
pendent ones  alone  that  are  real.  This  linking  of  reality 
with  independence  has  persisted.  At  the  present  time  we 
often  find  reality  described  in  terms  of  independence.  For 
there  is  a  widespread  conviction  that  unreal  entities  do  not 
perdure  through  those  instants  at  which  they  are  not  objects 
of  thought,  while  real  entities  perdure  through  those  in- 
stants at  which  they  are  not  being  thought  of  as  well  as 
through  the  instants  at  which  they  are  objects  of  con- 
sciousness. 

Now,  when  a  real  entity  is  described  as  one  that  is  not 
dependent  on  my  thought  of  it,  or  on  any  thought  of  it, 
there  is  one  class  of  entities  that  is  definitely  being  called 
unreal.  These  are  the  ''ideas"  that  have  been  said  to  be 
the  objects  of  our  consciousness.  When  I  think,  I  think  an 
idea  that  may  or  may  not  have  an  entity  beyond  to  which  it 
means  to  correspond.  But  an  idea  of  this  kind  does  not 
persist  when  I  am  not  thinking  of  it:  or,  in  any  case,  it 
does  not  persist  when  no  consciousness  is  thinking  of  it.  It 
is  conceived  to  be  dependent  on  consciousness,  whether  on 
my  individual  consciousness  or  on  consciousness  in  general. 
If,  then,  to  exist  is  to  be  independent  of  consciousness,  these 
"ideas"  do  not  exist.  It  follows,  consequently,  that  one 
cannot  be  an  epistemological  dualist  proclaiming  the  exist- 
ence of  ideas  and  at  the  same  time  be  using  "existence"  to 
mean  independence. 

This  definition,  however,  while  it  determines  the  onto- 
logical  status  of  "ideas"  in  the  epistemological  sense,  is 
open  to  the  same  objection  as  that  which  we  made  against 
the  identification  of  existence  with  permanence.  After  all, 
it  is  in  order  to  distinguish  between  centaurs  and  fairies 


\ 


»\ 


Democritus :   fr.  9. 


25 


and  horses  and  men  that  we   feel  called  upon  to  use  the 
terms   "existence"   and   ''non-existence."      A   definition  of 
existence  m  terms  of  independence,  however,  does  not  help 
us  in  the  least  to  make  distinctions  of  this  kind.     Ivanhoe 
and  Walter  Scott  pretend  to  be  in  the  same  position  so  far 
as  independence  of  my  consciousness  is  concerned.     Diana 
and  all  the  other  deities  of  Greek  mythology  were  taken 
by  the  orthodox  to  be  independent.     They  were  ''immortal" 
and  were  conceived  to  be  entities  that  would  persist  when 
the  consciousness  of  mortal  man  is  no  more.     Phlogiston, 
again,  pretended  to  be  independent  of  consciousness.    It  was 
conceived  as  an  element  that  persists  through  those  instants 
at  which  no  one  is  thinking  of  it,  as  well  as  through  those 
instants  at  which  it  is  an  object  of  thought.     In  fact,  un- 
less we  have  been  very  much  affected  by  idealism,  all  entities 
come  to  us  pretending  to  be  independent.     And  if  the  thesis 
of  idealism  is  ever  before  our  minds,  they  all  alike  come 
seeming    to    be    dependent    on    consciousness, — the    island 
Madagascar  as  well  as  the  island  Atlantis.     A  definition  in 
terms  of  independence,  consequently,  does  not  separate  out 
the  entities  we  are  primarily  interested  in  excluding  from 
existence.     Indeed,  some  of  those  who  most  loudly  insist 
on  the  independence  of  real  entities  recognize  that  a  defini- 
tion  in   terms   of   independence   would   be   unsatisfactory. 
Perry,  for  example,  in  order  to  support  the  view  that  real 
entities  are  independent  of  consciousness,  deals  at  length 
with  the  notion  of  independence.     And  yet  in  developing  a 
theory  of  independence  he  disclaims  any  intention  to  define 
reality  in  terms  of  independence.^- 

The  meanings  of  "real"  we  have  thus  far  been  led  to 
consider  have  all  been  due  to  ambiguities  in  the  notion 
of  permanence.  There  have  been  various  meanings  attached 
to  the  word  "real"  as  there  have  been  various  senses  in 
which  permanence  has  been  understood.  But  the  senses  of 
the  word  that  we  are  now  to  consider  are  connected  in  a 
different  fashion  with  the  concept  of  permanence.  The 
different  senses  to  which  we  are  now  to  attend  are  due, 
not  to  ambiguities  in  the  term  itself,  but  to  differences 
of  opinion  as  to  w^hat  is  concomitant  with  permanence. 
Permanence  is  held  to  be  co-extensive  now  with  one  quality, 
now  with  another.     And,   since  permanence   is  equivalent 

"The  New  Realism,  p.  117. 

26 


\ 


a 


to  reality,  reality  will,  of  course,  be  held  to  be  co-extensive 
now  with  one  quality  and  now  wath  another.  But  if  it  is 
co-extensive  with  these  qualities,  it  may  be  defined  in  terms 
of  these  qualities.  And  so  the  notion  of  permanence  drops 
out  of  sight  and  reality  is  held  to  be  equivalent,  directly, 
to  these  qualities  newdy  come  upon  the  stage. 

It  is  in  this  way,  I  think,  that  we  must  explain  the  genesis 
of  the  notion  that  entities  known  by  "reason"  are  alone  real. 
These  entities  were  probably  called  "real"  in  the  first  in- 
stance, not  because  they  were  known  by  reason,  but  because 
they  were  permanent.  And  probably  before  "unreal"  came 
to  mean  "known  through  sense  perception,"  objects  per- 
ceived by  the  senses  were  called  unreal  because  they  were 
subject  to  change.  The  entities  that  change  continually, 
among  which  nothing  abides,  were  identified  with  the  en- 
tities of  which  we  become  conscious  through  sense  percep- 
tion; and  those  that  remain  unchanged  were  identified  with 
those  that  we  know  through  reason.  And  so  the  real  came 
to  mean  the  intelligible  and  the  unreal  the  sensible.  As  we 
have  found  Democritus  saying,  "By  the  senses  we  in  truth 
know  nothing  sure,  but  only  something  that  changes  accord- 
ing to  the  disposition  of  the  body  and  of  the  things  that 
enter  into  it  or  resist  it."^"^  Intelligible  entities,  it  is  implied, 
do  not  vary  with  the  subject;  they  remain  unaltered  and 
persisting,  and  consequently  they  alone  are  real.  The  Pla- 
tonic dialogues  are  the  great  source  of  inspiration  for  this 
identification  of  the  real  with  the  intelligible.  There  we 
find  in  abundance  passages  in  which  the  objects  of  the 
intellect,  the  Ideas,  are  eulogized  and  called  "real."  and 
in  which  the  objects  of  the  senses  are  called  "unreal. "^^  A 
realism  or  rationalism  of  this  kind  comes  to  the  Middle 
Ages  with  Saint  Augustine.  The  author  of  the  "City  of 
God"  show^s  the  same  partiality  for  these  intelligible  entities. 
The  mind,  says  he,  "is  disabled  by  besotting  and  inveterate 
vices  not  merely  from  delighting  and  abiding  in.  but  even 
from  tolerating  His  unchangeable  light,  until  it  has  been 
gradually  healed,  and  renewed,  and  made  capable  of  such 
felicity."-^    Did  we,  how^ever,  have  a  mind  that  was  entirely 


M 


Democritus  :  f  r.  9. 
'^Cf.  esp.— Phaedo :  65,  74;  Republic:  525. 
St.  Augustine— City  of  God;  Bk.  11,  Sec.  2. 


27 


» 


purified,  then  we  should  have  a  mind  capable  of  contem- 
plating the  immutable  spiritual  things  that  are  stipremely 
real  and  abidmg.     'Jliere  are.  in  fact,  two  ways  in  which 
materia]  things  may  be  known.     They  "are  known  in  one 
way  by  the  angels  in  the  Word  of  (^orl,  in  which  are  seen 
the  eternally  abiding  causes  and  reasons  according  to  which 
these  things  were  made,  and  in  another  way  in  which  these 
things  are  seen  as  they  are  in  themselves/    In  the   former 
way,  they  are  known  with  a  clearer  knowledge ;  in  the  latter 
they  are  known   with   a  dimmer  knowledge,   a   knowledge 
rather   of    the    bare    works    than    of    the   design. ''2«      xt    is 
knov/ledge  of  the  spirit  that,  implicitly,  is  true  knowledge, 
knowledge  of  the  spirit  that  alone  contemplates  true  reality' 
Scattered  through  the  Middle  Ages  we  find  marks  of  this 
Platonic  doctrine.     That  "in  which   there   is  any  mutable 
element,"  says  Saint  Anselm,^'   '*is  not  altogether  what  it 
IS.   .   .   .     And  what  has  a  past  existence  which  is  no  longer, 
or   a    future   existence   which    is    not    yet,— this   does    not 
properly  and  absolutely  exist."    It  is  God  who  truly  is,  God 
who  is  pure  spirit  and  immutable.     Similarlv  in  the  seven- 
teenth century   we   find   the   distinction   made   between  the 
spiritual  things  that  are  truly  real,  and  the  sensible  things 
that  stand  on  a  lower  plane.     We  find  the  distinction  made 
by  Descartes,  especially  in  the  small  "Search  after  Truth" ; 
we  find  it  made  by  Malebranche  and  the  more  pious  Car- 
tesians, by  Spinoza  and  by  Leibniz. 

Thus,   the  word   "real"   is  used   to  point   to   intelligible 
entities.     The  only  real  entities  are  those  that  are  known 
by^  reason.      Sensation    and    imagination    are    not    distin- 
guished;   the  entities   that  are  known   by   either   of   these 
faculties  are  unreal.     The  same  seventeenth  century  phi- 
losophers  who  used  the  word  "real"  in  this  sense  frequently 
employed  the  phrase:   "clear  and   distinct   ideas."     To  be 
sure,  when  this  phrase  was  upon  their  lips,   they  usually 
were  talking  about  judgments.     But  often  we  may  regard 
the   object   held   in   view   to   be   an   entity   that   is   intuited 
rather  than  a  judgment  that  is  asserted.     And  when  this 
IS  the  case,  it  is  the  entities  that  are  ''clear  and  distinct" 
that  are  real  and  those  that  are  obscure  or  confused  that 


n 


Ibid:  Bk.  ii,  Sec.  29. 

St.  Anselm:  Proslogium,  ch.  22. 

28 


k  m€ 


are  unreal.  This,  however,  is  not  a  different  use  of  the 
word  "real"  from  that  which  makes  "real"  and  "intelligible" 
synonymous.  For  the  entities  that  are  referred  to  as  "clear 
and  distinct"  are  generally  precisely  those  that  a/e  in- 
telligible. Mathematical  concepts,  God,  and  moral  ideals 
are  intelligible  entities  and  they  are  at  the  same  time  objects 
that  are  "clear  and  distinct."  They  are  not  clear  and  dis- 
tinct in  the  sense  that  we  can  form  images  of  them  that 
have  sharp  outlines,  for  these  are  entities  of  which  we  can 
form  no  images  at  all ;  but  they  are  clear  and  distinct  in  the 
sense  that  they  can  be  thought  through  without  contradic- 
tion. "Intelligible,"  "clear  and  distinct,"  "self-consistent," 
and  "real" — all  mean  one  and  the  same  thing.  The  very 
fact  that  so  many  terms  were  used  to  point  to  the  same 
class  of  entities  shows  how  important  these  entities  were 
held  to  be.  Tliey  were  the  real  entities;  all  others  were 
unreal  and  at  the  same  time  unimportant. 

On  the  other  hand  there  is  a  tendency  to  identify  the  real 
and  permanent  with  the  stable  and  reliable.     And  entities 
that  are  present  to  the  senses  are  then  identified  with  those 
that  are  stable.     Other  entities  than  these   sense-data  are 
mere  fancies,  cobwebs  of  the  brain  that  can  be  swept  aside. 
But  these  things  that  are  seen  and  felt  are  not  ephemeral. 
They  cannot  be  wished  away;  they  are  enduring.     And  so 
the  term  "real"  comes  to  mean  these  sense-data.     This,  at 
least,  seems  to  be  the  easiest  way  in  which  to  explain  the 
genesis  of  the  view  that  sense-data  alone  are  real.     Whether 
this  view  arises  in  this  way  or  not,  however,  we  find  this 
sense    of    the    term     coming    into    use    rather    early.      In 
Epicureanism  "real"  is  used  to  mean  sense-data  quite  evi- 
dently.    To  be  real  means  to  be  present  to  the  senses.     It  is 
a  sense  of  "real",  moreover,  that  has  remained.     In  modern 
philosophy  nothing  is  more  common  than  the  use  of  the 
term  in  this  sense.     From  Bacon  and  Hobbes  to  James  and 
Bergson  there  has  been  a  line  of  philosophers  to  whom  this 
has  been   the  meaning  of   "real."      And   in   the  course   of 
the  extensive  history  of  this  sense  of  reality,  new  meanings 
of  the  term  have  l)een  introduced.     Just  as  in  the  first  place 
different  kinds  of  permanence  were  discovered  and  reality 
identified  with  each  kind  separately,  so  here  there  are  found 
to  be  various  ways  in  which  an  entity  can  be  present  to  the 

29 


senses  and  realil)-  is  tlien  identified  with  each  kind  of 
sense-data  in  tnrn.  But  the  consideration  of  these  develop- 
ments we  shall  reserve  for  another  chapter.     (Chap.  III.) 

Development  alont^  another  line  leads  to  a  rather  para- 
doxical conclusion.     We  meet  no  success  in  looking  for  that 
which  is  permanent.    We  decide  tliat  all  objects  change,  even 
those  most  nearly  stable.     But  in  the  depths  of  our  despair 
we    light    upon    (^ne    thing    that    remains    forever,    namely, 
change  itself.     For  if  all  objects  are  continually  changing, 
then  change  itself  never  ceases.     Of  course  the  reference 
cannot  l>e  to  any  specific  case  of  becoming.      It  would  be 
absurd  to  hold  that  a  given  example  of  change  is  an  example 
of  permanence,  that  of  the  entity  under  consideration  the 
part  that  changes  remains.      It  is  not   the  changing  entity 
that  is  permanent,  but  the  fact  of  change.     What  remains 
unaltered  is  the  laze  that  all  entities  change.     We  find  our 
permanence,    consequently,    not    in    phenomena    themselves, 
but  in  the  laws  to  which  phenomena  are  sul)ject.     And  so 
we  come  to  identify  permanence  and  realilv  with  law  and 
with  subjection  to  law.     In  Hermann  Lotze  the  meaning  of  - 
the  term  "real"  undergoes  (piite  explicitly  a  development  of 
this  sort.     In  summarizing  one  of  his  discussions,  he  says: 
*'\\'e  gave  up  seeking  the  permanent  element  of  things  in 
a  state  of  facts  always  identical  with  itself,  and  credited  our- 
selves with  finding  it  in  the  very  heart  of  change,  as  the 
uniform  import  of  a  law  which  connects  a  multiplicity  of 
states  into  one  rounded  whole."-''    In  this  way  "real"  comes 
to  mean  the  law  to  which  changing  phenomena  are  subject, 
the  system  to  which  changing  phenomena  belong.     It  comes 
to  mean  the  system  of  interrelated  entities  and  the  inter- 
related entities  that  belong  to  this  system.     But  if  the  mean- 
ing of  "real"  is  to  be  precise  and  definite,  we  must  elaborate 
this  idea  and  make  further  distinctions.     However,  this  too 
will  be  left  for  another  chapter.     (Chap.  IV.) 

There  can  in  this  general  way  be  found  a  common  origin 
for  most  of  the  meanings  the  term  "real"  has  been  given. 
But  from  this  common  origin  there  develops  the  greatest 
diversity.  Senses  of  "reality"  come  into  use  that  are  utterly 
opposed  to  one  another.  All  of  the  entities  that  are  "real" 
if  the  term  is  used  in  one  sense  are  "unreal"  when  the  term 


P-78. 


Lotzc:     Metaphysic,  Bk.   i,  ch.  4,  §  38.     Trans,  by  Bosanquet.  1884, 


30 


is  used  with  another  meaning.  We  come  to  the  pass  where 
we  cannot  in  the  least  tell  whether  an  entity  is  real  or  not 
unless  we  know  in  which  of  these  many  senses  "real"  is  being 
used.  Now^  of  these  many  conflicting  senses,  which  is  to 
be  chosen?  The  sense  in  which  reality  is  identified  wdth 
permanence  has  a  certain  claim  due  to  its  priority.  But  we 
have  found  permanence  to  be  an  ambiguous  concept;  and 
we  have  found  that  a  definition  of  reality  in  terms  of  per- 
manence does  not  assist  us  in  making  the  distinctions  we  are 
interested  in  making.  Furthermore,  mere  priority  certainly 
establishes  no  convincing  claim.  W^e  cannot  say,  because 
"real"  was  said  to  mean  the  permanent  before  it  was  said 
to  mean  that  which  is  present  to  the  senses,  that  "real"  is 
not  to  be  given  this  latter  meaning.  All  senses  of  the  term, 
both  original  and  derivative,  stand  on  a  par  as  possible 
senses  in  which  the  term  may  be  used.  And  when  we  choose 
to  use  the  term  in  one  of  these  senses  rather  than  in  another, 
it  is  by  an  arbitrary  choice  that  we  decide  that  the  term  is 
to  have  for  us  this  one  meaning  rather  than  some  other. 

It  is  rare,  however,  to  find  a  writer  who  realizes  that  there 
is  something  arbitrary  in  giving  the  term  "real"  the  meaning 
he  chooses  to  give  it.  For  the  most  part,  a  writer  will  use 
the  term  in  one  of  its  senses  without  noticing  the  fact  that  it 
has  often  been  used  in  very  different  senses.  "Real,"  as 
we  have  seen,  has  often  been  used  to  mean  that  which  is 
"intelligible,"  that  which  is  given  to  the  intellect  alone.  And 
this  use  of  "real"  has  often  been  accompanied  by  the  employ- 
ment of  many  pious  and  edifying  expressions.  A  noble  life 
is  identified  with  one  conversant  about  the  intelligible 
entities,  an  ignoble  life  with  one  whose  attention  is  limited 
to  sensible  entities.  Statements  of  this  kind  are  so  fre- 
quently associated  with,  and  apparently  based  upon,  state- 
ments that  intelligible  entities  alone  are  real,  that  one  would 
think  these  edifying  sentiments  could  flow  out  of  such  a 
meaning  of  the  term  "real."  And  yet  the  identification  of 
the  "real"  with  the  "intelligible"  is  merely  a  matter  of 
definition.  These  intelligible  entities,  that  by  definition  are 
given  the  predicate  "real"  also,  may  of  course  be  held  to 
be  important  and  praiseworthy  on  other  grounds.  But  to 
the  extent  to  which  they  have  been  held  important  because 
they  have  the  predicate  "real,"  we  have  a  right  to  enter  an 

31 


objection.  For.  as  we  have  seen,  it  i.>  only  by  an  arbitrary 
definition  that  the  intenio:ible  entities  are  called  'Veal." 
While  those  whom  1  may  c\ill  F^atonists  are  applying  the 
term  to  these  entities  and  are  withholding  it  from  the  objects 
of  the  senses,  other.>  whom  we  shall  consider  in  the  next 
chapter  are  applyini,-  it  to  the  sensible  entities,  and  are  not 
applying  it — some  of  them,  at  least,  are  not — to  any  of  the 
intelligible  entities.  Since  now  one  has  no  more  right  to 
the  term  than  the  other,  an  author  is  free  to  elect  that  the 
term  shall  carry  for  him  one  meaning  or  that  it  shall  carry 
for  him  the  other  meaning.  One  exercises  choice  in  giving 
the  word  one  meaning  or  another;  and  in  this  sense  there 
is  something  arbitrary  about  the  way  in  which  "real,"  as 
the  result  of  such  a  choice,  is  implicitly  or  explicitly  defined. 
There  are  certain  methods  of  approach  that  are  especially 
likely  to  make  one  lose  sight  of  this  element  of  choice.  This 
is  particularly  the  case  when  an  author  fixes  his  attention  on 
the  concept  tliat  "real"  symbolizes  for  him  and  disregards 
the  word  itself  that  does  the  symbolizing.  These  concepts 
or  notions  or  ideas,  we  may  admit  to  Ix-  fixed  and  objective 
— in  the  n^fi(re  of  things.  Reality  in  the  sense  of  mtelli- 
gibility  may  l)e  as  objective  as  you  please,  and  so  may  reality 
in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  synonymous  with  sensibility.  But 
it  is  arbitrary  to  make  the  icrni  "reality"  refer  to  one  of  these 
objective  concepts  rather  than  to  the  other.  Accordingly, 
the  meaning  of  the  tenn  is  not  objectively  given.  The  term 
has  been  used  to  refer  to  any  number  of  different  concepts. 
And  so  when  we  make  use  of  it,  it  will  not  be  clear  which 
of  these  man\-  concepts  is  meant  unless  we  make  it  clear. 
It  behooves  us,  therefore,  in  employing  the  term  "real,"  to 
state  the  meaning  the  term  has  for  us.  We  must  lay  down 
a  definition  of  reality,  a  statement  of  what  it  means  to  us  to 
be  real.  It  will  not  be  sufficient  to  say  of  "reality"  or  ''exist- 
ence" as  Descartes--'  does,  and  as  Kanf'^"  and  others  do  after 
him,  that  it  is  simple  and  clear.  Nor  will  it  be  sufficient 
to  let  the  matter  go  with  a  vague  stateinent  such  as  Wolff's  : 
"Existence  is  the  completing  of  possibility,"'"*^  a  statement 

-"•*  Descartes  ;  Reply  to  the  Sixth  Set  of  C^bjections.  Oeuvres,  cd.  by 
Adam  and  Tannery,  vol.  9.  p.  225:  Principles  of  Philosophy.  Part  i, 
Prin.  10. 

■"'Kant:     Der  einci^  mogliche  Beweisyrund  zu  eincr  Demonstrahun 
des  Daseins  Gottcs.     ll'crke,  ed.  by  Hartenstein,  vol.  2.  p.  115. 
''Wolff:     Ontulogia.  §   174. 

32 


that  does  not  tell  us  at  all  which  of  the  many  possible  senses 
of  the  word  is  being  used.  We  need  a  definition,  either  an 
explicit  definition  or  one  implicit  in  the  context,  that  will 
show  us  which  sense  of  the  word  is  intended.  Without  such 
a  definition  we  cannot  judge  of  the  truth  of  those  proposi- 
tions of  the  author's  in  which  the  term  ''real"  appears.  With 
such  a  definition,  on  the  other  hand,  not  only  do  such 
propositions  become  meaningful,  but  we  have  a  criterion 
that  enables  us  to  tell  which  entities  are  "real"  in  the  sense 
of  the  word  that  is  chosen  and  which  are  unreal. 


33 


CHAFI^ER  III. 

The  Real  as  the  Sensible. 
"Real"  and  "existing"  are  terms  that  we  are  using'  all  the 
time  to  mark  off  that  which  is  substantial  and  in  a  certain 
sense  important  from  that  which  is  a  mere  phantasm,  that 
which  is  a  mere  subsistent  or  mere  idea.  We  use  these 
terms  with  perfect  freedom,  as  if  there  were  a  iKtitctly 
clear  and  well  recognized  distinction  between  the  real  and 
the  unreal.  But.  as  a  matter  of  fact,  there  is.  as  we  have 
seen,  by  no  means  such  unanimity  of  opinion  as  to  what 
objects  shall  be  called  "real"  and  what  "unreal."  One 
philosopher  assumes  that  one  set  of  objects  are  primarily 
deserving  of  the  predicate  "real."  another  that  the  term 
"real"  points  to  quite  another  set  of  objects.  In  the  present 
chapter  we  shall  deal  with  the  opinion  that  assumes  that  the 
term  "real"  denotes  primarily  the  objects  present  to  the 
senses.  This  is  but  one  out  of  many  meanings  the  term  in 
question  has  been  given ;  some  have  used  ''real"  to  mean 
ideas  that  are  clear  and  distinct,  others  to  mean  that  which 
IS  in  time  and  space,  others  to  mean  that  which  has  power 
or  force,  others  to  mean  that  which  we  ha\e  on  divine 
authority. 

But  the  view  of  "reality"  that  we  .>hall  deal  with  in  diis 
chapter  applies  the  term  to  those  entities  which  it  is  per- 
haps most  frequently  used  to  denote.  And  since  it  is  in  this 
sense  that  the  term  is  used  most  commonly,  when  we  use  it 
so.  we  are  more  than  usually  likely  to  forget  that  in  other 
contexts  the  term  has  other  meanings.  "Real"  is  said 
primarily  to  denote  sense-data  without  anv  reason  being 
stated  by  the  author  why  this  rather  than  some  other  mean- 
ing is  given  the  word,  without  the  author  giving  any  evi- 
dence to  show  that  he  is  even  conscious  the  word  is  some- 
times used  in  a  different  sense.  And  (juite  frequently  "real" 
IS  used  to  mean  sense-data  without  any  explicit  statement 
in  which  the  term  is  definitely  given  this  meaning. 

We  shall  deal  in  this  chapter  with  those  who  apply  the 
term  "real"  primarily  to  sense-data.  Things  that  we  hear 
and  taste  and  feel  and  see  are  real,  it  is  assumed.     A  table. 


34 


if  it  is  something  we  see  before  us,  something  present  to  the 
senses,  is  real.     The  reality  of  God,  or  of  an  historical 
event  alleged  to  have  taken  place  centuries  ago,  is  open  to 
dispute.     But  this  table  before  me  I  see ;   it  is  a  sense-datum, 
and  that  is  sufficient  to  establish  its  reality  on  incontestable 
grounds.     Such  a  doctrine  as  to  the  meaning  of  "real"  is 
usually    accompanied    by    another    opinion    from    which    it 
cannot  be  easily  distinguished.     I  refer  to  the  opinion  that 
we    are   first   aware   of   sense-data   and    that   investigation 
should  start  out  with  these  simple  data  and  gradually  lead 
up  to  conceptional  generalizations.     One  is  an  opinion  on 
the  nature  of  the  real,  the  other  an  opinion  on  the  order  in 
which    the    various   kinds   of   objects   of    thought    do   and 
should  come  before  the  mind ;    one  answers  a  question  in 
ontology,  the  other  a  question  in  psychologv  and  what  may 
be  called  methodology.      And  yet  since  one  opinion  often 
leads  one  unwittingly  to  accept  the  other,   and  since  the 
opinions   with    which    we  are   dealing  are   not   always   ex- 
plicitly stated,   but  must  be  extricated   from  statements  in 
which  some  indefinite  sort  of  priority  is  attributed  to  sense- 
data,  it  is  difficult  to  distinguish  between  these  two  ideas. 

in  the  Epicurean  philosophy,  as  we  find  it  summarized 
by    Diogenes   Laertius,   these   two   principles   are   both   en- 
dorsed.    We  read :    "Again,  the  reason  cannot  pronounce 
on  the  senses ;    for  we  have  already  seen  that  all  reasoning 
has  the  senses  for  its  foundation."^-     Here  we  have  stated 
the  psychological  priority   of   perceptual   objects,   and  the 
ontological  priority  of  these  objects  based  upon  that  fact. 
In  the  next  sentence  the  "real"  is  identified  with  sense-data 
in  as  explicit  a  manner  as  we  can  expect  to  find.     "Reality 
and  the  evidence  of  sensation  establish  the  certainty  of  the 
senses;    for  the  impressions  of  the  sight  and  hearing  are 
just  as  real,  just  as  evident,  as  pain."    The  reality  of  sense- 
data,  that  is  to  say,  is  assumed.    Sense-data  are  real  because 
they  just  are.     This  may  seem  puerile,  but  it  is  not;   there 
can  be  no  better  reason  given.     For  "real"  is  one  term  and 
"sense-data"   another.     And  to  use  them  together  in  this 
manner  can  only  mean  that  they  are  being  used  to  point  to 
the  same  objects.     The  term  "real"   is  being  used  in  the 
sense  in  which  it  means  sense-data.     "Real"  is  being  de- 

"Diogenes    Laertius:      Lives   of    the    Philosophers.     Translation    by 
Yonge,  p.  4^5. 

35 


.1 


fined  to  mean  sense-clata  :    that   is  the  onJv   and   sttfficicnt 
reason  why  sense-data  arc  real. 

For  how  can  the  psychological  prioiitv  of  perceptual 
objects  show  their  reality?  Assuming  that  I  am  first  aware 
of  percepts  and  later  of  concepts,  whv  should  I  apply  the 
term  ''real"  to  these  entities  that  first  become  objects  of  my 
consciousness?  Others  who  do  not  denv  the  psychological 
priority  of  percepts  call  the  concepts  "real."  It  can  only  be 
that  ]  am  using  the  term  "real"  in  a  different  sense  from 
that  in  which  they  are  using  it.  1  am  using  it  to  denote 
those  objects  that  are  psychologically  prior,  or,  more  con- 
cretely, sense-data.  Or.  rather,  Epicurus  is  using  it  so, 
since,  if  we  can  rely  on  Diogenes  Laertius,  he  asserts  both 
the  psychological  and  the  ontological  priority  of  sense- 
data. 

But  as  we  come  to  close  quarters   with  this  notion  of 
sense-data  we  notice  two  sets  of  entities  to  which  it  may 
apply.     We  may  be  naming  *'sense-data"  those  objects  that 
excite  the  sense  organs  and  cause  the  observer  to  be  con- 
scious of  sights  or  sounds.     Or  we  may  be  referring  to  the 
peculiarly  vivid  objects  of  consciousness  that  we  assume  to 
be  due  to  such  excitation  of  the  sense  organs.     I  am  not 
concerned    in    differentiating    the    cause    of    consciousness 
from   the  object   of  consciousness   in   the  case  of   veridical 
perception.     For  my  present  purpose  it  is  a  matter  of  indif- 
ference whether,  when  we  perceive  correctly,  the  object  of 
consciousness  and  the  cause  of  consciousness  be  taken  as 
one  or  as  two.     But  since  there  are  times  when  we  err  in 
our  perceptions,  since  our  senses  deceive  us,  which  group 
of  entities  do  we  mean  by  *'sense-data"  ?     Do  we  mean  all 
entities  that  excite  the  sense  organs  and  result  in  conscious- 
ness, whether  the  resulting  experience  be  valid  or  illusory? 
Or  do  we  mean  vivid  objects  of  consciousness  presumably 
due  to  stimulation  of  the  sense-organs,  whether  or  not  they 
correspond    to— or,   if   you   will   have   it   so,   are   identical 
with — the  causes  of  this  consciousness?     In  the  system  of 
Epicurus  this  distinction  between  the  causes  of  conscious- 
ness   and    the    objects    of    consciousness    is    not    made. 
And    the    distinction    does    not    have    to    l>e    made,    since 
Epicurus    does     not    admit     the    possibility    of    error     in 
sense-perception.       That    is,    there    is    for    him  no    vivid 
object  of  consciousness  that  is  not  identical  in  content  with 


the  cause  of  that  consciousness.     There  is  nothing  that  we 
see  that  has  not  acted  upon  us.     ^The  visions  of  insanity 
and  of  sleep  have  a  real  object,"   writes  Laertius,^^   -for 
they  act  upon  us ;    and  that  which  has  no  reality  can  pro- 
duce no  action."     Since,  then,  the  causes  of  consciousness 
are  identical  in  content  with  the  objects  of  consciousness   it 
makes  no  difference  under  which  name  we  assert  the  reality 
Of  this  group  ot  entities.     But  to  us  who  do  recognize  the 
possibility  ot  error  in  sense-perceptions,  and  for  whom    in 
consequence,  the  distinction  between  the  causes  of  conscious- 
ness and  the  objects  of  consciousness  does  have  meaning 
It  is  the  latter  group,   the  objects  of  consciousness,   that 
hpicurus  seems  to  have  called  "real."     The  vivid  sun  that 
seems  to  be  two  hundred  feet  away  Epicurus  said  was  a 
real  sun;    to  the  visions  of  insanity  and  of  sleep  he  at- 
tributed, too,  a  real  object.    What  we  should  call  the  objects 
of  perception  but  not  the  causes  of  perception  he  called 
"real."     But  for  Epicurus  these  objects  of  perception  were 
identical  in  content  with  the  causes  of  perception.     Epicurus 
meant  by  "real"  what  he  meant  by  ''cause  of  perception"  or 
by  ''object  of  perception,"  but  he  meant  by  "real"  what  we 
mean  by  "object  of  perception"  and  not  vvhat  we  mean  by 
"cause  of   perception."     But  in   making  these   distinctions 
between  Epicurus's  point  of  view  and  our  own  and  between 
causes  of  perception  and  objects  of  perception,  let  us  not 
forget  the  larger  statement  on  which  these  distinctions  are 
refinements.      In  any  case,   when  Epicurus  used  the  term 
"real"  he  referred  to  what  we  may  indefinitely  call  "sense- 
data."     "Real"   is   used   in   the   sense  which   is  of  present 
interest  to  us;    it  is  used  in  the  sense  in  which  it  points 
primarily  to  the  entities  present  to  the  senses  and  not  to 
concepts  of  reason  or  to  the  mystical  "One"  that  is  All,  or 
vvhat  not. 

In  modern  times  the  empiricism  that  has  now  become  so 
widespread  found  its  first  important  exponent  in  Francis 
Bacon.  Bacon  was  more  interested  in  the  methodological 
principle  that  investigations  should  start  with  sense-percep- 
tions and  gradually  advance  to  broad  generalizations  than 
he  was  in  applying  the  term  "real"  to  sense-data.  He  was 
convinced  that  all  opinions  have  their  basis  in  sense-per- 
ceptions.    "Man,"  says  the  first  aphorism  of  the  Novum 

""  Ibid,  p.  435. 

2>7 


Organuni.  "as  the  minister  and  interpreter  of  nature,  does 
and  tmderstands  as  much  as  his  observations  on  the 
order  of  nature,  either  with  regard  to  things  or  the  mind, 
permit  him,  and  neither  knows  nor  is  capable  of  more." 
All  of  us,  then,  get  our  opinions  from  our  sense-data. 
Some,  however,  build  big  and  inspiring,  though  hasty  and 
unstable,  structures  on  this  foundation,  while  others  ad- 
vance cautiously  and  leave  reluctantly  the  secure  ground 
from  which  they  start.  ''There  are  and  can  exist  but  two 
ways  of  investigating  and  discovering  truth,"  says  Bacon, 
and  both  start  with  sense-perceptions.  Even  he  who  is  most 
enamored  of  the  flights  of  reason  must  start  with  the  senses. 
But  ''the  one  hurries  on  rapidly  from  the  senses  and  par- 
ticulars to  the  most  general  axioms,  and  from  them  as 
principles  and  their  supposed  indisputable  truth  derives  and 
discovers  the  intermediate  axioms,"  while  "the  other  con- 
structs its  axioms  from  the  senses  and  partictdars,  by 
ascending  continually  and  gradually,  till  it  finally  arrives  at 
the  most  general  axioms."  The  former,  Bacon  says,  is  the 
method  his  contemporaries  use.  while  the  latter  is  **the  true 
but  unattempted  way."^"* 

Bacon  is  the  high  priest  of  sense.  His  new  method  is  a 
method  in  which  sense-perceptions  have  the  most  important 
part.  And  when  he  comes  to  use  the  word  "real,"  he  uses 
it,  too,  to  mean  that  which  is  present  to  the  senses.  The 
sense-data,  according  to  him,  are  "real";  the  products  of 
the  mind  with  which  they  become  entangled  are  false.  But 
in  contrast  to  the  position  of  Epicurus,  it  is  the  causes  of 
perception  and  not  the  objects  of  perception  that  Bacon 
makes  real.  The  entities  that  present  themselves  to  the 
sense-organs  and  result  in  consciousness,  these  are  the  real 
entities.  Unfortunately  there  is  often  a  certain  manipula- 
tion, a  distortion,  and  a  contamination  in  the  process  of 
getting  known,  so  that  what  we  are  finally  conscious  of  is 
not  identical  in  content  with  the  entity  first  presenting  itself 
to  the  sense-organ.  It  is  the  crude  sense-datum,  not  yet 
worked  over  by  the  mind,  that  he  calls  "real";  and  a 
process  of  "getting  known"  that  shall  not  affect  the  con- 
tent, that  he  holds  desirable.  The  cause  of  perception  is 
real;  we  can  be  conscious  of  this  "real"  by  neutralizing  the 

*^  Bacon:     Novum  Organutn,  Aphorism   19. 

38 


A 


damage  done  by  the  mind  in  altering  the  content  of  the 

Bacon  let  men  please  themselves  as  they  will  in  admiri,i<. 
and  a  most  adoring  the  human  mind,  thi's  is  cenam    2 

to  its  T  T  """'"^  ^"'°"^  '^''  '^y  °*"  objects  according 
to  ,ts  own  figure  and  section,  so  the  mind,  when  it  receives 
.mpress,ons  of  objects  through  the  sense,  cannot  be  tru  ted 
to  report  thent  truly,  but  in  forming  its  notions  mixefup 
Its  own  nature  with  the  nature  of  things." 

And  not  only  is  Reason  the  criminal.   Sense  also  is  at 
fault      Besides  the  distortions  of  reason  or  mind,  we  must 
guard    against    the    deceptions    of    the    senses    themselves 
Bacon  ,s  not  one  of  those  who  say  the  senses  are  always 
correct,  who  say  that  what  we  call  deceptions  of  the  senses 
are  mistakes  of  judgment  in  interpreting  the  data  of  the 
senses^    According  to  him  the  objects  of  sense-perception 
otten  fail  to  tally  with  the  causes  of  perception.     And  when 
there  IS  this  failure,  it  is  the  causes  of  perception  and  not 
the  objects  of  perception  that  are  real ;  the  latter  are  illusory 
and  unreal.     And  so  even  the  objects  of  sense  with  which 
we  start  must  be  submitted  to  a  process  of  scrutiny  and 
correction.      The  cause  of  perception,   to  which   the  term 
real      is   restricted,    is    the   objective   of   knowledge       In 
order  to  be  aware  of  the  content  of  this  cause  of  perception 
we  must  correct  the  errors  to  be  found  in  the  objects  of 
sense-perception  and  neutralize  as  far  as  possible  the  dis- 
tortions mtroduced  by  mmd.     Or.  as  Bacon  summarizes 
h.s  position,    the  evidence  of  the  sense,  helped  and  guarded 
by  a  certain  process  of  correction.  I  retain.    But  the  mental 

pTrTrele. -"■'   '°"°^'^  ^'^  '''  °*'  ^^"^^  '   '^  '^^  -- 

o{^nl!^"'rl  "U°^"  ^'''^'  ''  '""^h  "^^^  ^i"^P'e  than  that 
of  Bacon.     The  "Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding"  is 

somewhat  encyclopedic  in  character;  the  manv  subjects  that 
are  discussed  in  it  are  not  treated  with  the  singleness  of 
purpose  we  find  in  Bacon's  philosophical  writings  Con 
sequently  we  do  not  find  in  Locke  this  whole-hearted 
advocacy  ol  the  priority  of  sense-data.  We  find  passages 
"Plan  of  the  Instauration ;  in  the  edition  by  J.  M.  Robertson  Crcx)5), 


p.  250 

"Ibid.    Ed.  by  J.  M.  Robertson,  p.  256, 


39 


evidencing  an  empiricism  that  is  quite  marked,  but  we 
should  be  slow  to  accept  these  passages  as  typical.  Yet 
traditionally  Ivocke  is  considered  an  empiricist,  and  this 
characterization  is  not  without  some  justilication.  On  the 
psychological  side,  his  advocacy  of  the  priority  of  sense- 
data  can  be  asserted  without  ciualification.  Again  and  again 
he  tells  us  that  all  ideas  come  from  experience.-'"  The  mind. 
Locke  says,  cannot  originate  a  single  new  simple  idea.'*^ 
These  simple  ideas,  since  they  cannot  he  derived  from  the 
mind  itself,  must  all  be  the  result  of  entities  directly  present 
to  the  senses.  Consequently  the  psychological  priority  of 
sense-data  is  well  established.  Simple  ideas  are  identified 
with  sense-data,  and  complex  ideas  are  derived  from,  and 
consequently  subsequent  to,  these  simple  ideas. 

In  many  passages,  too,  Locke  asserts  the  ontological 
priority  of  sense-data.  The  o1)jects  of  sense-perception 
are  associated  with  a  reality  of  a  sort  that  other  objects 
have  not.  An  entity  I  see  or  have  seen  I  know  to  l>e  real, 
hut  the  reality  of  an  entity  that  is  not  in  connection  with 
my  senses  is  quite  unreliable.  "For  if  I  saw,"  says  Locke, 
"such  a  collection  of  simple  ideas  as  is  wont  to  be  called 
'man'  existing  together  one  minute  since,  and  am  now  alone, 
I  cannot  be  certain  that  the  same  man  exists  now."-^^  That 
is  to  say,  we  can  assert  the  reality  of  the  man  one  minute 
ago  on  the  ground  that  he  was  a  sense-datum,  but  we  have 
no  such  basis  for  attributing  reality  to  the  man  of  the 
present  moment.  Those  entities  that  are  sense-data  are  real 
in  contrast  to  the  entities  that  are  not ;  and  those  entities 
that  have  been  sense-data  are  also  given  the  name  "real." 
''Real"  is  used  in  a  sense  in  which  it  points  out  entities  that 
are  or  have  been  present  to  the  senses. 

In  other  places  the  reality  of  sense-data  is  contrasted 
with  the  possible  unreality  of  facts  we  learn  from  authority. 
I  may  learn  on  authority  that  gold  is  malleable,  but  the 
malleability  of  gold  will  still  be  a  fact  of  doubtful  reality. 
VV^hen  I  have  before  me  gold  that  is  hammered  out,  then, 
l:)eing  a   sense-datum,   malleability   is  a    fact."*^*     We   know 

''Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding,  especially  Book  2,  chapter  i. 
**  Book  2,  chapter  2,  section  2,  and  Book  4,  chapter  4,  section  4. 
'"Ibid;  Book  4,  chapter  ir,  section  9. 

^  Ibid;  Book  4,  chapter  12,  section  9.    Cf.  also  Book  i,  chapter  4,  sec- 
tion 2Z- 

40 


^  ^f 


what  we  experience,  but  do  not  necessarily  know  what  we 
have  on  authority.  It  is  true  that  we  are  here  dealing  with 
the  certainty  of  our  knowledge  and  are  not  here  dealing 
directly  with  the  ontological  status  of  the  objects  of  that 
knowledge.  We  are  dealing  in  the  first  instance  with  the 
category  of  modality  and  not  with  the  category  of  reality. 
There  is,  however,  an  intimate  connection  between  the  two. 
An  object  that  I  do  not  know  to  be  real  belongs  to  a  class 
containing  both  real  and  unreal  entities.  If  objects  that  we 
have  on  authority  were  all  real,  I  should  know  an  entity 
to  be  real  as  soon  as  it  is  described  as  such  an  object. 
And  since,  according  to  Locke,  we  do  not  know  entities  to 
be  real  that  are  given  on  authority,  some  entities  that  we 
have  on  authority  may  be  real  and  some  may  be  unreal. 
"Object  learned  on  authority"  does  not  imply  "real  object" 
as  "object  present  to  the  senses"  does. 

The  meaning  of  reality  that  I  have  been  bringing  out  is 
that  in  which  the  word  is  applied  to  sense-data  exclusively 
and  is  not  applied  exclusively  to  facts  learned  on  authority, 
nor,  indeed,  to  any  entities  that  are  not  sense-data.  It  is  a 
sense  in  which  the  distinction  between  real  and  unreal 
holds  of  the  mere  content,  regardless  of  whether  the  entity 
under  consideration  be  "thing"  or  ''idea."  But  at  other 
times  it  is  the  "thing"  that  Locke  calls  real  in  contrast  to 
the  ''idea,"  the  "thing"  with  its  primary  qualities  and  not 
the  various  ideas  in  our  minds  representing  the  "thing." 
It  is  not  that  Locke  often  explicitly  identifies  the  real  with 
the  "thing"  and  the  unreal  with  the  "idea."  But  there  is, 
through  much  of  his  book,  a  bias  in  favor  of  the  "thing" 
as  substantial,  reliable  and  real.  Now,  in  so  far  as  Locke 
calls  the  "thing"  real,  he  is  again  using  the  "real"  to  sig- 
nify a  sense-datum.  For  the  "thing"  is  the  cause  of  per- 
ception, and  the  sense-datum,  it  will  be  remembered,  can  be 
taken  to  mean  either  the  cause  of  perception  or  the  object  of 
perception.  In  this  connection,  where  "real"  means  the 
"thing"  and  not  the  "idea,"  it  obviously  means  the  sense- 
datum  as  cause  of  perception  and  not  as  object  of  percep- 
tion. But  in  the  cases  with  which  we  had  previously  to 
deal,  the  cases  in  which  "real"  means  the  sense-datum  and 
not  the  fact  that  we  learn  on  authority  or  by  conjecture, 
it  is  hard  to  tell  whether  the  sense-datum  that  is  real  is  the 

41 


cause  of  perception  or  the  object  of  perception.     Probably 
there,  too,  it  is  the  cause  of  perception  that  is  real.     The 
hammered  gold  that  is  a  sense-datum  probably  is  'Veal"  in 
that  it  affects  my  sense-organs  and  not  in  that  it  is  a  vivid 
object  of  consciousness.     But  there  are  passages  in  which 
Locke  seems  to  imply  that  when  it  is  the  content  that  we  are 
dividmg  into  real  and  unreal,   the  distinction  between   die 
content  of  the  cause  of  perception  and  that  of  the  object 
ot  perception  is  unnecessary.     He  seems  to   feel  that  'the 
vivid  objects  of  perception  never  point  to  the  wrong  causes 
of  perception,  that  objects  of  sense-perception  have  internal 
marks  ^distinguishing   them    from   dream   objects  and   illu- 
sions.^^   And  if  we  conclude  from  these  passages  that  Locke 
does  not.  in  these  passages,  recognize  the  possibility  of  error 
in   sense-impressions,   we  must   admit   that   it   is   no  more 
necessary  tor  him  than  it  was  for  Epicurus  to  distinguish 
between   the  content  of  the  cause  of  perception  ancrthat 
of  the  object  of  perception. 

The  Locke  whom  we  have  been  considering  has  applied 
the   term    "real"   to   sense-data   exclusivelv.      Xow    he   has 
applied  it  to  the  thing  outside  the  mind  in  contrast  to  the 
ideas  we  have  of  this  thing,  now  to  the  object  of  experience 
in  contrast  to  the  fact  learned  on  authority  or  by  conjecture 
In  the  one  case  he  means  the  cause  of  perception;    in  the 
other  It  IS  doubtlul  whether  he  means  the  cause  of  percep- 
tion or  whether  he  fails  to  find  it  necessarv  in  practice  to 
distinguish  between  the  content  of  the  cause  of  perception 
and  that  of  the  object  of  perception.     But  in  anv  case  the 
real     has  meant  a  sense-datum.     We  were  prepared  in  the 
beginning,  however,  to  find  that  Locke  was  not  so  thorough- 
going a  sensationalist  as  Bacon.     There  are  many  passa-es 
in  which  he  asserts  the  reality  of  entities  other  than  sen^'se- 
data,  where  he  gives  the  term  "real"  other  meanings      For 
example,  substance,  he  says,  is  "real."     Why?     It  is  real 
because  it  is   impossible   for  us  to  conceive   of  attributes 
without  a   substratum,   not   l)ecause   substance   is   a   sense- 
datum.^^     -Real"  here  is  used  in  a  sense  in  which  it  means 
that  the  opposite  of  wdiich  is  inconceivable,  not  in  the  sense 
in  which  it  means  that  which  is  a  sense-datum.     Again, 

yind;  Book  4,  chapter  2.  section  14,  and  Book  4,  chapter  11. 
Ibid;  Book  2.  chapter  23,  section  4. 

42 


>     !• 


Locke  at  times  uses  "real"  in  the  sense  of  "possible."  Ob- 
jects of  thought  that  are  possible  he  calls  "real."  though 
he  does  not  say  they  "exist."  It  is  a  sense  of  "real."  that 
is  to  say,  in  which  the  term  ceases  to  be  synonymous  with 
"existence."  It  is  in  this  sense  that  mathematical  entities 
and  moral  concepts  such  as  "absolute  justice"  are  "real."^^ 
They  are  not  sense-data,  they  in  some  cases  do  not  "exist," 
and  yet  they  are  called  "real."  All  objects  of  thought  that 
are  possible,  the  component  parts  of  which  are  compossible, 
are  real.  We  have  knowledge  of  reality  when  we  perceive 
the  agreement  between  our  ideas,  for  the  agreeing  ideas 
constitute  a  "real"  And  so  in  many  places  "reality,"  if 
not  "existence,"  is  used  in  a  sense  in  which  it  by  no  means 
points  to  sense-data.  "Real"  is  used  by  Locke  in  more 
than  one  sense.  In  some  passages  the  term  "real"  points 
to  a  sense-datum  of  one  sort  or  another.  In  other  passages 
it  means  something  other  than  that  which  is  a  sense-datum. 
And  so  if  we  call  sensationalism  the  assertion  that  to  be 
real  means  to  be  a  sense-datum  of  some  sort,  Locke  may 
be  called  a  sensationalist  in  his  definition  of  "real,"  but 
certainly  not  a  consistent  one.  His  "real"  in  many  con- 
texts refers  to  the  sense-datum  and  to  nothing  else.  But 
in  other  passages  his  use  of  "real"  is  very  similar  to  that 
traditionally  attributed  to  Leibniz.  And  it  is  a  sensational- 
ism that  at  its  best  is  expressed  haltingly  and  without 
enthusiasm. 

Bishop  Berkeley,  insofar  as  he  asserts  the  reality  of 
sense-data,  asserts  it  in  a  more  clear-cut  and  a  simpler  man- 
ner than  does  Locke.  W^ith  him  as  with  Locke  all  of  our 
ideas  arise  from  experience.  Some  objects  are  present  to 
our  external  senses,  some  objects  are  present  to  our  internal 
sense,  and  the  rest  of  our  ideas  are  complexes  founded 
upon  these  two  forms  of  sense  experience.  "The  objects  of 
knowledge,"  he  writes,  "are  (i)  ideas  actually  imprinted 
on  the  senses,  (2)  ideas  perceived  by  attending  to  the 
passions  and  operations  of  the  mind,  or,  lastly,  (3)  ideas 
form.ed  by  help  of  memory  and  imagination — either  com- 
pounding, dividing,  or  barely  representing  those  originally 
perceived  in  the  aforesaid  ways."^"*     Psychologically,  then, 

^^  Ibid;  Book  4,  chapter  4.  sections  6-8. 

**  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  part  i,  section  i. 

43 


the  data  of  the  external  and  uiternal  senses  are  prior-w.th 
Berkeley  as  n>th  Locke-to  the  objects  formed  by  help  of 
memory  and  inm.^ination.     But  when  it  conies  to  restricting 

he  term  real  to  these  entities  psychologically  prior! 
Berkeley  .s  more  defnnte  than  f.ocke.  The  objects  of  the 
senses   as   contrasted    with    those   of    the    imagination   are 

real.       And  ue  do  not  have  to  wonder  wliether  it  is  the 

mZ-  "'   'f^'^li''""   T  '^''  "'^■'■'"  °f  perception   that   he 
makes    real.       Sense-data  are  real  as  oh/ccts  of  perception 
They  are  real  in  that  they  are  vivid,  brilliant,  compelling 
objects,  and  the  objects  of  the  imagination  are  unreal  in 
that  they  are  weak,    faint,  and  subject  to  change  at   will 
1  he  Ideas  imprmted  on  the  senses  by  the  Author  of  nature 
are  ca,  ed  real  , kings,  an.l  those  excited  in  the  imagination 
being   less   vivid   and   constant  are  more   properly   tenned 
Ideas  or  ,magcs   of   things,   which   thev   copv   and    repre- 
sent.    ■      And  again   we   read :      "The   ideas  of  sense  are 
allowed  to  have  more  reality  in  them  than  the  creatures  of 
the  mind. 

It   is   accordingly   the   vivid   objects   of  percq.tion   that 
Berkeley   uses  the   term   "real"   to  point  out.      He  cannot 
admit,  if  he  adheres  to  this  meaning  of  reality,  the  possi- 
bility of  error  in  sense-perceptions.     For  to  do 'so  would  be 
to  run  counter  to  his   identification   of   realitv  with  vivid 
objects  ot  i>erception  by  making  some  of  these 'vivid  objects 
of  perception  unreal.     And  Berkeley  does  seem  to  call  all 
these  vivid  objects  "real,"  though  there  are  some  to  which 
the  term  as  commonly  used  would  not  apply,  some  which 
m  the  denotation  given  the  term  more  usually,  would  be 
called  unreal.     "For  my  part,"  savs  Berkeley,""  "I  can  as 
well  doubt  of  my  own  being  as  of  the  being  of  those  things 
mhKh  I  actually  perceive  by  sense:  it  being  a  manifest  con- 
tradiction that  any  sensible  object  should  be  immediately 
perceived  by  sight  or  touch,  and  at  the  same  time  have  no 
existence  m  nature,  since  the  very  existence  of  an  unthink- 
ing being  consists  in  being  perceived." 

In  all  this  the  term  "real"  most  clearly  and  explicitly 
refers  to  sense-data.  But  in  other  connections  the  term 
quite  as  evidently  does  not  refer  to  sense-data.  I  have  in 
mind  those  passages  where  Descartes's  phrase  "clear  and 

'''Ibid:    section  33.    Cf.  also  sections  36,  go 
"Ibid:    section  88. 

44 


4 


1 


distinct  ideas"  shows  itself.  In  the  introduction  to  the 
"Principles  of  Human  Knowledge/'  for  example,  general 
abstract  ideas  are  declared  unreal.  Ideas  such  as  "triangle" 
are  declared  unreal,  not  on  the  ground  that  they  \re 
creatures  of  the  imagination,  lacking  the  vividness  of  ex- 
perience, but  on  the  ground  that  they  are  objects  of  thought 
that  are  not  clear  and  distinct.  The  two  criteria  must  be 
distinguished.  For  many  objects  with  the  compelling 
power  and  vividness  of  experience  are  hazy  and  inchoate  in 
form  and  possibly  inconsistent  on  analysis,  while  others 
that  are  quite  definite  and  self-consistent  may  be  but 
creatures  of  the  imagination.  General  abstract  ideas,  then, 
are  unreal  because  they  are  not  clear  and  distinct.  Such  a 
statement  points  to  a  use  of  real  that,  following  Descartes, 
makes  objects  real  that  are  clear  and  distinct,  and  objects 
unreal  that  lack  these  qualifications.  Descartes  had  an 
influence  on  the  line  of  British  philosophers  that  is  not 
always  recognized.  Locke,  Berkeley  and  Hume  by  no 
means  developed  a  system  of  thought  indigenous  to  the 
British  Isles,  insulated  from  their  contemporaries  and 
predecessors  on  the  Continent.  But  the  evidence  of  this 
Continental  influence,  especially  on  the  part  of  Descartes,  is 
SO  very  abundant  that  the  point  is  hardly  w^orth  mentioning. 

In  the  latter  part  of  his  life  Berkeley  may  be  assumed  to 
have  again  used  'Veal"  in  a  sense  in  which  it  does  not  point 
to  sense-data.  In  ''Siris"  he  show^s  himself  particularly  in- 
terested, not  in  the  entities  that  are  psychologically  prior,  but 
in  the  entities  that  are  inferred  from  these  sense-data.  It 
is  the  knowledge  of  spirits  and  of  the  Platonic  Ideas  that 
he  stresses,  entities  which  I  presume  he  would  call  real, 
though  they  are  evidently  not  sense-data.  In  so  far,  then, 
as  he  calls  spirits  and  the  Platonic  Ideas  'Veal,"  he  is  using 
"real"  in  a  sense  in  which  it  means,  not  sense-data,  but 
entities  that  we  are  aware  of  mediately  and  inferentially. 

Hume's  use  of  "real"  is  very  similar  to  that  characteristic 
of  Berkeley.  He  begins,  as  do  Locke  and  Berkeley,  with 
the  assertion  that,  psychologically,  sense-data  are  the  first 
objects  of  our  consciousness,  and  that  it  is  from  them  that 
our  other  objects  are  derived.  The  vivid  sense-data  are 
called  impressions,  the  derivative  objects  ideas.  There  is 
some  shifting,  however,  from  the  psychological  thesis  that 
all  ideas  must  be  derived  from  sense-data,  to  the  thesis  that 

45 


w^^^ 


all  valid  objects  of  thought— though  not  all  possible  objects 
of  thought —  must  be  derived  from  sense-data.  It  becomes, 
not  impossible,  but  inralid,  to  have  objects  of  thought  that 
are  not  derived  from  sense-data.  And  so  we  get  the  onto- 
logical  principle  that  sense-impressions  and  ideas  derived 
from  sense-impressions  are  ''real,"  while  other  objects  of 
consciousness  are  unreal.  There  are  only  impressions  and 
ideas  derived  from  them,  according  to  Hume:  the  rest  is 
arguing  about  words.  But.  contrary  to  his  psychological 
thesis,  he  admits  a  "rest"  ;  it  is  possible  to  have  as  an  object 
of  consciousness  what  he  would  call  a  "mere  word."  For 
example,  some  people  talk  about  "power."  But  ''power"  is 
an  object  of  consciousness  that  is  a  'mere  word";  it  is  a 
pseudo-idea,  unreal  in  that  there  is  no  impression  from 
which  it  is  derived. 

At  times  Hume  restricts  the  meaning  of  reality  further. 
He  uses  the  term  to  mean,  not  both  sense-impressions  and 
the  ideas  derived  from  them,  but  only  the  \i\-id  sense-im- 
pressions. Sense-data  arc  real.  The  objects  I  am  aware 
of  when  I  look  at  entities  are  real :  l)ut  when  I  turn 
away  and  am  aware  of  these  entities  as  "still  there,"  the 
objects  of  my  consciousness  are  unreal.  The  fiction  of  the 
continued  existence  of  these  entities,  Hume  says,  "is  really 
false,"  for — I  suppose  this  is  his  meaning — when  I  am  not 
looking  at  these  entities  they  are  not  sense-data,  and  are, 
consequently,  unreal."*^ 

At  other  times  Hume,  like  Berkeley,  uses  "real"  to  mean 
the  ''clear  and  distinct."  Universals  are  unreal,  not  so 
much  because  they  are  not  sense-data  or  derived  from 
sense-data,  but  rather  because  they  are  not  clear  and  dis- 
tinct.^^  And  power  is  unreal,  not  only  in  that  it  is  not 
derived  from  a  sense-datum,  but  also  because  we  have  no 
distinct  idea  of  either  some  particular  power  or  of  power  in 
general.-*'^  Then  we  can  find  passages  in  Hume,  and  in 
Locke  and  Berkeley  as  well,  where  all  objects  of  conscious- 
ness seem  to  be  real.  In  the  main,  however,  Hume  uses 
"real"  to  mean  sense-data,  and.  with  some  wavering,  ob- 
jects derived  from  sense-data.  Sense-data  are  real  as 
*'vivid  objects"  and  not  in  the  sense  of  "causes  of  percep- 

*'  Hume:    Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Book  i,  pt.  4,  sec.  2;    Cf.  also 
Book   I,  pt.  3,  sec.  5. 

*^  Ibid:    Book   i,  j)t.  i,  sec.  7. 
"^  Ibid:    Book  i,  pt.  3,  sec  14. 

46 


% 


tion,"  though  to  a  certain  extent  Hume  seems  to  regard 
the  class  of  vivid  objects  as  identical  in  content  with  what 
we  are  accustomed  to  call  the  causes  of  perception.  That 
is  to  say,  the  result  of  his  identification  of  "real"  with  vivid 
objects  of  perception  is  not  to  make  the  objects  of  dreams 
real.  For  he  allows  our  ideas  "in  sleep,  in  a  fever,  in  mad- 
ness, or  in  any  very  violent  emotions  of  soul"  only  to  "ap- 
proach" the  vividness  of  impressions.^*^  All  vivid  objects 
of  consciousness  are  real  then,  though  these  vivid  objects 
never  happen  to  be  what  common  sense  would  call  illusions. 
In  the  other  case  in  which  Hume  uses  "real"  to  point 
primarily  to  sense-data,  in  the  case  in  which  the  denotation 
of  "real"  is  so  widened  that  those  ideas  that  are  derived 
from  sense-impressions  are  also  called  real,  Hume  is  using 
"real"  very  looselv.  For  with  merely  this  description  of 
"real,"  it  is  quite  impossible  to  determine  which  objects  of 
thought  are  the  ones  that  are  "derived"  from  sense-data, 
and  which  are  the  objects  that  are  not  so  derived,  that  are, 
consequently,  "unreal."  Be  that  as  it  may,  what  little  defi- 
niteness  this  definition  of  "reality"  has  forces  it  to  be  recog- 
nized as  belonging  to  the  group  of  definitions  in  which  the 
"real"  is  primarily  identified  with  sense-data.  And  so  we 
come  to  Kant. 

We  have  previously  met  quite  frequently  with  the  asser- 
tion that  all  our  ideas  begin  with  sense-experience.  In 
Kant  we  find  this  assertion  repeated.  "That  all  our  knowl- 
edge begins  with  experience,"  we  read,  "there  can  be  no 
doubt."  "For,"  Kant  continues,  "how  should  the  faculty  of 
knowledge  be  called  into  activity,  if  not  by  objects  which 
affect  our  senses,  and  which  either  produce  representations 
by  themselves,  or  rouse  the  activity  of  our  understanding 
to  compare,  to  connect,  or  to  separate  them."^^  And  if 
more  passages  to  the  same  effect  are  desired,  we  can  turn 
to  the  beginning  of  the  "Aesthetic"  where  we  read :  "What- 
ever the  process  and  the  means  may  be  by  which  knowledge 
reaches  its  objects,  there  is  one  that  reaches  them  directly 
and  forms  the  ultimate  material  of  all  thought,  viz. :  intui- 
tion {Anschauung).  .  .  .  All  thought,  therefore,  must, 
directly  or  indirectly,  go  back  to  intuitions  {Anschauun- 
gen),  i.  e.,  to  our  sensibility,  because  in  no  other  way  can 

"^  Ibid;    Book  i,  part  i,  sec.  i. 

"Kant:    Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  2d  edition,  p.  i. 

47 


objects  be  given  to  us."''^     The  effect  of  this,  to  be  sun- 
is  to  ffive  sense-<lata  a  certain  fundamental  i)osition  in  the 
genesis  of  the  objects  of  o.;r  consciousness,  but  it   in  no 
uay  involves  the  tern,  "real.-     It  is  important  for  our  pur- 
poses, however,  because,  with  Kant  as  with  the  writers  we 
have   just    exannne.l.    the    assertion   of    this   psychological 
priority  of  sense-data  lea,ls  to  the  assertion  of  the  onto- 
logical    priority    of    these   entities.      Now,    in    considering 
Kant  s  position,  we  shall  have  to  distinguish  Ix^tween  the 
crude  material  of  knowledge  and   the  entities  that  result 
from   the  addition   to   this  crude   m.iterial   of   the  mental 
factors  that  play  so  large  a  part  in  knowledge,  between  the 
unsynthetized  manifold  present  to  the  senses  and  the  syn- 
thetized.  co-ordinated  manifold  that  is  the  world  as  we  see 
it^    Kant  implicitly  denotes  by  "real"  now  one  of  these  sets 
of  entities.  n<nv  the  other.     When  he  seems  to  imply  that 
the  crude,  unsynthetized  manifold  is  -'real."  it  is  the  mental 
factors   that,    in   contrast   to   this    unsvnthetized    manifold 
seem  to  be  called  "ideal."     The  distinction  between  these 
two  elements,   the  crude  bare  data   of  sensation  and  the 
mental  factors  that  make  knowledge  possible,  Kant  makes 
quite  plainly.      Connection,   he  .savs,^'^   "does   never  lie  in 
the  objects,  and  cannot  be  borrowed  from  them  by  percei)- 
tion  and  thus  be  taken   into  the  understanding    but  it  is 
always  an  act  of  the  understanding,  which  itself  is  nothing 
but  a  faculty  of  connecting  a  priori,  and  of  bringing  the 
mamfold  of  given  representations  under  the  unity  of  apper- 
ception."    .And  looked  at  from  one  point  of  view,  this  con- 
nection, not  lying  in  the  objects,  does  not  form  a  real  part 
of  the  world  of  objects:  it  is  a  man-made  addition  superim- 
posed upon  nature.    Though  the  connection  is  an  important 
and  valuable  addition,  it  is  the  unsvnthetized  manifold  that 
IS  the  "real."     There  are  passages,  ]   sav,  in  which  Kant 
seems  to  take  this  position,  in  which  he  applies  the  term 
"real"  exclusively  to  the  crude  objects  not  vet  taken  up  and 
worked  over  by  the  understanding      For  example,  in  the 
Anticipations  of  Perception"  in  the  Second  Edition  of  the 
Kritik  dcr  rcincn   Vcrmmft.  he  says  that  i)henomena  con- 
tain "over  and  above  the  intuition,  the  material  for  some 
one  object  in  general   (through  which  something  existing 
Ibid:    i.st  edition,  p.  19. 
"Ibid:    2(1  edition,  Deduction  of  the  Categories  §  10. 

48 


■■4 


4* 


in  space  and  time  is  represented)  ;  that  is,  they  contain  the 
real  of  sensation,  as  a  merely  subjective  representation, 
which  gives  us  only  the  consciousness  that  the  subject  is 
affected,  and  which  is  referred  to  some  object  in  general. 
Now,  there  is  a  gradual  transition  possible  from  empirical 
to  pure  consciousness,  till  the  real  of  it  vanishes  completely 
and  there  remains  a  merely  formal  consciousness  (a  priori) 
of  the  manifold  in  space  and  time."  The  crude  data,  while 
not  the  entities  that  Kant  desires  to  emphasize,  are  called 
"real."  And  things-in-themselves.  which,  in  so  far  as 
they  have  any  content  at  all,  may  be  taken  to  have  the  con- 
tent of  these  crude  data,  are  also  given  the  attribute  "ex- 
istence." "For  that  it  existed  by  itself,"  Kant  says,^* 
"without  any  reference  to  ourselves  and  possible  experi- 
ence, might  no  doubt  be  said  when  wt  speak  of  the  thing  by 
itself." 

Now  these  crude  data,  in  so  far  as  they  are  called  "real," 
are  they  real  as  causes  of  sensation  or  as  objects  of  sensa- 
tion? That  is  to  say,  are  these  crude  entities  real  because 
they  affect  the  sense-organs  and  bring  about  the  perception 
of  objects  as  we  know  them  ?  Or  are  they  real  as  element- 
ary, embryonic  objects  of  consciousness,  as  the  inchoate 
part  of  the  entities  that  are  objects  for  nsF  There  is  little 
basis  for  attributing  to  Kant  one  of  these  positions  rather 
than  the  other.  He  does  seem,  however,  to  make  no  dis- 
tinction between  the  content  of  the  crude  cause  of  percep- 
tion and  the  content  of  the  crude  object — or,  rather,  poten- 
tial object — of  perception.  That  is  to  say,  he  seems  to 
deny  the  possibility  of  error  where  we  are  dealing  with 
these  very  elementary  objects.  All  error  is  due  to  the 
mental  factors  in  knowledge.  The  crude  object  of  percep- 
tion is  never  unreal,  never  differs  in  content  from  the  crude 
thing-in-itself  that  affects  the  sense-organs.  But  the  evi- 
dence for  this  interpretation  is  very  scanty.^^  It  is  scanty 
because  Kant  for  the  most  part  denies  any  cognizable  con- 
tent to  either  the  crude  cause  of  perception  or  this  very 
elementary  o-bject  of  perception.  For  the  most  part  he 
admits  content  only  to  the  object  of  experience,  the  entity 
that  results  from  the  assimilation  of  the  crude  material  to 
the  mental   factors  that  make  experience  possible.     These 


""Ibid: 
*  Ibid: 


First  Edition,  p.  493. 
First  Edition,  p.  303. 


49 


,.ii 


entities  and  not  the  crude  data  have  content,  and,  in  a 
different  sense  of  the  word  "real"  from  that  which  we  have 
been  considering,  these  entities  and  not  the  crude  data  are 
'Veal." 

In  fact,  the  sense  in  which  'Veal"  means  crude  data  is 
the  exception ;  it  is  much  more  frequently  that  Kant  em- 
ploys the  term  to  denote  the  object  of  experience.  For  the 
crude  data  are  really  nothing  when  taken  by  themselves; 
the  mental  factors  are  the  sine  quibiis  non  of  knowledge 
and  even  of  perception.  It  is  the  combination  of  crude 
data  and  mental  factors  that  makes  the  world  we  know, 
the  world  that  Kant  calls  "real"— in  this  second  sense  of 
the  word.  It  is  not  the  unsynthetized  manifold  by  itself 
that  is  "real"  in  this  sense,  but  the  unsynthetized  manifold 
affected  by  a  process  of  connection  and  so  turned  into  ob- 
jects of  experience.  These  objects  of  experience  are  the 
entities  that  "real"  most  fre([uently  denotes  for  Kant. 
These  entitie>  are  the  important  entitie.v;  they  are  the  only 
objects  that  are  objects- for-us. 

Now    when    "real"    denotes    crude    data,    it    is    evidently 
denoting  a  species  of  sense-data.     When  it  denotes  objects- 
for-us,  objects  of  experience,  it  is  not  being  used  so  appar- 
ently to  denote  sense-data.     For  these  objects  of  experience 
are  objects  that  are  permeated  through  and  through  with 
ideal  elements,   while  we  generally  think  of   sense-data  as 
simple  entities  that  are  to  be  contrasted  with  the  products 
of    mind.      But    what    are    Kant's    objects    of    experience? 
For  the  most  part,  it  seems  to  me.  Kant's  "objects  of  ex- 
perience"  refer  to  the  objects  that  we  see  and  hear,  the 
objects  at  hand,  objects  that  we  have  been  calling  sense-data 
quite  as  much  as  we  have  been  calling  the  crude  material 
sense-data.     That  is  to  say,  we  must  make  a  distinction 
between  two  sorts  of  sense-data.     On  the  one  hand  there 
IS  the  crude  material,  the  elementary  object  of   sense-per- 
ception; on  the  other  hand  there  are  the  objects  of  sense- 
perception   as   we   know   them,   the  ol)jects-for-us   that   we 
see  and    feel   and  hear.      Yet  both  groups  of   entities  may 
be  called   sense-data.     The  crude   material   has  been  held, 
by  those  whose  opinions  we  have  considered,  to  be  present 
to  the  senses  either  as  original  cause  or  as  elementary  object 
of  perception.     And  the  objects  of  sense-perception,  in  the 

50 


M 


form  they  have  for  us,  are  sense-data,  in  contrast  to  the 
objects  of  memory,  of  reason,  and  of  imagination.  Let  us 
turn  our  attention,  then,  to  these  objects  of  sense-perception, 
which,  with  all  the  connection  that  is  given  them  by  mind, 
are  still  sense-data  in  contrast  to  the  objects  of  memory, 
imagination,  and  reason. 

It  is  to  these  synthetized  objects  of  sense-perception,  I 
have  suggested,  that  Kant  in  large  part  attributes  reality. 
Objects  of  experience  rather  than  crude  data  are  real, 
and  sense-data  are  the  objects  of  experience  par  excellence. 
Still  it  is  not  the  synthetized  objects  of  sense-perception 
alone  that  are  real,  in  the  sense  of  "real"  with  which  we  are 
concerned.  These  sense-data  transmit  their  reality,  so  to 
speak,  to  the  entities  that  are  derived  from  them  and  con- 
nected with  them.  And  so  we  have  a  use  of  "real"  identical 
with  that  which  w^e  noticed  in  discussing  Hume: — "Only 
sense-data  and  their  derivatives  are  real."  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  while  such  a  principle  is  upheld  by  Hume,  it  is 
much  more  characteristic  of  Kant.  "What  is  real  in 
external  phenomena."  we  bud  asserted  in  the  "Critique," 
"is  real  in  perception  only,  and  cannot  be  given  in  any  other 
w\'iy."  "From  such  perceptions,  whether  by  mere  play  of 
fancy  or  by  experience,  knowledge  of  objects  can  be  pro- 
duced, and  here  no  doubt  deceptive  representations  may 
arise,  without  truly  corresponding  objects,  the  deception 
being  due,  either  to  illusions  of  imagination  (in  dreams), 
or  to  a  fault  of  judgment  (the  so-called  deceptions  of  the 
senses).  In  order  to  escape  from  these  false  appearances, 
one  has  to  follow  the  rule  that  whatever  is  connected  accord- 
ing to  empirical  lazvs  zvith  a  perception  is  real/'^^^  And 
again,  in  another  passage,  he  writes r"^'  "That  there  may 
be  inhabitants  in  the  moon,  though  no  man  has  ever  seen 
them,  must  be  admitted  but  it  means  no  more  than  that, 
in  the  possible  progress  of  our  experience,  we  may  meet 
with  them;  for  everything  is  real  that  hangs  together  wdth 
a  perception,  according  to  the  laws  of  empirical  progress." 
Passage  after  passage  comes  to  the  same  thing.  ''The 
postulate  concerning  our  knowledge  of  the  reality  of  things 
requires  perception,  therefore  sensation  and  the  conscious- 


67 


Ibid,   1st  Edition,  p.  376. 
Ibid,  1st  Edition,  p.  493. 


51 


''^ 


ness  of  it.  not,  indeed,  immediately  of  the  object  itself, 
the  existence  of  wliich  is  to  be  known,  but  yet  of  a  con- 
nection between  it  and  some  real  perception  according  to 
the  analogies  of  experience  which  determine  in  general 
all  real  combinations  in  experience.  .  .  .  But  if  we  do  not 
begin  with  experience  or  do  not  proceed  according  to  the 
lazi's  of  the  eiiipirical  connection  of  phenomena,  we  are  only 
making  a  vain  display  as  if  we  could  guess  and  discover 
the  existence  of  anything. ''^^ 

Sense-data  and  the  objects  that  are  connected  witii  them 
are  the  objects  of  possible  experience,  and  them  alone  is 
the  word  "real" — in  the  sense  of  the  word  we  have  been 
discussing — used  to  denote.  In  contrast  to  these  objects 
of  possible  experience  that  are  real,  there  are  other  entities 
that  are  unreal.  "It  is  possible  experience  alone  that  can 
impart  reality  to  our  concepts;  without  this  a  concept  is  only 
an  idea  without  truth,  and  without  any  reference  to  an 
object."'*^  That  is  to  say,  leaving  out  of  account  the  crude, 
inchoate  data,  there  are  two  sorts  of  entities — the  objects 
of  possible  experience  and  the  mere  ideas.  An  unreal  entity 
is  a  ''mere  idea,  the  objective  reality  of  which  can  never 
be  shown  in  any  possible  experience,"  while  the  real  world 
is  the  world  of  sense  w^hich  "must  be  looked  upon  as  the 
sum  total  of  all  possible  experience."^^  There  are  unreals, 
then,  though  the  content  of  these  "mere  ideas"  is,  as  with 
Hume,  left  quite  indefinite. 

Now,  when  it  is  the  entities  in  the  wu3rld  of  possible  ex- 
perience that  are  real,  these  sense-data  and  their  derivatives 
seem  to  be  real  in  so  far  as  they  are  vivid  objects  or  con- 
nected with  vivid  objects,  not  in  so  far  as  they  are  causes 
of  our  thought.  For,  says  Kant,^'^  "wnth  reference  to  the 
reality  of  external  objects,  I  need  as  little  trust  to  inference 
as  with  reference  to  the  reality  of  the  objects  of  my  internal 
sense  (my  thoughts),  both  being  nothing  but  representa- 
tions, the  immediate  perception  (consciousness)  of  which 
is  at  the  same  time  a  sufficient  proof  of  their  reality."  This 
seems  to  imply  that  the  objects  of  experience  that  are  vivid 
and  those  objects  that  are  connected  with  such  vivid  objects 


I 


Ibid:    1st  Edition,  p.  225. 
Ibid;  1st  Edition,  p.  489. 
Ibid;  I  St  Edition,  p.  437. 
*^  Ibid;  1st  Edition,  p.  371. 


Be 


eo 


52 


of  experience  are  unmistakably  real.  Consequently,  with 
Kant,  as  with  all  who  make  sense-data  real  as  object  of 
perception  and  not  as  cause  of  perception,  there  is  ruled 
out  the  possibility  of  error  in  the  perception  of  vivid  objects 
of  experience.  Perceptions  and  objects  connected  with 
them  by  a  rule  are  real.  But  how  recognize  a  perception? 
A  perception  is  a  vivid  object  of  experience;  consequently 
no  vivid  object  of  experience  is  unreal. 

There  are  other  definitions  of  reality  implicit  in  Kant 
than  those  I  have  brought  out.     Some  are  implied  in  pas- 
sages I  have  not  mentioned,  w^hile  others  may  be  inferred 
from  passages  I  have  given,  provided  a  different  interpre- 
tation be  given  the  term  "experience."     But  the  senses  in 
which  Kant  can  be  taken  to  use  'Veal"  to  mean  sense-data 
are,   roughly   speaking,   two.      He   calls   "real"    the   crude 
material,  taken  now  as  mere  elementary  data,  now  as  thing- 
in-itself.    And  he  calls  "real"  the  complete,  informed  objects 
of  sense-perception  and  the  entities  connected  with  them  by 
a  rule.    The  meaning  of  real  when  used  in  the  first  of  these 
two  senses  is  not  ambiguous,  though  the  entities  denoted  by 
it  are  practically  without  content.    In  so  far  as  vivid  objects 
of  experience  and  entities  connected  with  them  are  real,  we 
lack  any  good  criterion  to  distinguish  the  real   from  that 
which  is  a  "mere  idea."     "Reality"  in  this  sense  is  rather 
indefinite;  the  reality  of  vivid  objects  of  perception  is  well 
assured,  but  which  objects  are  connected  with  these  vivid 
objects,  and  which  are  not,  is  not  sufficiently  determined.^^ 
Since  Kant  these  varying  definitions  of  "reality"  have 
gone  on  repeating  themselves.     And  the  men  in  whose  writ- 
ings these  definitions  are  implied  have  been  at  even  less 
pains,  if  possible,  to  make  their  definitions  explicit  and  to 
justify  or  to  acknowledge  the  lack  of  justification  for  the 
various  senses  in  which  they  have  used  the  term.     In  par- 
ticular, the  two  senses  in  w^hich  Kant  used  "real"  to  mean 
sense-data    have    become    commonplaces.      The    physicist 
Mach,  for  example,  uses  "real"  in  almost  exactly  the  first 
of  the  two  senses  in  which  Kant  used  "real"  to  mean  sense- 
data.     For  Mach,  as  in  part  for  Kant,  it  is  the  crude  ma- 
terial, the  data  without  the  infiltration  of  any  mental  ele- 
ments, that  alone  are  "real."    Nature  is  composed  of  "sensa- 

*"  Cf.  however:    infra.,  pp.  71-73. 

53 


I 


tions"  as  its  elements/''^  These  crude  entities,  he  imphes, 
are  alone  ''there."  By  way  of  contrast,  all  mental  con- 
structs, such  as  hypotheses  and  abstractions,  are  unreal. 
*' Atoms  cannot  he  perceived  by  the  senses,"  he  finds;  there- 
fore "like  all  substances  they  are  things  of  thought"  and 
implicitly  unreal/'*  The  crude  data  alone  are  real.  Sub- 
stances are  ideal  abstractions  and  hy])otheses  ideal  con- 
structions for  the  sake  of  economy.  The  crude  data  or 
what  Ayenarius  calls  "pure  experience" — for  Avenarius 
holds  a  similar  position — are  the  only  objects  of  which  we 
can  be  conscious  without  addini;  a  mental  construct.  "Real" 
conseciuently  means  them  alone. 

Another  physicist,  Karl  Pearson,  makes  sense-data  and 
entities  connected  with  sense-data  "real."  He  uses  "real" 
in  practically  the  same  sense  as  that  in  which  Kant 
uses  it  when  he  calls  sense-data  and  entities  connected  with 
sense-data  "real."  "The  reality  of  a  thing."  Pearson  says,^^ 
"depends  upon  the  possibility  of  its  occurring  in  whole  or 
part  as  a  group  of  immediate  sense-impressions."  And 
"a  sine  qua  non  of  the  existence  of  an  actual  black-board 
is  some  immediate  sense-impression  to  start  with."^®  Not 
merely  actual  sense-data,  however,  but  possible  sense-data 
inferred  from  actual  data,  are  real.  "I  have  heard  of  the 
Capitol  at  Washington,"  says  Pearson,^^  ''and  although  1 
have  never  been  to  America,  I  am  convinced  of  the  reality 
of  America  and  the  Capitol-— that  is,  T  believe  certain  sense- 
impressions  would  be  experienced  by  me  if  I  put  myself  in 
the  proper  circumstances."  On  the  other  hand,  entities  that 
are  neither  actual  nor  possible  sense-data  are  unreal.  Atoms, 
molecules,  electrons,  mathematical  points,  lines,  and  sur- 
faces, the  ether,  matter — all  are  unreal,  in  so  far  as  they 
have  not  become  objects  of  perception.^^  At  times  when 
Pearson  wants  to  give  to  some  of  these  unreal  entities  a 
name  that  for  him  has  a  particularly  disagreeable  connota- 
tion, he  calls  them  "metaphysical."  It  is  in  such  an  invidious 
manner  that  he  talks  about  ether  and  matter,  about  "force" 

"  Mach. :    Science  of  Mechanics  (Chicago,  1907),  p.  482. 

^  Ibid;  p.  492. 

"Karl    Pearson;    Grammar   of   Science,   3d   Edition,   Part    i,   p.   41. 

Ibid:    p.  40. 
'Ibid:    p.  40.     * 

Ibid:    pp.  193.  286. 

54 


and  about  an  hypostatized  "will."  Apropos  of  the  last  two 
he  says:^^  "Both  carry  us  into  the  region  beyond  our  sense- 
impressions;  both  are  therefore  metaphysical."  Sense-data 
and  entities  connected  with  sense-data  are  real.  Some  other 
entities  in  the  course  of  time  reveal  themselves  as  actual 
sense-data  or  as  entities  connected  with  actual  sense-data, 
that  is,  as  possible  sense-data.  Thereupon  it  becomes  possi- 
ble for  us  to  attribute  reality  to  them.  But  of  other  entities 
that  have  not  shown  themselves  to  be  possible  sense-data 
we  cannot  assert  existence.  And  those  entities  that  can 
never  be  objects  of  possible  experience — such  as  mathe- 
matical points— are  for  Pearson  definitely  labelled  "unreal." 
The  vivid  o1)jects  of  sense-perception  are  real.  The  objects 
connected  with  sense-data,  that  are  also  real,  are  the 
objects  that  would  be  sense-data  "if  I  put  myself  in  the 
proper  circumstances."  The  objects  connected  with  sense- 
data  are  consequently  delimited  to  a  certain  extent,  but  cer- 
tainly not  to  an  extent  sufficient  to  enable  us  to  tell  whether 
any  given  object  is  to  be  called  "real"  or  "unreal."  So  far 
as  the  entities  connected  with  sense-data  are  concerned,  the 
definition,  that  is  to  say,  suffers  from  the  same  indefiniteness 
that  we  found  in  Hume's  meaning  of  "real"  and  in  Kant's — 
when  Kant  uses  "real"  to  refer  to  the  objects  of  experience 
and  the  entities  related  to  them. 

Another  recent  writer  to  use  "real"  to  denote  sense-data 
is  William  James.  His  "real"  points  now  to  a  hazy  thing- 
in-itself,  now  to  the  objects  of  sense-perception  as  we  know 
them.  In  his  accounts  of  the  genesis  of  thought  he  falls 
back  upon  a  thing-in-itself  that  is  objective  and  real  and 
that  sets  the  processes  of  consciousness  going.  We  start 
with  a  simple,  unanalyzed  "that,"  he  tells  us,  something  quite 
lacking  in  definiteness  and  hence  unattainable  after  early 
childhood.  This  is  sensation,  the  function  of  which  **is  that 
of  mere  acquaintance  with  a  fact."'*^  With  its  pristine 
innocence,  however,  it,  and  it  alone,  puts  us  in  contact  with 
reality.  Or,  as  James  says,  it  is  only  consciousness  with 
the  "sensational  tang''  that  "directly  encounters  (to  use  a 
word  of  Mr.  Bradley's)  a  reality  outside  itself. "^^  It  is  an 
unattainable   thing-in-itself,   consequently,   a   thing-in-itself 


«e 


as 


es 


Ibid:   p.  119. 

'''James:    Principles  of  Psychology,  1890,  vol.  2,  p.  2. 
"  Ibid:    vol.  2,  p.  6. 

55 


Mm 


to  which  the  original  "blooming,  buzzing  confusion"  most 
nearly  corresponds,  that  James  is  using  the  term  "real"  to 
point  out. 

But  at  other  times,  and  indeed  more  often,  it  is  things 
as  we  know  them  that  are  real.  The  vivid  sense-perceptions 
of  a  jumping,  barking,  hairy  body  ^'are  the  real  dog.  the 
dog's  full  presence  for  my  common  sense."''"'  It  is  the  vivid 
objects  of  sensation  succeeding  one  another  in  a  stream  of 
consciousness  that  give  us  the  content  of  reality.  "Dive 
back  into  the  flux  itself,  then."  James  says^"^  in  paraphrasing 
Bergson,  whose  thought  he  endorses,  "if  you  wish  to  know 
reality,  that  flux  which  Platonism,  in  its  strange  belief  that 
only  the  immutable  is  excellent,  has  always  spurned;  turn 
your  face  toward  sensation,  that  flesh-hound  thing  which 
rationalism  has  always  loaded  with  abuse."  All  content  that 
is  given  by  sensation  is  real,  all  content  that  is  not  so  given 
is  unreal.'^'*  "Every  examiner  of  the  sensible  life  in  concreto 
must  see  that  relations  of  ever>'  sort,  of  time,  space,  differ- 
ence, likeness,  change,  rate,  cause,  or  what  not,  are  just  as 
integral  members  of  the  sensational  flux  as  terms  are."'^''^ 
Therefore  relations  are  real.  However,  not  merely  actual 
sense-data  are  real.  As  with  Flume,  with  Kant,  and  with 
Pearson,  entities  connected  with  sense-data  are  real.  As 
with  all  of  these  men,  however,  the  distinction  between  those 
entities  that  are  real  by  reason  of  their  connection  with  sense- 
data  and  those  entities  that  are  unreal  l>ecause  they  lack 
such  connection  is  not  drawn  so  clearly  as  might  be  desired. 
Events  remembered  to  have  taken  place  in  the  past  seem  to 
be  called  "real,"  if  there  is  a  continuity  from  them  to  the 
sense-data  present."^'  Another  statement  implies  that  entities 
not  sense-data  now  and  for  me  are  real  if  they  "can  be 
experienced  at  some  definite  time  by  some  experient."^"^ 
And  another  criterion  is  the  one  that  makes  entities  not 
sense-data  real  if  the  thought  of  them  "leads"  me  into  the 
presence  of  them.'^    But  with  any  or  all  of  these  criteria. 

"  James :    Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism,  p.   198. 

"James:    A  Pluralistic  Universe,  p.  252. 

'*  James:    Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism,  p.  42 

"  A  Pluralistic  Universe,  p.  279. 

'•  Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism,  p.  213. 

"'Ibid:   p.  160. 

""Ibid:   p.  55- 

56 


the  distinction,  I  say,  between  those  entities  not  sense-data 
that  are  real  and  those  that  are  unreal  is  quite  vague. 

Besides  these  meanings  of  "real,"  there  are  times  when 
James  uses  the  term  in  still  other  senses,  times  when  "real" 
means  neitlier  the  elemental  ihing-in-itself  nor  sense-data  as 
we  know  them  and  their  derivatives.  James  tends  in  some 
passages  to  use  the  term  in  a  sense  that  makes  all  things 
"real,"  and  so  makes  the  term  quite  valueless.  He  does  not 
deny  that  concepts  and  the  relations  between  them  are  just 
as  real  in  their  "eternal"  way  as  percepts  are  in  their  tem- 
poral way."^^  In  his  broad-minded  desire  to  recognize  all 
elements  in  the  universe,  he  seems  to  me  to  give  "reality" 
at  times  so  broad  a  meaning  that  it  loses  all  connotation  and 
becomes  altogether  unserviceable. 

I  quoted  above  a  passage  in  which  James  shows  his 
agreement  with  Bergson  with  regard  to  the  ontological 
status  of  sense-data.  Bergson,  that  is  to  say.  is  another 
who  at  times  uses  "real"  to  mean  sense-data.  Like  so 
many  of  the  recent  writers  who  imply  this  definition  of 
reality,  however,  he  apparently  regards  this  meaning  as 
so  entirely  a  matter  of  common-sense  that  he  nowhere 
comes  near  making  it  explicit.  Through  a  large  part 
of  his  writings  the  implication  is  apparent  that,  to  get 
at  the  world  as  it  is,  we  must  take  from  our  objects  the  part 
that  is  added  by  the  intellect  and  so  get  at  the  crude  data. 
"We  must  appeal  to  experience — an  experience  purified,  or, 
in  other  words,  released,  where  necessary,  from  the  molds 
that  our  intellect  has  formed  in  the  degree  and  proportion 
of  the  progress  of  our  action  on  things. "^^  Time  and  states 
of  consciousness  have  really  no  magnitude.  As  we  are 
aware  of  them  they  have  a  magnitude,  it  is  true,  but  this 
magnitude  is  read  into  them  by  intellect.  Real  time,  states 
of  consciousness  as  they  really  are,  are  without  any  such 
magnitude.  Spatial  entities  come  through  the  process  of 
getting  known  unscathed;  their  content  is  not  distorted. 
That  is  to  say,  the  mind  is  well  equipped  to  handle  such 
entities.  But  temporal  entities  have  their  content  altered  in 
the  process  of  getting  known.  And  so  do  psychological 
data.     "Now  just  as,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  real  relations 

^ James:    Some  Problems  of  Philosophy,  p.   loi.     Cf.  also:    Some 
Problems  of  Philosophy,  p.  7S,  and  Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism,  p.  17. 
*  Bergson  :    Creative  Evolution ;   translation  by  Mitchell,  p.  363. 

57 


of  physical  phenomena  to  one  another,  we  abstract  what- 
ever obviously  clashes  with  them  in  our  way  of  perceiving 
and  thinking,  so,  in  order  to  view  the  self  in  its  original 
purity,  psychology  ought  to  eliminate  or  correct  certain 
forms  which  bear  the  obvious  mark  of  the  external  world. "^^ 
It  is  the  crude  material,  then,  that  is  real.  That  part  of  the 
objects  of  our  consciousness  that  is  due  to  intellect  is  unreal. 
''Real"  is  being  used  once  more  in  the  sense  in  which  it 
means  crude  data. 

And  there  are  many  other  arguments,  so  common  that 
they  need  not  be  identified  with  any  one  man.  that  imply  the 
reality  of  sense-data.  Where  we  find  the  word  "assump- 
tion" there  is  nearly  always  this  meaning  of  reality  lurk- 
ing in  the  background.  The  reality  of  sense-data  is  seldom 
''assumed";  it  is  undoubted,  [kit  the  reality  of  entities  that 
are  not  sense-data  is  not  quite  certain;  such  entities  are 
hypothetical,  they  are  assumptions. 

Then,  there  are  the  apologists  for  religion  who  say  that 
there  are  many  things  we  do  and  must  believe  on  faith, 
and  that  God  belongs  in  this  class.  The  implication  is  that 
sense-data  are  nn(|uestionably  real."-  Other  entities  are 
probably  real,  are  to  be  held  as  real  though  we  have  not 
seen  them  but  have  them  only  on  authorit\- or  hearsay;  and 
it  is  argued  that  there  should  be  attributed'  to  God  this  same 
inferred  reality  that  we  give  to  earthly  entities  we  do  not 
ourselves  directly  experience.  Those  who  deny  God  because 
He  is  not  a  sense-datum  are,  of  course,  using  "real"  in  this 
same  sense.  God  is  unreal  because  "real"  is  being  used  to 
denote  sense-data  exclusively. 

And  finally  there  are  such  questions  as:  How  are  uni- 
versal judgments  possible?  We  can  know  the  particular 
cases  that  we  or  others  have  met  with  in  experience,  but 
how  can  we  know  those  particulars  that  are  subsumed  under 
the  universal  which  we  have  not  yet  experienced?^  We  can 
undoubtedly  make  true  judgments  about  objects  of  experi- 
ence, but  a  knowledge  of  other  objects  is  questionable. 
Sense-data  are  real ;  the  knowledge  of  them  raises  no  ques- 
tion. But  other  objects,  in  what  sense  are  they  real,  or,  at 
least,   knowable:^     In  all   of  these  cases   "real"   is  used  to 


4 


81 
82 


Bergson:    Time  and  Free  Will ;    translation  hy  Pogson.  pp   223,224 
St.  Augustine:    Confessions,  VI,  5. 

=;8 


denote  with  certainty  all  sense-data,  while  the  application 
of  the  term  to  other  entities  is  fraught  w^ith  some  doubt, 
calls  for  some  hesitation  and  requires  explanation. 

One  man  uses  "real"  to  mean  the  crude  data,  another 
to  mean  objects  of  "experience" ;  one  to  mean  causes  of  per- 
ception, another  to  mean  objects  of  perception;  one  to  mean 
sense-data  alone,  another  to  mean  objects  of  memory  also, 
and  still  another  to  mean,  in  addition,  any  entity  vaguely 
connected  with  sense-data.  All  these  are  shades  of  meaning 
given  to  "real"  while  that  term,  generally  speaking,  still 
points  especially  towards  sense-data.  Now,  the  account  I 
have  given  of  these  "reals"  is  like  an  elementary  history 
of  philosophy  that  would  content  itself  with;  "Thales  said: 
'All  is  water' ;  Anaximander  said  ;  'All  is  the  indefinite'  " ; 
that  is,  it  is  like  a  syllabus  that  catalogs  the  opinions  men 
have  held  without  stating  the  reasons  for  these  opinions. 
I  have  mentioned  Epicurus,  Bacon,  Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume, 
Kant,  Mach,  Pearson,  James  and  Bergson,  and  to  each  I 
have  attributed  one  or  more  meanings  of  "real'';  but  I  have 
not  explained  why,  for  each  of  these  men,  "real"  has  the 
meaning  that  it  has.  The  fault,  however,  is  not  mine,  but 
theirs.  Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  "real"  is  used  in  so 
many  dififerent  senses,  a  writer  will  clearly  imply  that  the 
term  has,  for  him,  one  of  these  meanings  in  particular;  and 
still  he  will  give  no  reason  for  his  choice,  nor  even  call 
attention  to  the  fact  that  he  might  have  chosen  dififerently. 

In  fact,  no  one  seems  to  be  aware  that  he  might  have 
chosen  differently.  To  each  "Reality"  seems  to  consist, 
fixedly  and  objectively,  of  those  entities  that  he  has  denoted 
"real."  He  seems  not  to  know  that  reality  is  not  "there" 
before  the  term  "real"  is  given  a  meaning;  nor  is  he  aware 
that  a  different  reality  is  there  if  "real"  is  defined  differ- 
ently. And  so  he  confidently  makes  assertions  that  follow 
directly  from  the  definition  of  reality  he  has  assumed,  but 
which  would  by  no  means  be  true  were  "real"  interpreted 
in  a  different  sense.  Perhaps  he  says  wdth  some  feeling : 
"To  know  reality  we  must  appeal  to  experience."  This  is 
quite  true  if  "real"  has  the  sort  of  meaning  we  have  chiefly 
considered  in  this  chapter,  if  it  means  sense-data,  experi- 
enced entities.  But  if  "real"  denotes  the  sort  of  entities 
that    are    not    experienced — Platonic    ideas,    mathematical 

59 


formulcT,   the   Infinite,   the  miracles   of   the   Old   and   New 
Testaments — this   statement   is   quite   as   evidently   untrue. 
Sensationalism,  that  is  to  say,  may  be  (juite  close  to  one's 
heart,  and  yet  he  based  entirely  on  the  definition  of  "reality" 
that  is  implied.     The  question:    "How  are  universal  judg- 
ments possible?"   would  not  excite  one   who  did  not   start 
out  with  a  bias  towards  the  ontological  priority  of  sense- 
data.      And    so.    too,    with    anti-intellectualism.      The    dis- 
satisfaction both  James  and  Bergson  feel  with  the  intellect 
results   from   the    fact   that   the  objects  of   intellectualized 
awareness  are  not  'Veal"— "real"  being  taken  in  the  special 
sense  in  which  it  means  sense-data.     So  much  that  we  hold 
important  is  apt  to  depend  on  the  definition  of   'Veality" 
implied,  that  we  ought  at  least  to  make  this  definition  ex- 
plicit and  to  state  the  reason  we  employ  the  definition  we 
do  rather  than  some  other. 


t 


•     t  p 


CHAPTER    IV 

Thk  Rkal  as  That  which  is  Related. 

A  great  number  of  the  events  that  pass  before  our  con- 
sciousness seem  to  accord  with  one  another  quite  well ; 
they  form,  so  to  speak,  a  coherent  group  of  phenomena. 
All  of  the  members  of  this  group  are,  for  example,  in  space, 
each  one  being  at  a  certain  distance  from  each  other  one. 
Or  they  are  all  in  time;  any  one  is  simultaneous  with,  or 
before,  or  after,  some  other  one.  Perhaps  we  consider 
them  as  all  being  subject  to  the  same  laws ;  there  are  strik- 
ing similarities,  we  say.  in  the  way  all  of  them  behave.  If 
we  have  near  the  earth  an  unsupported  body  whose  density 
is  greater  than  that  of  the  air  around  it,  it  always  falls  to 
the  ground.  Whenever  a  body  is  tilted  so  that  its  center 
of  mass  falls  beyond  its  base,  the  body  always,  if  left  to 
itself,  tumbles  over.  All  of  these  entities  form,  in  short,  a 
system  of  coherent,  related  phenomena.  But  there  are 
other  objects  that  we  are  sometimes  aware  of  that  do  not 
fit  into  this  system.  In  our  dreams,  in  books,  or  even  in  our 
waking  life,  we  are  aware  of  objects  that  behave  in  ways 
that  do  not  accord  with  our  usual  experience.  We  meet 
with  dogs  that  speak,  with  fairy  godmothers,  with  giants 
and  ogres  and  centaurs  and  unicorns.  Now,  it  is  not  un- 
usual to  call  these  objects  that  do  not  agree  with  our  ordi- 
nary experience  unreal  and  to  call  those  that  fit  into  a 
coherent  system  real.  Using  'Veal"  in  this  sense,  entities 
that  form  part  of  an  interrelated  whole  are  real,  and  those 
outside  of  this  system  are  unreal.  The  real  entity  is  the 
one  that  coheres  in  an  ordered  universe  of  related  phenom- 
ena. And  the  unreal  entity  is  the  one  that  is  eccentric, 
peculiar,  unrelated  to  the  world  with  which  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  deal. 

Basing  his  interpretation  on  certain  passages  in  the 
Saggiatore,^^  Cassirer*^"*  says  that  Galileo  holds  that  a  large 
part  of  science  is  to  be  concerned  with  the  derivation  of 


83 


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60 


390. 


Galileo:    Opcre,  vol.  4,  pp.  174,  258  (Edition  by  Alberi). 

Cassirer :    Das  Erkenntnisprohlem,  Second  Edition,  vol-  i,  pp.  389, 

61 


plienomena  from  one  another,  and  that  "as  long  as  this 
derivation  is  not  reached  we  possess  no  guarantee  that  we 
move  in  the  reahn  of  true  Being  and  not  in  an  invented 
world  of  fable."  That  is  to  say,  it  is  the  entities  that  form 
an  interrelated  system  that  are  real,  and  tlie  isolated,  un- 
related ones  that  are  unreal;  and  it  is  only  when  we  are 
aware  of  its  interrelations  that  we  can  he  sure  a  phenomenon 
before  us  is  real.  An  entity  related  to  the  general  system 
of  entities,  accordingly,  is  real.  The  term  "real"  is  used 
to  point  to  these  entities;  it  uicans  these  entities.  We  have 
before  us.  consequently,  one  of  these  cases  w^here  "real" 
points  to  the  component  parts  of  a  coherent  system,  and 
where  "unreal"  points  to  the  unrelated  entity  that  stands 
outside  of  this  system.  An  entity  to  he  "real"  in  this 
sense  of  the  term  must  sustain  certain  relations  to  other 
parts  of  the  universe. 

But,  we  may  ask.  what  sort  of  relations  must  an  entity 
have  in  order  thus  to  he  called  "real?"  It  is  not,  accord- 
ingly to  Cassirer.  on  the  basis  of  its  co-ordination  with  other 
individual  phenomena  that  (lalileo  calls  an  entity  "real." 
It  IS  only  when  the  object  in  question  agrees  with  the 
generalizations  that  are  called  scientific  laws  that  it  is  real. 
When  a  phenomenon  is  consistent  with  the.-e  laws  it  is  real, 
when  it  is  inconsistent  with  thetn  it  is  unreal,  and  when  its 
relation  to  these  laws  of  nature  is  not  known  we  ix>ssess 
no  assurance  of  its  reality.  Can  we  say  that  such  a  notion 
of  reality,  whether  it  be  really  Galileo's  or  l)e  incorrectly 
attributed  to  him  by  Cassirer.  is  true  or  false?  We  can, 
indeed,  ask  whether,  by  an  application  of  this  definition 
to  individual  entities,  the  same  entities  would  be  called 
"real"  that  are  so  called  in  ordinary  parlance.  But  it  would 
be  extremely  hard  to  find  out  except  in  the  most  unenlight- 
ening  terms  w^hat  entities  are  called  "real"  in  ordinary  par- 
lance. For  the  present,  then,  let  us  be  content  simply  to 
regard  this  notion  of  reality  as  involving  a  conceivable 
definition  of  the  term  "real."  It  is  not  to  1)e  described  as 
true  or  false,  but  merely  as  possible. 

In  our  dreaming  as  in  our  waking  life  we  are  aware  of 
objects.  In  the  one  as  well  as  in  the  other  there  passes 
before  our  consciousness  a  series  of  events  of  the  greatest 
variety — battles,  conversations,  murders,  loves.     Jjut  the  one 

62 


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>j 


>» 


series  of  events  is  usually  called  "unreal"  and  the  other  for 
the  most  part  called  "real."  Now  when  we  start  out  with  a 
determination  to  call  dream  entities  "unreal,"  we  are  usuallv 
led  to  a  use  of  the  term  "real"  according  to  which  this  term 
is  applied  to  phenomena  belonging  to  a  system  of  inter- 
related entities,  and  is  not  applied  to  unrelated  entities.  For 
when  we  attempt  to  find  the  marks  that  distinguish  dream 
objects  from  others,  the  distinction  that  is  most  frequently 
hit  upon  is  the  incoherence  and  absurdity  of  the  former,  the 
impossibility  of  fitting  them  into  our  experience  as  a  whole, 
and  the  coherence  and  unbroken  connections  betw^een  the 
|)ai-ts  of  the  latter,  ft  is  not  the  lack  of  vividness  that  dis- 
tinguishes dream  objects,  for,  as  Hobbes  says,^'  "they  are 
clearer  than  the  imaginations  of  waking  men,  except  such 
as  are  made  by  sense  itself,  to  which  they  are  equal  in  clear- 
ness." No,  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  dream 
objects  is  their  unrelatedness;  it  is  this  unrelatedness  that 
makes  them  dreams  and  makes  them  unreal.  Consequently, 
when  we  call  dreams  "unreal,"  we  are  usually  using  "real 
in  the  sense  in  which  it  means  the  related  entity  and  "unreal 
in  the  sense  in  which  it  means  the  unrelated  one.  "Real," 
accordingly,  is  being  given  a  meaning  similar  to  that  which 
we  have  just  discussed  in  connection  with  Galileo.  And 
"unreal"  again  means  the  strange  incoherent  object  that 
stands  outside  of  the  system  of  entities  that  are  related  to 
(^ne  another  and  that  behave  in  similar  ways. 

Descartes  comes  to  use  "real"  in  this  sense  when  he  con- 
siders the  characteristics  of  dream  entities.  "And  I  ottght," 
he  says  at  the  end  of  his  "Meditations,"  "to  set  aside  all  the 
doubts  of  these  past  few  days  as  hyperbolical  and  ridiculous, 
especially  that  very  cotnmon  uncertainty  respecting  sleep, 
which  1  could  not  distinguish  from  the  waking  state;  for 
at  present  1  find  a  very  notable  difference  between  the  two, 
inasmuch  as  our  memory  can  never  connect  our  dreams  one 
with  the  other,  or  with  the  whole  course  of  our  lives,  as  it 
unites  events  which  happen  to  us  while  we  are  awake.  And, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  if  some  one.  while  I  was  awake,  quite 
suddenly  appeared  to  me  and  disappeared  as  fast  as  do  the 
images  which  I  see  in  sleep,  so  that  I  could  not  know  from 
whence  the  form  came  nor  whither  it  went,  it  would  not 

'^'  Hobbes :    Dc  Corporc,  part  4,  chapter  25,  section  9. 

63 


4 


ti»' 


be  without  reason  that  I  should  deem  it  a  spectre  or  a 
phantom  formed  by  my  brain  [and  similar  to  those  which 
T  form  in  sleepl,  rather  than  a  real  man."  'Phat  is  to  say, 
dreams  are  unconnected  and  wakino  life  is  connected.  And 
dream  objects,  it  is  implied,  are  unreal,  and  the  connected 
objects  of  wakin-  life  real.  "Real"  accordin-ly.  is  bein- 
used  to  mean  that  which  is  related  and  "unrear^  to  mean 
that  which  is  unrelated.  And  the  interrelation  that  ^.s  in- 
sisted upon  with  respect  to  real  objects  is  not  merely  a  con- 
sistency with,  and  deducibility  from,  the  general  laws  of 
science.  A  phenomenon  to  be  real,  as  Descartes  seems  to  say 
in  the  same  paragraph,  must  be  one  such  that  no  evidence 
can  be  brought  forward  by  the  senses,  the  memory,  or  the 
understanding,  that  is  repugnant  to  it. 

Let  us  stop  here  for  a  while  to  examine  this  notion  of 
repugnance.      Let  us  see   what  sort  of  evidence  might   l)e 
brought  forward  that  would  be  repugnant  to  a  given  object. 
There    are    undoubtedly    propositions    that    Galileo    and 
Descartes    would    have  'considered    intelligible    laws.       We 
may  mention  as  examples  the  rule  that  every  event  has  a 
cause  and  the  law  that  all  bodies  fall  to  the  earth  with  a  con- 
stant acceleration.     Accordingly,  a  phenomenon  that  had  no 
cause,  or  one  whose  motion  towards  the  earth  took  place  in 
a  different   fashion.  w(nil(l  be  a  phenomenon  repugnant  to 
these  intelligible  laws.      Since,  moreover,  consistency  with 
these  laws  is  a  requisite  of  reality,  such  an  entity  would  be 
an  unreal  entity.     Now  such  a  rule  seems  to  me  to  give  a 
perfectly   self-consistent  method   of   separating  out  certain 
phenomena  as  unreal,  though  the  reach  of  phenomena  to 
which  it  may  be  applied  is  limited  by  the  number  of  mtelh- 
gible  laws  that  are  definitely  laid  down.     One  cannot,  for 
example,  applv  this  rule  to  exclude  from  reality  my  riding 
in  an  aeroplane  last  Tuesday  unless  there  is  some  intelligible 
law  with  which  >uch  a  phenomenon  is  inconsistent.     And 
these  laws  must,  1  say,  be  laid  down  with  some  definiteness ; 
otherwise  it  would  be  impossible  to  apply  them.     It  may  be 
mentioned  that,  if  reality  is  defined  in  this  way,  the  particular 
laws  that  are  laid  down  1)ec()me  immune   from  overthrow 
by  what  are  known  as  negative  instances,  for  the  negative 
instances  are  thrown  out   by  definition  as  unreal  entities. 
But  it  is  none  the  less  possible  to  lay  down  definite  proposi- 

64 


tion^  as  intelligible  laws  and  to  call  those  entities  that  are 
consistent  with  them  real  and  those  that  are  inconsistent 
with  them  unreal.  We  have  here,  consequently,  another 
definition  of  reality,  or  rather  many  definitions,  since  the 
content  of  reality  will  varv'  as  the  specific  propositions  that 
are  laid  down  as  intelligible  laws  vary.  It  is  definitions  of 
this  sf>ecies  that  Galileo  and  Descartes  imply,  I  think,  insofar 
as  they  use  the  term  "real"  to  point  to  entities  that  are  con- 
sistent with  the  eternal  verities  that  may  be  called  intelligible 
laws  and  the  term  "unreal"  to  point  to  entities  that  are  incon- 
sistent with  them. 

But  Descartes  also  requires  that  a  phenomenon  that  is  to 
be  called  "real"  be  consistent  with  the  evidence  of  the  senses 
and  the  memory,  with,  in  short,  "the  whole  course  of  our 
lives."  That  men  should  be  turned  into  stones,  or  should 
come  to  life  again  when  once  dead,  does  not  accord,  we  say, 
with  our  experience.  But  there  is  a  difference  to  be  noticed 
between  the  sort  of  accordance  spoken  of  here  and  that 
spoken  of  above.  In  the  absence  of  the  sort  of  consistency 
that  was  demanded  above  there  is  real  contradiction.  That 
event  A  should  occur  without  a  cause  is  contradictory  to 
the  law  that  all  events  have  causes.  But  the  assertion  that 
a  man  has  turned  into  a  stone  does  not  assert  a  phenomenon 
that,  precisely  speaking,  is  contradicted  by  our  experience. 
Such  a  phenomenon  is  one  that  our  experience  has  not 
accustomed  us  to  expect;  but  our  experience  being  limited 
to  particulars  cannot  contradict  it,  cannot  render  it  impossi- 
ble. Such  phenomena  are  sometimes  experienced ;  visions 
of  the  Virgin  Mary  are  by  no  means  unknown.  But  they 
are  phenomena  that  we  are  not  accustomed  to  experience. 
And  so  a  phenomenon  that  does  not  accord  with  our  ex- 
perience is  one  that  is  of  a  kind  that  we  do  not  usually 
experience.  It  is  a  rara  azns  that  is  dissimilar  to  w^hat  w-e 
usually  meet  with  in  the  course  of  our  lives.  Such  a  char- 
acterization of  the  unreal,  however,  is  as  yet,  I  am  afraid, 
too  vague.  It  is  not  sufficiently  definite  to  afford  us  a  means 
of  picking  out  any  group  of  specific  events  as  unreal.  For 
what  is  the  usual?  The  experiencing  of  devils  w^as  not 
at  all  unusual  in  the  Middle  Ages,  nor  w^as  the  experiencing 
of  witches  unusual  in  the  sixteenth  century.  To  determine 
what  is  usual,  we  are   forced  to  engage  in  a  counting  of 


65 


numbers  with  the  range  of  the  field  of  entities  that  are  to  be 
counted  quite  undetermined.     If  we  Hmit  ourselves  to  the 
experience  of  the  sixteenth  century  wdtches  are  not  unusual, 
though  if  we  take  into  consideration  the  experience  of  sub- 
sequent centuries  they  are.     Again,  substances  that  give  off 
emanations  are  unusual  in  our  experience,  though  pieces  of 
radium  that  give  off  such  emanations  are  not  rare.    Witches 
that  can  fiy  through  the  air  are  not  rare ;   most  witches  have 
that  power.     But  women  in  general  who  go  flying  through 
the  air  on  broomsticks  are  met  with  quite  seldom.     What 
is  usual,   in  short,   depends  entirely  on  the  range  of  phe- 
nomena we  take  into  consideration.     It  depends  on  what 
subjects  we  pick  out  whose  experiences  are  to  be  investi- 
gated, and  on  how  narrowly  we  circumscribe  the  phenomena 
whose  reality  is  to  be  considered. 

And  so  when  we  simply  say  that  an  entity  to  be  real  must 
accord   with   our  experience   and   do   not   lay   down   more 
specifically  the  sort  of  consistency  that  is  to  l)e  demanded, 
we  are  without  a  rule  by  which  we  can  exclude  entities  from 
reality  with  any  definiteness.     We  must  have  some  specific 
sort  of  consistency  with  experience  demanded,  so  that  we 
can  tell  by  applyitig  this  rule  to  an  individual  phenomenon 
whether  that  phenomenon  is  meant  to  be  called  "real"  or 
not.      More  concrete  demands  of  this  kind  are  sometimes 
laid  down.     Sometimes  it  is  said  that  an  entity  to  \yQ  real 
must  be  experienced  not  only  by  ourselves  but  by  those 
around  us :    A  ghost  that  I  see  but  that  no  one  in  the  room 
with  me  sees  is  unreal.     Such  a  rule  seems  to  me  to  give  a 
serviceable  definition  of  reality.     If  we  make  such  a  demand 
of  reality,  only  that  is  "real"  which  is  experienced  by  more 
than  one,  while  the  realm  of  the  unreal  includes  all  those 
entities  which  are  experienced  by  but  a  single  consciousness. 
Or  it  is  demanded  that  for  an  entity  to  be  'Veal"  one  must 
l)e  able  to  repeat  it  and  to  predict  it.     The  phenomenon  must 
be  a  recurring  phen(^menon  and  we  must  be  able  to  predict 
its  behavior  when  it  does  recur.     Here  too  we  have  a  rather 
specific  definition  of  reality.     It  enables  us  to  call  radium 
emanations  "real"  and  Jacob's  ladder  up  to  heaven  "unreal." 
I  believe  that  the  class  of  entities  marked  out  as  unreal  by 
each  of   these  definitions  excludes   some  entities  that  are 
commonlv    called    "real."      1    believe    common    sense,    for 

66 


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example,  would  call  many  phenomena  that  occur  but  once 
"real"  and  would  call  the  creation  of  some  entrancing  color 
a  real  event,  though  perhaps  it  could  not  be  repeated.  But 
I  do  not  want  to  enter  into  this  very  deeply,  for  I  find  it 
quite  impossible  in  many  cases  to  tell  w^hat  common  sense 
w'ould  call  "real."  The  naive  man's  use  of  the  term  "real" 
is  as  inchoate  as  the  contradictions  betw^een  the  many  senses 
in  which  philosophers  have  used  the  term  would  have  led 
one  to  expect  it  to  be;  and  his  use  of  it  has  varied  from 
generation  to  generation  as  the  philosopher's  has,  from  the 
Middle  Ages  when  devils  were  "real"  to  now  when  they  are, 
I  suppose,  "unreal."  But  these  two  definitions  are,  none  the 
less,  ways  in  which  "real"  may  be  defined. 

In  mentioning  these  two  more  specific  sorts  of  consist- 
ency with  experience  that  may  be  demanded  of  real  enti- 
ties, I  have  anticipated  somewhat.  For  Leibniz  is  the  first 
philosopher  in  whose  writings  I  have  found  them  laid  down. 

Leibniz  uses  the  "real"  to  mean  "that  which  is  related" 
to  a  much  greater  extent  than  does  an}-  previous  philoso- 
pher. With  him  the  notion  is  by  no  means  thrown  out  in 
stray  passages ;  it  is  a  notion  that  is  expressed  f  requendy 
and  with  considerable  elaboration.  The  world  of  real  enti-  '^ 
ties  is  conceived  as  a  system  of  interrelated  compossible 
entities.  And  on  the  other  hand,  an  unreal  entity  is  one 
that  finds  no  place  open  for  it  in  this  system,  one  that  lacks 
the  manifold  relations  that  characterize  real  entities.  For  y 
the  world  of  real  entities  is  chocked  full  of  relations;  each 
one  of  these  entities  enters  into  relations  with  the  others  so 
that  all  together  they  form  an  organic  system  in  w'hich  each 
bit  is  essential.  We  cannot  tamper  with  the  slightest  part 
without  having  the  whole  universe,  so  to  speak,  come  tumb- 
ling down  on  our  hands.  And  while  all  the  entities  within 
the  system  are  inextricably  bound  to  one  another,  they  are 
jointly  and  severally  free  from  relations  w'ith  entities  out- 
side it.  And  so  we  have  this  notion  that  the  real  is  that 
which  is  related  quite  unmistakably  before  us.  xAn  entity 
is  "real"  if  it  belongs  in  the  system,  if  it  sustains  the  sort 
of  relations  that  all  real  entities  do  sustain  towards  one 
another.  And  it  is  "unreal"  if  it  comes  without  antecedents 
and  goes  without  consequents,  a  stranger  that  has  no  con- 
nection wath  the  interrelated  world  we  know. 

67 


But  just   what  sort  of  relations  are  we  talking  about? 
What   sort  of   relations  does  an  entity  that   is  within  the 
system  and  is  to  be  called  "real"  sustain  ?'     And  what  sort 
of   relations   does   an   "unreal"   entity   that   is   outside  the 
system  lack?     As  with  Descartes,  what  are  demanded  of 
real  entities  are  relations  with  the  intelligible  laws  and  with 
the  course  of  our  experience.     "The  basis  of  the  truth  of 
contingent  and  singular  things  is  in  the  succession  which 
causes  these  phenomena  of  the  senses  to  be  rightly  united 
as  the  intelligible  truths  demand."''^'  And  a  phenomenon  to 
be  real  must  agree  with  experience.     ''Undoubtedly/'  says 
Leibniz,'' •    "the   strongest   proof"    (of   the   reality  of   phe- 
nomena, he  means)  "is  the  agreement  with  the  whole  course 
of  life."     Entities  that  do  so  agree  with  the  whole  course 
of  life  he  uses  the  term  "real"  to  denote.     And  entities  that 
lack   this   consistency    wnth   experience   he   calls    "unreal." 
"We  can  neither  know  nor  ought  we  to  desire  anything  of 
sensible   things  than  that  they  harmonize   as   well   among 
themselves  as  with  indubitable  reasons,  and  in  such  a  way 
that  future  things  may  in  a  certain  degree  be  foreseen  from 
past  things.     Any  other  truth  or  reality  will  be  sought  in 
them  in  vain  than  that  which  this  vouches  for.  nor  ought 
sceptics  ask  anything  else  nor  the  dogmatics  promise  it.«^ 
For  it  is  these  interrelated  entities,  as  I  look  at  it,  that  the 
term  "real"   means.     They   are   "real"   because   Leibniz   is 
calling  them  "real."     And  men  moving  through  the  air, 
"sitting  upon  the  hyppogryphs  of  Ariosto,""-'  are  "unreal" 
because  they  do  not  accord  with  experience  and  therefore 
belong  to  the  class  of  entities  that  Leibniz  designates  by  the 
term  "unreal."     That  which  is  related  is  the  real  and  that 
which  is  unrelated  the  unreal.     This  is  the  meaning  Leibniz 
gives  these  words.    At  times,  indeed,  there  is  a  more  definite 
description  of  the  characteristics  of  the  related  entities  that 
are  real.      Real   entities  are  now   those  that  appear  in  the 
experience  of  others  and  now — and  this,  indeed,  is  insisted 

^Leibniz:    New  Essays  on  the  Human  Understanding,  Bk,  4,  ch.  4. 
section  4. 

*'Langlcy:    Leibniz's  New  Essays,  etc.  (1916),  p.  718;  Gerhardt.  vol. 

7,  p.  320. 

**  Duncan :     Philosophical  Works  of  Leibniz,   2nd  ed.,  p.   d8— Anim- 
adversions on  Descartes's  Principles  of  Philosophy"— On  Article  4. 

**Langley:    New  Essays,  etc.  (1916),  p.  718;  Gerhardt,  vol.  7.  P-  320- 

68 


I 


on  more  frequently — they  are  entities  that  can  be  foretold. 
But  it  is  not  their  vividness  that  makes  these  objects  real 
and  not  their  clearness  and  distinctness;  it  is  their  related- 
ness. 

To  a  considerable  extent,  however,  even  entities  that  are 
related  are  not  surely  real.  A  *Veal"  entity  becomes  quite 
mysterious  and  its  properties  quite  undiscoverable.  There 
is  hardly  any  entity  that  one  can  put  one's  finger  on  and  say 
with  assurance  that  it  is  denoted  by  the  term  "real."  Even 
if  an  entity  has  all  of  the  relations  that  have  been  mentioned, 
we  still  cannot  be  quite  sure  that  it  is  meant  by  the  term 
"real."  "By  no  argument  can  it  be  absolutely  demonstrated 
that  there  are  bodies,  nor  anything  keep  certain  well-ordered 
dreams  from  being  objects  to  our  mind  w^hich  are  considered 
by  us  as  true,  and  on  account  of  the  agreement  among  them- 
selves with  respect  to  use  are  equivalent  to  truths. "^'^  Such 
well-ordered  dreams  would  still  be  dreams  and  as  such 
unreal.  Most  related  entities  are,  indeed,  real,  but  some,  in 
spite  of  their  relations,  may  be  unreal.  We  never  can  tell 
wdiether  an  entitv  before  us  is  real  or  not,  and  that  not 
because  we  are  unable  to  discover  the  qualities  that  go  with 
reality,  but  because  there  are  no  qualities — such  as  w^e  have 
taken  relatedness  to  be — that  invariably  go  wath  reality — 
because  there  is  no  definite  class  of  entities  that  "real"  is 
being  used  to  point  out — because,  in  short,  the  term  "real'* 
is  being  used  without  meaning.  If,  no  matter  how  much 
of  relatedness  or  of  whatever  other  quality  you  please  w^e 
admit  in  bodies,  we  still  can  not  say  that  bodies  exist,  then 
^'existence"  is  being  used  without  meaning.  Agnosticism 
is  a  conceivable  theory  if  reality  is  given  some  rather  definite 
content  and  that  content  declared  undiscoverable.  But  it  is 
meaningless  if  the  term  "reality"  that  points  to  what  is  for- 
ever hidden  points  to  nothing  that  can  be  conceived.  And 
that  is  the  sort  of  agnosticism  we  have  here.  Reality  has 
no  definite  characteristics;  related  entities  as  w^ell  as  un- 
related ones  may  be  unreal;  the  term  "real"  points  to  noth- 
ing. 

Yet  in  spite  of  his  wavering  it  was  Leibniz  who  brought 
into  fashion  this  notion  that  the  "fictitious"  phenomenon 
is  the  strange  event  out  of  accord  with  experience  and  the 


»0 


Langley  :     New  Essays,  etc.,  p.  719;  Gerhardt;  vol.  7.  p.  320. 

69 


^Veal"  event  the  one  that  belongs  to  an  interrelated  system. 
The  romance  of  Astraea  is  unreal  because  it  does  not  fit  in 
with  our  world;  it  could  only  be  real  if  all  our  world  were 
different.^^     Dream  objects,  hyppogryphs,  and  all  such  en- 
tities are  unreal  because  they  are  strange  phenomena  that 
stand  outside  of  the  connections  that  relate  the  various  parts 
of  our  ordinary  experience  and  are  not  subject  to  the  uni- 
formities that  hold  there.     Christian  Wolff  takes  up  the 
same  theme ;  he  uses  the  term  '^unreal"  to  point  to  the  same 
class  of  entities.    In  a  dream  ''while  you  look  at  someone,  he 
suddenly  changes  into  someone  else  or  he  vanishes  straight- 
way and  no  one  comes  back  to  take  his  place. "^^     Things 
hai)pen  in  a  strange,  haphazard,  and  unreasonable  manner. 
And  it  is  this  that  distinguishes  them  from  real  entities  and 
makes  them  dreams.     In  the  interrelations  of  real  entities 
there  is  order,  and  in  dreams  there  is  none.     Consequently, 
"order   distinguishes  truth    from   fable."^^      The   "real''   is 
the  ordered,  the  related;  and,   since  all  the   relations  that 
hold  between  the  ordinary  objects  of  our  experience  are 
summed  up  in  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  a  real  entity 
is  one  that  is  subject  to  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason. 
"If  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  is  removed,  the  real 
world  turns  into  a  fictitious  world  in  which  we  must  look 
to  the  will  of  man  rather  than  to  reason  for  the  explanation 
of  the  things  that  happen. ^^     It  is  order,  then,  subjection 
to  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  that  "real"  means.     An 
ens  veruni,  a  real  entity,  is  defined  as  one  in  which  "order  is 
given  in  the  qualities  that  meet  in  it."^^^     But  what  sort  of 
order  is  required  is  not  said;  the  meaning  of  the  term  is  left 
more  formal  and  indefinite  than  by  Leibniz. 

According  to  Wolff,  if  we  take  away  the  principle  of 
sufficient  reason  the  real  world  turns  into  the  world  of  fic- 
tion. We  can  have  no  reality  at  all  without  it,  or,  in  other 
words,  order,  relatedness,  is  a  presupposition  of  reality. 
Of  course,  relatedness  is  a  presupposition  of  reality  taken 
in  the  sense  in  which  Wolff  uses  that  term.  For.  for  him 
"  Letter  to  Bonrgct.    Latta :  Monadology,  etc.,  p.  64.  note  2 ;  Gerhardt, 

vol.  3,  P-  572- 

*=  Wolff:  Ontologia,  §  493- 

''Ibid:  §494- 

^  Ibid:    §  77.     Cf.  also:    Verniinftiges  Gedanken  von  Gott,  dcr  Welt, 

auch  alien  Dingen  iibcrhaupt,  §  142,  ct  scq. 
Ontologia,  §  4«>6. 

70 


i 


i 


I 


60 


f 


reality  means  relatedness,  and  naturally,  if  there  is  no 
relatedness  there  can  be  no  reality.  It  is  just  as  correct, 
however,  to  say  that  reality  is  a  presupposition  of  related- 
ness. For  if  all  reality  were  done  away  with,  there  could 
be  none  of  the  relatedness  that  is  equivalent  to  it.  The 
assertion  that  relatedness  is  the  presupposition  of  reality 
comes  to  no  more  and  to  no  less  than  the  definition  of  the 
real  as  the  related.  It  is  defining  the  term  "real;"  though, 
in  view  of  the  indefinite  character  of  the  demand  that  an 
entity  be  consistent  with  the  whole  course  of  our  lives,  it  is 
giving  a  definition  that  is  not  very  serviceable.  And  it  is 
one  definition  out  of  many.  The  "real"  may  be  defined  as 
that  which  is  clear  and  distinct  or  as  the  vivid  object  of 
consciousness  as  easily  as  it  may  be  defined  as  the  related. 
And  so  when  Wolff  and  Kant  talk  about  the  presupposi- 
tions of  reality,  they  are  not  coming  to  the  subject  with  a 
more  fundamental  consideration  than  anyone  else.  They 
are  bringing  forward  their  own  notion  of  reality,  a  notion 
that  requires  further  elaboration  if  it  is  to  be  at  all  service- 
able in  distinguishing  the  real  from  the  unreal,  but  one 
that  at  least  potentially  is  a  definition  of  reality. 

In  Kant  the  notion  that  the  real  is  that  which  is  related 
IS  rather  common.  In  our  discussion  of  the  view  that  identi- 
fies the  real  primarily  with  sense-data,  we  have  already 
considered  those  passages  in  the  "Critique  of  Pure  Reason" 
that  say  that  "whatever  is  connected  according  to  empirical 
laws  with  a  perception  is  real."^^  In  those  passages  per- 
ceptions are  called  "real,"  certainly.  But  so  is  the  whole 
group  of  entities  connected  with  them,  the  entities  that 
with  them  form  an  ordered  system  of  interrelated  entities. 
From  one  point  of  view  "real"  in  these  passages  means 
perceptions  and  the  entities  connected  with  them.  But  from 
another  point  of  view  it  means  the  elements  in  an  ordered 
concatenated  whole  of  which  perceptions  are  a  part.  How, 
now,  are  we  to  tell  an  entity  that  is  connected  with  a  per- 
ception according  to  empirical  laws  from  one  that  is  not? 
In  short,  what  sort  of  relatedness  to  a  perception  must  an 
entity  show  in  order  to  be  "real"?  We  have  noticed  above 
two  sorts  of  relations  that  may  be  demanded  of  entities 
that  are  to  be  called  "real."  Either  it  is  required  that  such 
real  entities  be  in  accord  with  the  whole  course  of  experi- 

"Kant:   Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  ist  edition,  p.  ^7^,    Cf.  also  p.  22S- 

71 


ence.  Or  it  is  required  that  they  do  not  contradict  definite 
intelligil)le  laws.  In  Kant's  case  it  is  the  latter  requirement 
rather  than  the  former  that  is  emphasized.  A  ''real"  entity 
is  one  that  is  connected  with  a  perception  in  the  way  that 
the  concepts  of  the  understanding  require.  And  more  par- 
ticularly, a  "real"  entity  is  one  such  that  its  relation  to  a 
perception  does  not  contradict  the  a  priori  laws  laid  down 
in  the  "Analogies  of  Experience."  P'^or  a  phenomenon  to 
be  called  "real"  then,  it  mubt  not  contradict  the  law  that  the 
quantity  of  substance  is  permanent,  the  law  that  every  event 
has  a  cause,  or  the  law  that  there  is  dynanucal  interaction 
between  contemporaneous  entities.  I  describe  these  laws  as 
being  laid  down  so  that  existence  may  be  defined  in  terms  of 
them;  Kant  calls  them  i)resuppositions  of  existence.  It  is 
through  the  concepts  of  the  understanding  alone  "that 
knowledge  and  determination  of  an  object  ])ecome  possi- 
ble."^^  With  respect  to  the  second  of  these  three  laws  he 
makes  this  assertion  more  frequently.  It  is  the  relation  of 
cause  and  effect,  he  says,  "which  forms  the  condition  of  the 
objective  validity  of  our  empirical  judgments  with  regard 
to  the  series  of  perceptions,  and,  therefore,  also  the  condi- 
tion of  the  empirical  truth  of  them  and  of  experience. "^^ 
And  again  :^^  "The  law  of  nature  that  everything  which 
happens  has  a  cause,  ....  this  law,  through  which  alone 
phenomena  become  nature  and  objects  of  experience,  is  a 
law  of  the  understanding  which  can  on  no  account  be  sur- 
rendered and  from  which  no  single  phenomenon  can  be 
exempted ;  because  in  doing  this  we  should  place  it  outside 
all  possible  experience,  separate  from  all  objects  of  possi- 
ble experience,  and  change  it  into  a  mere  fiction  of  the  mind 
or  a  cobweb  of  the  brain."  There  are  two  ways  in  which 
these  laws  can  become  the  conditions  of  existence.  Either 
existence  has  first  a  definite  meaning,  and  then  this  meaning 
is  found  to  be  such  that  whatever  is  real  is  consistent  with 
these  laws ;  or  else  these  laws  are  first  laid  down,  and  then 
the  "unreal"  is  defined  as  what  is  inconsistent  with  them 
and  "real"  given  a  definition  to  correspond.  The  former 
is  undoubtedly  the  more  usual  way  of  looking  at  the  rela- 
tion between  these  laws  and  reality.  But  if  reality  is  such 
a  vague  concept,  meaningless  until  defined,  we  cannot  make 

""Kant:    Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  ist  edition,  p.  310. 
^  Ibid:    p.  202. 

^fbid:    p.  542. 

72 


it  a  point  of  departure  in  our  argumentation  without  first 
defining  it.  We  may  say  that  Kant  means  by  reality  those 
partieiiLir  entities  that  are  consistent  with  these  three  laws 
and  that  thence  he  concludes  that  these  three  laws  are  con- 
ditions of  existence.  But,  assuming  now  that  reality  has 
been  used  in  many  different  senses,  a  certain  amount  of 
arbitrariness  must  come  in  at  some  point.  And  so  it  is 
quite  as  correct  to  say  that  Kant  lays  down  these  three  laws 
and  means  by  the  "real"  that  which  is  consistent  with  them 
and  by  the  "unreal"  that  which  contradicts  them. 

Inconsistency  here  means  real  contradiction.  We  are  not 
troubled  with  the  demand  for  a  vague  "accordance  with 
experience"  that  depends  on  whose  experience  and  on  how 
much  experience  we  consider;  the  "unreal"  is  that  which 
actually  contradicts  one  of  three  specific  laws.  An  appari- 
tion that  comes  and  goes  again,  that  causes  for  a  few 
minutes  a  sudden  increase  in  the  quantity  of  substance  in 
the  universe,  is  "unreal."  So  is  a  ghost  that  has  no  cause, 
that  springs  up  from  no  place;  and  so  is  an  isolated  phe- 
nomenon that  seems  neither  to  affect  nor  to  be  affected  by 
the  entities  around  it.  These  laws,  as  I  remarked  in  dis- 
cussing Galileo,  are  immune  from  overthrow  by  negative 
instances.  If  I  am  aware  of  an  apparent  increase  in  the 
amount  of  substance  in  the  world,  the  increase  of  substance 
is  unreal.  The  term  "unreal"  means  all  phenomena  that 
increase  the  total  quantity  of  substance.  If  we  find  an 
event  without  a  cause,  we  do  not  have  to  investigate  fur- 
ther to  determine  its  reality;  the  term  "unreal"  by  defini- 
tion points  to  just  such  an  object.  We  have  here  a  per- 
fectly possible  way  in  which  the  term  "real"  may  be  used. 
The  difficultv,  of  course,  is  that  these  laws  are  far  from 
definite.  If  we  were  told  just  what  a  cause  is  and  just  what 
constitutes  dynamical  interaction,  our  definition  of  reality 
would  be  much  more  serviceable.  If  dynamical  interaction 
were  something  quite  clear  and  specific,  there  would  be  cer- 
tain entities  that  we  should  immediately  be  able  to  call 
"unreal."  But  with  "dynamical  interaction"  a  vague  and 
unexplained  term,  no  entities  immediately  appear  to  be 
unreal.  No  entities  are  such  that  they  cannot  be  conceived 
to  fit  in  with  experience  in  some  way. 

The  real  is  sometimes  said  to  be  that  which  is  active,  that 
which  has  power  to  do  and  capacity  to  suffer,  that  which 

73 


can  act  and  be  acted  upon.  Plato  considers  this  sense  of  the 
word  ''real"  in  the  ^'Sophist."  He  says,  "My  notion  would 
be  that  anvthing  which  possesses  any  sort  of  power  to  affect 
another,  or  to  be  affected  by  another,  if  only  for  a  single 
moment,  however  trifling  the  cause  and  however  slight  the 
effect,  has  real  existence;  and  I  hold  that  the  definition  of 
being  is  simply  power."^^^  But  what  does  it  mean  to  be 
active?  How  can  we  pick  out  those  entities  that  have  power 
from  those  that  haven't  it?  Surely  no  entities  come  to  us 
pretending  to  be  inactive.  All  seem  able  to  do  and  to  suffer. 
Dragons  can  slay,  and,  with  courage  and  good  fortune,  can 
be  slain;  devils  arc  fearful  only  because  of  their  power  for 
evil.  Therefore  in  order  to  get  a  definite  content  for  the 
inactive  and  a  limited  content  for  the  active,  the  notion  of 
activity  must  be  defined  and  made  specific.  Often,  however, 
we  find  it  said  that  the  real  is  the  active  and  find  no  further 
explanation.  Aristotle  distinguishes  between  the  potential 
and  the  actual.  He  too  calls  the  real  the  actual,  that  which 
possesses  activity,  that  which  has  an  entelechy.  For  Leibniz 
again  the  real  is  that  which  possesses  force.  And  several 
Germans  since  his  day,  perhaps  on  account  of  the  common 
ancestry  of  the  noun  "IVirklichkcif  and  the  verb  "unrken'' 
have  described  reality  in  similar  terms.  For  example 
Platner,  whom  we  shall  mention  later  in  another  connection, 
says  that  to  exist  is  to  act  and  to  act  is  to  exist. ^^^  But  all 
of  these  definitions  of  reality  tell  us  very  little.  We  are 
almost  as  unable  to  distinguish  the  real  from  the  unreal  wdth 
them  as  we  should  be  without  them.  What  we  need  is  to 
have  this  concept  of  activity  defined  in  such  a  way  that  the 
inactive  will  have  some  content.  To  say  that  the  real  is  the 
active  is  as  valueless  as  it  is  to  sav  that  the  real  is  that  which 
Stands  in  dynamical  communion  with  other  entities.  Indeed 
the  definition  of  the  real  as  the  active  is  exactly  equivalent 
to  Kant's  assertion  that  for  an  entity  to  be  real  it  must  be 
subject  to  the  third  law  laid  down  in  the  "Analogies  of 
Experience."  That  which  can  act  and  be  acted  upon  is  that 
which  stands  in  a  dynamical  commtmion  with  the  objects 
contemporaneous  with  it.  And  just  as  the  principle  of 
dynamical  communion  is,  as  we  have  seen,  indefinite,  so  the 


Ml 


I 


\ 


IW 


Plato :     Sophist,  2466-2476. 
^"  Platner:    Philosophische  Aphorismen,  §  739,  Note 


74 


notion  of  activity  is  indefinite.  With  neither  concept  can 
we  point  to  any  entities  and  say  with  assurance  that  they 
are  real  or  that  they  are  unreal. 

The  real,  it  has  been  said,  is  that  which  is  related.  More 
specifically,  reality  has  been  limited  to  those  entities  that  are 
in  accord  with  our  experience  or  to  those  that  obey  certain 
intelligible  laws.  More  specific  yet,  however,  is  the  defini- 
tion of  reality  that  defines  real  entities  as  those  that  are  in 
space  and  in  time.  For  when  we  are  told  that  all  real 
objects  are  related  to  one  another  by  being  in  the  same  space 
and  the  same  time,  we  have  a  definition  that  gives  the  unreal 
some  content.  Many  objects  appear  not  to  be  in  space  and 
many  objects  appear  not  to  be  in  time.  If,  consequently, 
we  define  reality  in  terms  of  time  and  space,  these  objects 
are  forthwith  unreal.  Here  then  we  have  indeed  come  upon 
something  that  may  be  used  to  mark  out  the  real  from  the 
unreal,  something  that  enables  us  to  say  forthwUh  that  cer- 
tain definite  entities  are  unreal. 

We  have  already  met  with  a  passage  in  Plato  that  lays 
down  the  thesis  that  whatever  is  not  in  time  is  unreal.  An 
object  that  does  not  participate  in  time  does  not  participate 
in  being.  ^^^^  When  we  come  down  to  Hobbes.  we  find  a 
similar  attitude  taken  with  respect  to  space.  ''If  the  triangle 
exists  nowhere  at  all,"  he  writes,  ''I  do  not  understand  how 
it  can  have  any  nature;  for  that  which  exists  nowhere  does 
not  exist. "^^^  Sometimes  it  is  required  of  a  real  entity  only 
that  it  be  in  time,  sometimes  only  that  it  be  in  space.  But 
more  often  the  two  requirements  are  joined.  Reality  is  made 
conditional  upon  the  possession  of  both  a  position  in  time 
and  a  location  in  space.  As  Crusius.  one  of  the  philoso- 
phers who  wrote  shortly  before  Kant,  puts  it,  to  give  an 
entity  that  is  merely  thought — that  is,  merely  possible — a 
position  in  time  and  a  place  in  space  is  to  give  it  existence. ^^"^ 
"If  a  substance  is  to  exist,  it  must  exist  immediately  in  some 
place  and  at  some  time."^^^ 

*" Plato;   Parmenides,  141,  152. 

'"** Hobbes:  The  Third  Set  of  Objections  to  Descartes'  Meditations- 
Objection  Fourteenth;  Descartes:  Oeuvres,  ed.  by  Adam  and  Tannery, 
vol.  9,  p.  150. 

^** Crusius:  Bntwurf  der  Notwendigen  Verminft-Wahrheiten,  1753, 
Sec.  46. 

^"  Ihid;   Sec.  57.    See  also  Sec.  59. 

75 


-3 


Here  we  have  a  serviceable  definition  of  reality,  one  that 
enables  us  to  pronounce  with  assurance  upon  the  ontological 
status  of  many  objects.  It  does  indeed  make  many  objects 
unreal  that  are  often  called  real.  It  rules  out  of  existence  a 
supra-spatial  God,  and  the  '^eternal  verities,"  if  they  are 
indeed  eternal.  The  meaning  of  real,  if  the  term  is  used  in 
this  sense,  is  not  exactly  that  which  it  has  in  common  speech ; 
but  it  is  none  the  less  rather  definite. 

There  are  one  or  two  subjects,  however,  on  which 
this  definition  is  as  yet  not  quite  specific.  After  Crusius  had 
described  the  real  as  that  which  is  in  time  and  in  space, 
Platner,  in  commenting  upon  this  definition,  raised  an 
objection.  He  objected  because  such  a  definition,  he  said, 
presupposes  the  existence  of  time  and  space  themselves. ^^® 
In  our  own  day  much  the  same  objection  has  been  raised  by 
Marvin. ^^"^  Notwithstanding  these  probably  independent 
expressions  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  definition  we  are  con- 
sidering, I  find  it  difficult  to  tell  what  lies  at  the  basis  of 
them.  If  by  ''time"  is  meant  the  entities  in  time  considered 
collectively,  I  see  no  legitimate  reason  for  dissatisfaction. 
For  if  these  entities,  taken  individually,  are  real  by  the  defi- 
nition of  *'real,"  then  they  are  real  taken  collectively.  If  by 
*'time,"  in  short,  we  mean  the  system  of  entities  in  time,  then 
''time,"  on  the  definition  we  are  considering,  must  likewise 
be  real.  To  be  sure,  the  definition  we  are  considering  is  a 
definition  that  involves  an  ontology.  But  in  this  respect,  we 
shall  find,^*^^  the  definition  w'e  are  considering  is  like  any 
other  definition  of  reality  that  is  precise  and  specific.  There 
may,  however,  be  another  meaning  behind  the  statement 
that  a  definition  of  reality  in  terms  of  time  and  space  pre- 
supposes the  existence  of  time  and  space  themselves.  By 
time  itself  there  may  be  meant  a  time  continuum  that  is 
distinct  from  the  system  of  temporal  entities.  And  if  this 
be  the  meaning  of  "time,"  I  can  see  how  the  definition  as  we 
have  it  may  be — not  invalid — but  ambiguous.  The  defini- 
tion as  we  have  it  does  not  specify  whether  the  continuum, 
as  contrasted  with  the  entities  in  it,  is,  or  is  not,  to  be  called 
"real."    This  indeterminateness,  however,  does  not  seem  to 


loe 


Plainer:   Aphorismen,  Sec.  739,  Note. 
"■"'  Marvin  :    The  Existential  Proposition;   Journal  of  Fhilosopk^,  etc., 
vol.  8  (191 1 ),  p.  490. 
^'^'^  Infra,  page  1 01. 


m 


\ 


76 


me  to  be  unavoidable.  We  need  only  frame  our  definition 
so  that  it  becomes  evident  that  time  and  space  themselves  are 
meant  to  be  called  real  or  that  they  are  meant  to  be  called 
unreal.  Our  definition  needs  only  to  'be  made  specific  on  this 
point;  that  is  to  say,  it  needs  to  be  framed  so  as  to  permit 
only  one  of  these  two  possible  interpretations. 

Another  ambiguity  resulting  from  the  identification  of 
the  real  with  that  which  is  in  time  and  in  space  is  more  im- 
portant. If  reality  refers  to  those  entities  that  form  one 
system,  to  those  entities  each  of  which  stands  in  certain 
spatial  and  temporal  relations  to  all  the  other  real  entities, 
then  there  is  but  one  space  and  one  time.  But  if  an  entity 
is  called  real  provided  it  belong  in  any  sort  of  space,  then 
there  may  be  more  than  one  space.  If  our  definition  is 
taken  in  one  sense,  all  entities  that  do  not  belong  in  the  one 
system  selected  are  unreal.  But  if  our  definition  is  taken 
in  the  other  sense,  some  of  these  entities — namely,  those 
that  are  characterized  by  a  spatial  position  of  some  sort — 
may  be  real.  The  distinction  is  important  in  dealing  with 
the  "ideas"  of  the  so-called  epistemological  dualist.  These 
*'ideas,"  as  sometimes  conceived,  are  not  in  the  one  objective 
space,  but  they  are  not  devoid  of  all  spatial  qualities.  The 
house  that  is  my  idea  is  not  in  objective  space ;  it  is  not  in 
the  spatial  system  that  contains  the  real  house.  But  it  is  to 
the  left  of  a  roadw^ay  that  is  also  my  idea;  both  the  house 
and  the  roadway  have  positions  in  a  subjective  space.  Con- 
sequently, if  to  be  real  is  to  be  in  a  space,  to  have  a  spatial 
position  of  some  sort,  this  house  that  is  my  idea  may  be  real. 
But  if  only  those  entities  that  form  a  single  system  of  inter- 
related spatial  entities  are  real,  this  house  that  is  my  idea 
is  unreal. 

Kant,  too,  at  times  makes  location  in  space  and  position 
in  time  conditions  of  reality.  While  time  and  space  are 
transcendentally  ideal,  as  he  puts  it,  they  are  empirically 
real.  And  every  entity  that  is  empirically  real — that  is  to 
say,  real  as  a  phenomenon — must  be  in  time  and  in  space. 
At  least  all  real  objects  except  thoughts  and  feelings  must 
be  in  space.  And  all  real  objects  without  exception  must  be 
in  time.  This  condition,  that  all  real  objects  must  be  in 
time  and  all  real  objects  except  thoughts  and  feelings  in 
space,  is  given  a  priori.     In  this  respect  the  situation  is 

77 


similar  to  that  when  reahty  is  defined  in  terms  of  intelhgible 
laws  that  are  laid  down  a  priori.     When  that  is  said  to  be 
real  which  does  not  violate  the  law  that  the  quantity  of 
matter  is  always  constant,  this  conservation  of  matter  can- 
not be  disproved  by  experience.     For  any  phenomenon  that 
seems  to  disprove  the  conservation  of  matter  is  thrown  out 
as  unreal  and  disregarded.     So  here  no  experience  can  show 
that  reality  is  not  conditioned  upon  position  in  time.     For 
any  entity  that  seems  not  to  be  in  time  is  by  that  very  fact 
to  be  called  unreal.     Time  and  space  are  given  a  priori  as 
conditions  of  reality  in  the  sense  that,  having  once  been 
laid  down  as  conditions  of  reality,  no  subsequent  experience 
can  show  that  they  do  not  deserve  that  status.     In  a  sense, 
of  course,  Kant  does  not  get  them  out  of  his  head  and  lay 
them  down  as   conditions  of   reality.      He   makes   several 
psychological  observations  such  as  that  we  cannot  form  the 
image  of  an  entity  not  in  time  and  space.^^^     But  unless 
reality  is  to  be  limited  to  those  entities  that  can  be  imaged, 
and  this  would  be  a  notion  of  reality  entirely  distinct  from' 
the  one  we  are  considering,  these  psychological  observations 
have  nothing  to  do  with  the  terms  "real"  and  "unreal."     If 
we  declare  that  only  those  objects  of  which  we  can   form 
nnages  are  real,  we  may  come  out  at  the  same  i)oint.     We 
may  arrive  at  the  same  conclusion,  namelv.  that  only  entities 
with  a  position  in  time  and  space  are  real.     But  if  'reality  is 
(Mmud  directly  in  terms  of  time  and  space,  time  and  space 
are  a  priori  only  because  they  are  laid  down  as  conditions 
of  reality. 

Among  our  contemporaries  position  in  time  and  location 
m  space  are  quite  frequently  made  conditions  of  existence. 
'T£xistent  processes."  says  Montague.^"*  "are  those  that 
occur  somewhere,  non-existent  are  those  that  occur  no- 
where. The  existent  is  in  short  that  to  which  the  Aristo- 
telian category  'pan  has  a  positive  application/'  But  there 
IS  a  tendency  not  to  limit  realitx  so  precisely.  In  the  ''New 
Realism"  we  find  Montague  saying:  "The  real  universe  con- 
sists or  the  time-space  system  of  existents  together  with  all 
that   is  presupposed   by   that   system."'^ ^      We   have,   con- 

109    1,'"  /'  ^      •      •  -       T-. 

Kam:  Critique  ot  Pure  Reason,  ist  ed..  p    24. 

"VMontague:    "Are   Mental   Processes   in '  Space  ^"-.Uo«^>    toI     18 
1908,  p.  21.  .        •       , 

'''The  New  Realism,  p.  255. 

78 


1 


-<l 


'I 


I 


sequently,  the  added  task  of  finding  out  w^hat  these  entities 
in  time  and  space  presuppose.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
in  talking  about  sense-data,  we  came  upon  the  thesis  that 
reality  includes  not  only  sense-data  but  all  entities  that  are 
implied  by  sense-data.  And  in  the  absence  of  a  proposition 
making  the  term  ''implication"  meaningful,  w^e  found  it 
impossible  to  distinguish  betW'Cen  those  entities  that  are  not 
implied  by  sense-data  and  are  unreal  and  those  that  are 
implied  by  sense-data  and  are  real.  In  the  present  case 
we  have  the  same  dit^culty  with  the  concept  "presupposi- 
tion." Of  those  entities  that  are  not  in  time  or  in  space, 
which  are  presupposed  by  the  time-space  system  and  which 
are  not?  Are  extra-spatial  ideas,  of  either  the  epistemo- 
logical  or  the  Platonic  variety,  so  presupposed  or  are  they 
not?  In  order  to  decide  this  question,  in  order  to  give  the 
unreal  some  specific  content,  we  must  know  wdiat  "presup- 
position" is.  "Presupposition"  and  ''implication" — if  "im- 
plication" is  equivalent  to  it — cannot  be  left  undefined  or 
be  defined  in  terms  that  assume  we  already  know  the  mean- 
ing of  "real"  and  "unreal." 

If  reality  is  defined  in  terms  of  time  and  space  we  ought 
to  know  whether  time  and  space  themselves  are  real.  We 
ought  to  be  told  whether  an  entity  in  any  spatial  system  is 
real,  or  only  those  entities  that  belong  in  one  specific  spatial 
system  that  is  pointed  out.  And  if  not  only  entities  in  time 
and  space  but  also  entities  that  these  spatial  and  temporal 
entities  presuppose  are  real,  we  ought  to  be  told  w^hat  "pre- 
supposition" means.  There  is  one  other  point  upon  which 
we  rnay  demand  further  information.  Must  an  entity  to  be 
real  be  at  some  definite  place  in  space  and  time  and  not 
vaguely  located  in  all  places,  or  is  it  only  necessary  that  it 
be  not  outside  of  space  and  time?  For  example,  "Nature" 
or  the  "cosmos"  is  not  outside  of  space,  but  neither  is  it  in 
one  place  rather  than  in  another.  It  has  what  the  Scholas- 
tics sometimes  called  "circumscriptive  ubeity"  but  not  "de- 
finitive ubeity."  It  remains  for  us  to  specify  in  our  defini- 
tion^ consequently,  whether  entities  of  this  kind  may  be  real 
or  whether  only  entities  with  "definitive  ubeity"  are  to  be 
accepted  into  the  chosen  circle.  When  these  am])iguitie5  are 
cleared  up,  time  and  space  seem  to  be  terms  that  can  very 
nell  be  used  in  the  definition  of  reality.     For  manv  of  the 

79 


entities  with  which  we  deal  will  lack  the  qualities  that  will 
hcAt  been  made  conditions  of  reality.  There  will  be  a  con- 
siderable number  of  entities  that  can  immediately  be  seen 
to  be  unreal. 

The  real  is  that  which  fits  into  a  determinate  order  or 
system  of  relations:    this  is  the  notion  of  reality  we  are 
engaged   in   bringing  out.      '^Reality,"   when   used   in  this 
sense,  has  to  do  with  a  system  of  interrelated  entities,  a 
system    where   experience   is   a   whole,    subject   to  certain 
uniformities,  held  together  by  manifold  interrelations.    This 
interrelatedness  of  experience,  its  essential  unitv,  is  insisted 
on  pre-eminently  by  Spinoza.     For  in  his  metaphysics  all 
things  are  related  to  one  another,  all  ha\  e  in  common  their 
derivation  from  God.    And  so  we  may  expect  to  find  in  his 
writings  passages  in  which  the  term  'Veal"  is  used  to  refer 
to  entities  that  belong  to  the  system  of  interrelated  eruities 
and  the  term  "unreal"  to  entities  ontside  it.     And  there  is 
there  this  notion  that  the  'Veal"  entity  is  the  one  that  is 
connected   with  experience  and   the   unreal   or  non-existent 
one  the  one  that  is  not  in  accord  with  the  laws  of  nature, 
that  violates  the  usual  order  of  things.     When  we  have  a 
definite  phenomenon  clearly  before  us.  it  exists,  of  course, 
if  its  nature  is  stich  that  it  must  exist,  and  it  does  not  exist 
It  its  nature  is  such  that  it  cannot  exist.     But.  leaving  aside 
the  help  that  this  pronouncement  affords  us  in  determining 
what  entities  are  real,  a  clearly  comprehended  phenomenon 
is  real  if  it  agrees  with  the  order  of  nature  and  is  not  real 
if  It  violates  that  order.     *l.et  us  conclude  again  briefly,'* 
says  Spinoza,  ''and  see  how  it  need  in  no  wise  be  feared  that 
fiction  will  be  confused  with  true  ideas.     As  for  the  first 
fiction  of  which  we  have  spoken,  where  the  thing  is  clearly 

conceived we  must  only  take  care  that  its  existence 

be  compared  with  its  essence,  and  that  attention  is  paid  at 
the  same  time  to  the  order  of  nature."^ ^-  Here  is  a  notion 
of  reality  similar  to  those  we  have  been  investigating  ii 
is  not  carried  out  in  so  much  detail  as  we  have  found  it 
carried  out  by  others.  We  have  no  definite  statement  of  the 
laws  with  which  a  phenomenon  must  be  consistent  in  order 
to  be  real ;  and  we  are  not  told  just  w  hat  <nrt  of  consistency 
with  experience  is  demanded.     But  none  the  less  "reality," 

^"^  Spinoza :    On  the  Emendation  of  the  Intellect,  §  65. 

80 


m 


or  rather  "existence,"  is  being  used  to  point  to  entities  that 
cohere  in  a  system. 

That  all  parts  of  the  universe  are  connected  with  one 
another  is  a  frequently  recurring  theme  in  Spinoza.  But 
along  with  this  doctrine  there  come  two  quite  different 
notions  of  reality.  One  is  the  notion  we  have  examined, 
the  notion  that  an  entity  is  real  if  it  forms  a  part  of  this 
interconnected  whole.  The  other  is  the  notion  that  only 
the  interconnected  whole  is  real,  and  that  all  parts  are  un- 
real Both  may  be  said  to  describe  the  real  as  that  which  is 
related.  For  one,  "real"  means  the  entity  that  sustains 
certain  relations  and  belongs  to  a  system ;  for  the  other, 
"real"  means  a  single  object,  and  that  is  the  whole  inter- 
related system.  Indeed,  the  two  senses  of  "real"  do  not 
at  all  agree;  all  the  individual  phenomena  that  are  "real" 
in  the  sense  that  they  belong  to  the  system  are  "unreal"  in 
that  they  individually  do  not  constitute  the  system.  And 
whereas,  using  "real"  in  one  sense,  unreality  is  made  up 
of  entities  that  do  not  belong  to  the  system,  to  many  of 
those  using  "real"  in  the  other  sense  such  unrelated  entities 
appear  absolutely  inconceivable.  There  are  for  them  no 
unrelated  entities ;  those  entities  that  are  called  "unreal" 
by  those  who  use  "real"  in  the  first  of  these  tw^o  senses 
belong  in  the  system — in  their  opinion — quite  as  much  as 
do  the  entities  that  these  others  call  "real." 

Now,  this  notion  that  the  whole  organic  thing  called  the 
universe  is  real  and  that  the  unreal  is  the  partial,  fragmen- 
tary bit  of  it  is  well  recognized  as  Spinoza's.  "To  call 
anything  finite,"  he  says,  "is  in  reality  a  denial  in  part,  and 
to  call  it  infinite  is  the  absolute  assertion  of  the  existence 
of  its  nature."^ ^^  When  we  are  aware  of  the  world  in  its 
entirety  we  are  aware  of  reality;  when  our  attention  is 
limited  to  a  small  portion  of  the  universe  we  are  out  of 
contact  with  reality.  "Falsity,"  reads  one  of  the  proposi- 
tions of  the  Ethics,  "consists  in  privation  of  knowledge 
which  is  involved  by  inadequate  or  confused  and  mutilated 
ideas."^^^  The  universe  as  a  related  whole  is  real;  its 
parts  are  unreal.  And  the  parts  that  are  unreal  are  the 
very  parts  that  are  real  when  Spinoza  uses  "real"  in  the 
other  sense.    Generally  speaking,  "real"  means  for  him  the 


U3 


Spinoza:    Ethics,  Book  i,  Prop.  8,  Note  i. 

'**Jbid:    Book  2,  Prop.  55- 

81 


individual  that  is  part  of  a  system,  when  his  attention  is  on 
concrete  phenomena.  And  he  uses  ''real"  to  refer  to  the 
system  as  a  whole,  when  he  is  dealing  with  entities  at  the 
other  end  of  the  scale,  with  God  and  the  eternal  truths. 
Since,  therefore,  Spinoza's  interest  lies  so  completely  in 
the  realm  of  eternal  truths,  the  term  is  used  much  more 
frequently  in  this  second  sense,  in  the  sense,  that  is,  in 
w^hich  it  points  to  the  organized  whole  and  not  to  the  parts 
of  that  whole. 

In  Hegel  it  is  the  organized  whole  that  is  real  and  not  at 
all  the  parts  of  that  whole.  The  fragmentary  parts  of 
experience  are,  indeed,  said  to  have  ''being*' ;  but  there  is 
no  attempt,  so  far  as  I  know,  to  distinguish  between  "being" 
and  "non-being"  by  saying  that  entities  that  belong  to  a 
system  have  "being"  and  that  those  that  do  not  liave  "non- 
being."  "Being,"  that  is  to  say,  does  not  mean  those  enti- 
ties that  sustain  certain  relations  and  "non-being"  does  not 
mean  those  entities  that  do  not  sustain  such  relations.  Ap- 
parently "being"  means  sense-data  and  "non-being"  means 
entities  that  are  not  sense-data.  Consequently,  reality — in 
the  sense  of  "being" — does  not  mean  the  part  of  a  related 
whole.  The  "real"  is  not  used  to  mean  that  which  is 
related  in  this  sense.  And  so  the  only  sense  in  which  the 
"real"  can  mean  the  related  is  the  sense  in  which  it  means 
the  relational  whole  itself. 

it  does,  however,  ilirou.c:h'>ut  a  large  part  of  Hegel's 
writings,  certainly  mean  this  related,  organized  whole,  this 
organized  whole  that  may  now  be  called  Nature  and  now 
the  Absolute  Idea.  This  unity  "in  which  all  characteris- 
tics have  coalesced"^ ^^'  is  the  real;  all  more  partial  and 
less  inclusive  entities  are  to  some  deqrec  unreal.  In  this 
Whole  that  is  real  are  included  entities  w  ithout  "being"  as 
well  as  those  with  it;  nothing  is  left  out  of  the  Absolute. 
And  so  all  conceivable  entities  are  part  of  an  interrelated 
system;  none  are  left  out  for  those  to  call  "unreal"  who 
would  use  the  term  to  point  t'^  entities  that  are  not  included 
in  the  system  of  experience. 

Among  Hegel's  English  followers  "real"  again  means 
the  organized  whole  in  its  entirety.  But  for  some  of  them 
it  is  also  used  in  the  sense  in  which  it  means  the  part  of  this 


i 


whole  and  excludes  the  entity  that  is  not  a  part  of  it.     Let 
us  take  Joachim  as  an  example.     Reality  is  for  him  the 
unified  co-ordinated  whole,   the  organized   system  of  ex- 
perience.    "Truth  in  its  essential  nature,"  he  says/^^  "is 
that  systematic  coherence  which  is  the  character  of  a  sig- 
nificant whole."     "A  'significant'  whole,"  he  adds,  "is  an 
organized   individual   experience,    self-fulfilling  and    self- 
fulfilled."    We  do  not  get  an  entity  that  is  able  to  stand  on 
its  own  legs,  and  so  is  self-fulfilling,  until  we  get  an  entity 
that  is  all-inclusive.     And  so  "real"  is  being  used  to  point 
to  this  unique  all-inclusive  whole.     But  "real"  is  also  used 
to  point  to  the  individuals  that  cohere  in  the  system  and 
"unreal"  to  point  to  individuals  that  do  not  belong  in  this 
system.     Or  at  least  we  can  infer  that  "real"  w^ould  be  so 
used  were  Joachim  talking  about  reality  instead  of  about 
truth.     Immediate  experiences,  for  example,  are  said  to  be 
"real,"  or — as  Joachim  says   (for  he  is  talking  about  the 
experiencing  of  those  objects  rather  than  about  the  objects 
themselves) — are  said  to  be  "true."     "Their  'truth'  means 
for  us  that  a  whole  system  of  knowledge  stands  and  falls 
with  them,  and  thai  in  that  system  they  surv'ive."^^'^    This 
is  like  Leibniz's  assertion  that  for  the  romance  of  Astraea 
to  be  real  the  whole  world  would  have  to  be  different.    The 
romance  of  Astraea  was  unreal  because  it  did  not  fit  in  with 
the  system  of  things  that  is.     It  was  an  unrelated  entity 
and  as  such  called  "unreal."     So,  too,  with  Joachim  it  is 
the  unrelated  phenomena,  the  parts  that  do  not  fit  in,  that 
are  "unreal."    The  immediate  experience  of  the  worshipper 
of  Baal  is  false  because  "the  moral  and  religious  experi- 
ences of  the  past  and  present  reveal  themselves,  when  criti- 
cally analyzed  and  reconstructed,  as  a  texture  into  which 
this  immediate  intuition  can  in  no  sense  be  woven ;    they 
form  a  system  in  which  this  would-be  truth  cannot  as  such 
survive."     That  is  to  say,  the  real  is  that  entity  that  fits 
into   experience,   and   the   phenomenon   that    he   sees   who 
sees  Baal  hurlins:  thunderbolts  is  unreal  in  that  it  does  not 
accord  with  experience.     The  question  is  not  as  to  whether 
such  an  experience  is  self-fulfilling;    it  is  as  to  whether  it 
"fits." 


lie 


Hegel:      Encyclopedia    of     the     Philosophical     Sciences.     Fart     i 

(Logic),  §  236. 

82 


uo 


117 


Joachin :   The  Nature  of  Truth,  §  26. 
Joachim :    The  Nature  of  Truth,  §  19. 

83 


''Real"  consequently  is  used  in  both  senses,  frequently 
by  the  same  author.  It  means  the  individual  phenomenon 
that  is  part  of  a  co-ordinated  interrelated  experience;  and 
it  means  the  unified  organized  whole.  A  criticism  of  the 
first  of  these  two  notions  would  be  a  repetition  of  what 
has  gone  before.  It  would  reduce  itself  to  the  objection 
that  we  have  yet  to  be  told  precisely  what  sort  of  related- 
ness  is  demanded  of  real  entities.  The  other  notion  of 
reality  is  a  possible  definition  of  the  term;  though  here 
reality  is  identified  with  an  entity  which,  being  one  "in 
which  all  characteristics  have  coalesced,"  is  necessarily  in- 
definite. What  I  want  to  call  attention  to  here,  however, 
is  the  absolute  incompatibility  of  these  two  definitions  of 
reality  with  each  other.  \i  "real"  means  the  organized 
whole,  then  the  parts  of  that  whole  are  "unreal."  Using 
"real"  in  one  sense,  the  parts  of  experience,  considered 
separately,  are  unreal;  using  it  in  the  other  sense,  it  is 
just  these  parts  that  are  real.  We  liave  come  upon  a  con- 
trast that  shows  the  utter  lack  of  uniformity  in  the  use 
of  the  term  "real,"  for  here  are  a  grotip  of  entities  that 
it  is  being  used  now  to  point  to,  now  to  exchide.  We  see 
the  word's  utter  meaninglessness  apart  from  a  definition 
of  it,  be  it  explicit  or  he  it  imi)licit  in  the  context  in  which 
the  term  appears.  W^e  see,  in  short,  that  we  can  do  nothing 
with  the  term  "real"  before  we  define  it. 


I. 
■ 


CHAPTER   V 

The  Problem  of  the  "Real  Centaur/'   BeliEE 

AND  Existence. 

Up  to  this  point  we  have  been  moving  slowly  but  we 
have  not  encountered  any  difficulties  that  have  threatened 
to  upset  our  plans.  We  have  discovered  several  definitions 
of  reality,  painfully  detached  them  one  from  another,  and 
set  them,  forth  one  by  one.  But  here  it  occurs  to  me  that 
perhaps  our  whole  search  is  in  vain.  Perhaps  it  is  im- 
possible to  define  reality  at  all.  necessary  as  such  a  definition 
is  if  we  are  to  make  any  use  of  the  term. 

For,  suppose  that  I  am  thinking  of  a  centaur  or  a 
mountain  of  gold.  These  objects  are  fictions,  objects  of 
the  imagination  if  you  will,  but  they  are  none  the  less 
objects  of  my  consciousness.  Let  me  now  suppose  that  the 
entities  of  which  I  am  thinking  have  in  addition  the  quality 
"existence"  or  "reality."  I  am  thinking  of  an  existing 
centaur;  the  object  with  which  my  consciousness  is  toying 
is  a  real  mountain  of  gold.  It  is  these  existing  centaurs 
and  real  golden  mountains  that  make  us  pause.  It  is  they 
that  can  lead  us  to  think  that  perhaps  the  definitions  we 
seek  are,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  impossible.  For  they 
bring  us  face  to  face  with  a  difficulty  that  is  extremely 
hard  to  overcome. 

Among  the  subsistents,  the  objects  that  may  be  subsumed 
under  the  all-inclusive  category  of  "being,"  we  find  such 
entities  as  existing  centaurs  and  real  golden  mountains. 
Apparently  these  entities  belong  in  the  class  of  real  beings, 
since  they  are  in  their  definition  explicitly  given  reality  as  a 
quality.  And  yet  if  they  are  considered  real,  reality  becomes 
quite  an  un wieldly  domain.  Any  object  becomes  real  that 
has  this  quality  added  to  the  concept  of  it.  A  Pegasus^^®  be- 
comes real  provided  that  it  is  called  a  real  Pegasus;  an 
island  floating  in  the  Atlantic  becomes  real  provided  it  is 


lis 


84 


Gassendi :  The  Fifth  Set  of  Objections  to  Descartes'  "Meditations"; 
See,  also,  the  discussion  of  the  "existing  lion"  in  the  First  Set  of 
Objections,  by  Caterus ;  Descartes :  Oeuvres,  ed.  by  Adam  and  Tan- 
nery, vol  9,  p.  79. 

85 


thought  of  as  a  perfect  island  and  hence  as  a  real  island. ^^® 
The  category'  of  reality,  if  less  inclusive  than  the  category 
of  being,  becomes  quite  as  heterogeneous  and  unwieldly. 

And  so  we  must  exclude  the  real  centaurs  and  real  winged 
horses  and  real  golden  mountains  from  existence.  We  must 
exclude  them,  that  is  to  say,  if  reality  is  not  to  be  as  in- 
coherent and  unlimited  as  being  itself.  This  exclusion  is 
usually  brought  about  by  saying  that  reality  is  not  a 
predicate  at  all.  So  say  Gaunilon,  and  Gassendi,  and,  most 
influential  of  all,  Immanuel  Kant.^^'"  We  can  make  our 
centaur  that  is  merely  a  concept  anything  that  we  desire 
except  that  we  cannot  make  it  real.  We  can  make  our  horse 
winged,  we  can  make  fire  come  out  of  his  nostrils,  we  can 
make  him  roar  like  a  lion;  but  we  cannot  make  him  a  real 
horse.  Existence,  in  short,  is  not  a  quality  that  can  be^ 
attributed  to  the  object  of  my  thought.  We  think  merely  of 
the  entity;  its  existence  is  no  proper  part  of  the  concept 
of  it.  A  hundred  real  thalers  contain  not  a  penny  more 
than  a  hundred  thalers  that  are  merely  imagined.  What  we 
can  have  as  objects  of  thought  are  merely  centaurs  or 
thalers.  They  are  not  to  be  described  as  real  centaurs  or 
imaginary  centaurs  or  real  thalers  or  imaginary  thalers. 
And  consequently  we  avoid  the  problem  of  the  real  centaur 
by  denying  that  such  a  combination  of  terms  is  an  object 
of  thought  at  all. 

But  if  existence  is  no  attribute  of  the  entities  of  which 
I  am  conscious,  I  can  never  talk  about  existence  at  all. 
The  only  entities  about  which  I  can  think  are  entities  that 
are  in  some  sense  objects  of  my  consciousness.  Conse- 
quently, if  existence  is  never  a  part  of  them,  1  am  cut  off 
from  all  commerce  with  existence.  If  what  I  think  about 
are  merely  centaurs  and  thalers,  essences  that  never  carry 
within  themselves  either  existence  or  a  reference  to  exist- 
ence, then  existence  is  something  entirely  foreign  and  mean- 
ingless. If  none  of  the  objects  of  my  thought  can  breathe 
a  word  about  existence,  there  is  no  way  in  which  I  can 
come  to  distinguish  between  the  existent  and  the  merely 
subsistent.  Accordingly,  existence  must  in  some  way  be 
given  in  some  of  the  objects  of  my  thought.     That  is.  some 


319 


120 


Gaunilon  :  In  Behalf  of  the  Fool,  sec,  6. 

Kant :  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  ist  eel.,  p.  597,  et  seq. 

86 


of  these  essences  must  contain  within  themselves  as  objects 
of  thought  either  existence  or  reference  to  existence.  They 
cannot  be  subsistents  pure  and  simple  that  breathe  no  word 
about  existence.  On  the  other  hand,  this  existence  or  this 
reference  to  existence  cannot  be  given  in  them  at  will. 
For  in  that  case  we  have  these  real  centaurs  and  real  golden 
mountains  that  are  real  merely  because  reality  or  a  reference 
to  reality  is  put  into  the  concept  of  them.  Reality  or 
reference  to  reality  must  be  given  in  some  concepts,  but 
it  cannot  be  given  in  any  of  them  to  which  we  please  to 
attribute  such  a  predicate. 

Here  is  where  the  difficulty  arises  when  we  attempt  to 
define  reality.  For,  suppose  that  we  define  the  real  as  the 
permanent.  Then,  since  permanence  is  equivalent  to  reality, 
the  status  of  permanence  is  the  same  as  the  status  of  reality. 
Permanence,  too,  must  be  a  predicate  of  some  entities  but 
not  of  any  entity  to  which  we  please  to  attribute  it.  On  the 
one  hand,  permanence  or  a  reference  to  permanence  must 
be  given  as  a  quality  of  some  of  the  objects  of  my  thought. 
Permanence,  like  reality,  must  be  conceivable;  it  must  have 
meaning.  But  on  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  allow  perma- 
nence to  be  made  a  quality  of  any  entity  that  we  please  to 
call  permanent.  For  in  that  case,  as  soon  as  I  conceive 
permanent  centaurs  or  permanent  golden  mountains,  such 
centaurs  and  golden  mountains  are  real  forthwith.  It  is 
not  enough,  consequently,  to  take  the  category  of  being 
or  subsistence  and  then  restrict  ourselves  to  those  subsist- 
ents that  are  conceived  to  be  permanent.  For  any  sub- 
sistent will  be  conceived  to  be  permanent  if  w^e  put  perma- 
nence into  the  concept  of  it.  No  matter  what  the  quality 
be  in  terms  of  which  we  choose  to  define  reality,  we  face 
the  same  difficulty.  Any  entity  can  be  conceived  to  be 
independent,  to  be  a  sense-datum,  to  be  a  member  of  a 
system  of  interrelated  entities.  So  long  as  we  restrict  our- 
selves merely  to  all  entities  that  pretend  to  have  one  quality 
or  another,  the  real  world  we  mark  out  will  suffer  from 
instability.  It  will  be  a  world  that  can  be  populated  at 
pleasure.  Reality,  accordingly,  cannot  be  defined  in  terms 
of  a  quality  that  can  be  made  a  quality  of  any  entity.  And 
yet  any  quality  that  we  may  select  will  apparently  be  one 
that  can  be  attributed  to  any  entity  to  which  we  please  to 

ST 


attribute  it.  "Any  character  you  please  may  be  imagined 
and  may  remain  merely  imaginary."^^^  Entities  that  seem 
to  be  permanent,  or  that  pretend  to  be  independent,  or  that 
may  be  conceived  to  be  sense-data,  are  legion. 

And  so  reality  must  consist  of  entities  that  are  really 
permanent,  or  really  independent  or  really  sense  data.  If 
reality  is  defined  in  terms  of  permanence,  real  entities  are 
those  to  which  pennanence  belongs,  not  those  that  seem  to 
be  permanent.  Of  the  entities  that  seon  to  be  permanent, 
some,  we  must  say,  are  permanent  and  real  and  some  are 
not.  A  centaur  or  a  golden  mountain  may  Ije  conceived  to 
be  permanent;  whether  it  is  permanent  and  real  is  another 
matter.  The  whole  case  is  thrown  o|>en  once  more.  For 
in  order  to  determine  the  content  of  reality  we  must  now 
distinguish  between  the  seeming  permanent  and  the  really 
permanent,  between  that  which  is  ruerely  conceived  as  per- 
manent and  that  to  which  permanence  belongs.  How,  now, 
are  we  to  answer  this  new  question?  How  are  we  to  tell 
with  which  entities  permanence  belongs  and  with  which  it 
does  noti^  If  we  define  the  really  pernianeiU  as  that  which 
in  addition  to  the  quality  permanence  has  the  quality  Q  and 
the  seeming  permanent  as  that  which  lacks  the  quality  Q, 
we  only  postpone  the  question.  For  the  quality  O  can  be 
added  to  the  concept  of  any  entity;  we  consequently  must 
undertake  to  distinguish  the  entities  to  which  the  quality 
O  belongs  from  those  to  which  it  does  not  belong.  We  are 
•caught  in  an  infinite  regress.  For  no  criterion  will  be  able 
to  rule  out  those  entities  that  merely  pretend  to  satisfy  it. 
And  so  it  seems  impossible  ever  to  mark  out  the  real  from 
the  merely  subsistent,  from  the  entities  that  are  merely 
objects  of  thought,  a  conclusion  that  is  fatal  not  only  to 
this  dissertation  but  to  all  science  as  well. 

There  is  a  first  step  that  must  be  taken  if  this  outcome  is 
to  be  avoided.  We  must  refuse  to  treat  the  concepts  ^Veal" 
and  "unreal"  in  the  same  way.  While  not  everything  that 
is  conceived  to  be  real  is  real,  we  must  grant  that  every- 
thing that  is  conceived  to  be  unreal  is  unreal.  My  real  cen- 
taur is  not  real  because  I  think  of  it  as  real.  But  a  desk 
that  I  think  as  unreal  is  by  that  very  fact  unreal.  This 
does  not  mean  that  the  desk  before  me  ceases  to  be  a  real 


121 


W.  H.  Sheldon:    The  Demolition  of  Unreality;    Journal  of  Phi- 
losophy, etc.,  vol.  13,  1916,  p.  319. 


desk  when  I  form  the  concept  of  an  unreal  desk  before  me. 
In  this  case  there  are  two  desks  to  be  considered,  one  with- 
out the  predicate  ''unreal"  and  one  with  it.  And  of  these 
two  subsistents,  only  the  one  conceived  with  the  predicate 
''unreal"  is  necessarily  ''merely"  a  subsistent  or  ''merely"  an 
object  of  thought.  When  that  which  is  in  question  is  the 
predicate  "real,"  the  situation  is  not  similar.  Here  too  we 
may  consider  two  entities,  one  centaur  conceived  without 
the  predicate  "real"  and  one  conceived  with  it.  But  in  this 
case  not  even  the  centaur  conceived  with  this  predicate  is 
necessarily  real. 

All  entities  conceived  as  unreal,  then,  are  unreal.  If, 
consecjuently,  reality  is  defined  as  permanence,  all  entities 
that  appear  to  be  impermanent  are  unreal.  Similarly,  if 
reality  is  defined  as  independence,  all  entities  that  pretend 
to  be  dependent  are  unreal.  If,  then,  a  definition  of  reality 
does  nothing  else,  it  does  rule  out  a  certain  class  of  entities 
as  "unreal."  This  service,  we  must  admit,  is  of  considerable 
importance.  For  it  becomes  ix>ssible  as  a  result  to  de- 
termine the  status  of  a  large  number  of  important  entities. 
If  to  be  real  means  to  be  present  to  the  senses,  then  the 
Platonic  Ideas  that  are  conceived  as  not  present  to  the 
senses  are  unreal.  And  the  greater  the  number  of  qualities 
than  an  entity  must  have  if  it  is  to  be  real,  the  greater  will 
be  the  number  of  entities  that  can  definitely  be  classified  as 
unreal.  If  an  entity  to  be  real  must  have  the  qualities  A, 
B  and  C,  any  entity  that  pretends  to  be  not  A  or  not  B  or 
not  C  will  be  unreal.  Just  which  entities  are  those  that 
pretend  to  be  not  A  or  not  B  or  not  C  will  depend  on  how 
reality  is  defined.  On  this  account  it  is  necessary  to  make 
explicit  the  various  definitions  of  reality.  For  each  of  these 
definitions  determines  in  a  different  fashion  the  content,  or, 
rather,  part  of  the  content,  of  the  unreal. 

If  we  define  the  real  as  the  permanent,  our  definition  de- 
termines part  of  the  content  of  the  unreal.  For  then  entities 
that  do  not  pretend  to  be  permanent,  entities  that  tnean  to 
be  evanescent,  are  unreal.  A  similar  result  is  accomplished 
when  we  define  the  real  as  that  which  is  related,  when  we 
define  it  as  that  which  is  a  sense-datum,  when  we  define  it 
as  that  which  is  independent.  In  one  case  an  entity  that 
does  not  mean  to  be  a  sense-datum  will  be  unreal,  in  another 
case  an  entity  that  does  not  mean  to  be  independent  will  be 

89 


N 


*# 


unreal.     Yet  one  definition  will  mark  out  a  larger  number 
of  entities  as  unreal  than  will  another.     If  we  say  that  an 
entity  to  be  real  must  be  a  vivid  object  of  sense-perception, 
then  a  number  of  entities  are  immediately  known  to  be  un- 
real.    For  there  are  a  number  of  entities  that  are  never  held 
to  be  vivid  objects  of  sense-perception.     If,  however,  we 
define  the  real  as  the  independent,  we  are  still  ignorant  of 
any  large  group  of  entities  that  are  obviously  unreal.     For 
there  are  not  many  entities  that  do  not  pretend  to  be  inde- 
pendent of  a  percipient.     It  is  useless  to  define  reality  in 
terms  of  independence  because  such  a  definition  does  not 
separate  out  any  important  group  of  entities  as  obviously 
unreal.     And  the  fault  that  is  here  found  with  a  definition 
of  reality  in  terms'  of  independence  is  the  fault  that  in  the 
preceding  chapters  has  been  found  with  many  other  defi- 
nitions of  reality.     It  is  useless  to  say  merely  that  the  real 
is  that  which  is  "connected"  with  a  perception,  for  unless  we 
know  the  specific  character  of  the  connection  demanded,  no 
entity  will  come  to  us  as  obviously  lacking  in  the  connection 
that  is  required  and  so  no  entity  will  come  to  us  as  obviously 
unreal.      We   have    in    the   preceding  chapters   objected    to 
certain  definitions  of  reality  in  that  they  do  not  thus  de- 
termine part  of  the  content  of  the  unreal.     The  problem 
that  has  been  raised  in  the  present  chapter,  however,  applies 
equally  to  all  of  the  definitions  that  we  have  considered. 
For  while  some  of  them  determine  quite  definitely  part  of 
the  content  of  the  unreal,  none  of  them  can  determine  with 
any  definiteness  the  content  of  the  real. 

A  rather  precise  definition  of  reality  will  mark  out  cer- 
tain entities  as  obviously  unreal.  But  when  all  is  said  and 
done,  we  are  apparently  left  with  an  irresolvable  element, 
a  surd,  in  the  concept  of  reality.  No  matter  how  many 
qualities  we  require  an  entity  to  show  in  order  for  it  to  be 
called  "real,"  and  no  matter  how  preciselv  we  describe 
these  qtialities  in  terms  of  which  we  are  defining  reality, 
our  goal  is  still  some  distance  away  from  us.  For  after  all 
we  have  only  succeeded  in  demanding  of  the  candidate  for 
reality  that  it  pretend  to  l>e  A.  and  pretend  to  be  B,  and 
pretend  to  be  C.  But  if  reality  is  to  be  kept  free  of  real 
centaurs  and  real  golden  mountains,  it  must  be  only  some 
of  these  entities  that  pretend  to  be  A  and  B  and  C  that  are 
real.     If  the  content  of  realitv  is  not  to  be  added  to  at  will, 


90 


no  number  of  limitations  imposed  on  subsistence  will  be 
sufficient  to  mark  out  the  real.     For,  as  we  have  seen,  no 
matter  how  many  requirements  we  make,  the  number  of 
entities  that  can  be  thought  to  fulfill  all  these  conditions 
will  be  legion.     Our  purpose  is  to  mark  out  the  real.     We 
shall   not   succeed    in   our   purpose   by    adding   one   more 
quality,  possession  of  which  is  to  be  made  a  requisite  for 
reaHty.     On  the  other  hand,  if  we  leave  the  matter  where 
it  stands,  we  cannot  tell  concerning  the  entities  we  have 
not  yet  definitely  labelled  ''unreal''  which  are  to  be  called 
''real"  and  which  are  to  be  called  "unreal."    We  have  sepa- 
rated out  a  class  of  unreal  entities,  but  what  we  have  left 
contains  both  real  and  unreal  entities.     My  centaur  pre- 
tends to  be  permanent  and  a  sense-datum  and  independent 
and  a  member  of  a  system  of  interrelated  entities.     Your 
desk  makes  the  same  pretensions.     What  reason,  now,  can 
we  find  for  calling  your  desk  real  and  my  centaur  unreal? 
And  how  am  I  to  know  when  I  am  confronted  by  ether  or 
phlogiston  that  also  makes  the  saine  pretensions  whether  it 
is  to  be  called  real  or  unreal  ?    One  way  out,  theoretically, 
at  least,  is  to  start  with  all  of  those  subsistents  not  pre- 
viously excluded,  and  to  enumerate  those  that  are  real  and 
those  that  are  unreal.     Such  a  remedy,  however,  is  just  as 
fatal  as  none  at  all.     We  get  started  on  the  road  to  knowl- 
edge only  to  come  to  the  end   of   the  road  at  the   same 
moment.'  Just  as  the  concept  ''reality"  becomes  meaning- 
ful, it  becomes  useless,  for  we  already  know  which  entities 
are  real  and  which  are  unreal. 

We  must  know  what  it  means  to  be  real ;    otherwise  the 
process  by  which  we  call  some  entities  real  and  others  unreal 
is  without  rhyme  or  reason.    Besides,  reality  must  be  defined 
in  general  terms,  in  tenns  of  a  criterion  that  has  yet  to  be 
applied.      And  yet   such  a   definition   seems   impossible   on 
account  of  the  real  centaurs  and  real  golden  mountains  that, 
it  would  seem,  cannot  be  got  rid  of.     Evidently  reality  can- 
not be  serviceably  defined  in  terms  merely  of  some  objec- 
tive quality  such  as  permanence  or  independence.     Let  us, 
consequently,  have  recourse  to  the  concept:    "belief."     If 
we  say  that  an  entity  to  be  real  must  not  only  be  conceived 
to  have  the  qualities  A,  B  and  C,  but  that  this  entity  so 
conceived  must  be  believed  by  me,  perhaps  then  we  shall 
have  found  a  solution.     Suppose  I  define  the  real  as  that 

91 


which  when  conceived  as  a  sense-datum  is  believed  by  me. 
Let  us  see  what  hai)i)ens  in  this  case  to  the  real  centaurs 
and  real  g-olden  mountains.     We  may  take,  as  an  example 
of  an  entity  that  is  conceived  to  be  a  sense-datum,  a  g-host 
that  I  pretend  is  before  me.     If,  now,  all  entities  that  are 
conceived  to  be  sense-data  are  real,  this  ghost  is  real.     Rut 
we  have  revised  our  definition;   only  those  entities  are  real 
that  when  conceived  as  sense-data  are  entities  in  which  I 
believe.     And  so  I  think  of  a  ghost  that  pretends  to  be  a 
sense-datum  in  which  T  believe.     But  as  soon  as  I  consider 
this  ghost,  I  am  aware  that  I  am  considering  a  ghost  that 
seems  not  to  be  an  entity  in  which  I  believe.     This  entity 
that  is  an  object  of  my  thought  is  given  as  a  sense-datum 
in  which  I  believe,  and  at  the  same  time  is  given  as  a  sense- 
datum  in  which  I  do  not  l>elieve.     But  since  it  is  given  as  a 
sense-datum  in  which  I  do  not  believe,  it  is  unreal.     For 
only  those  entities  are  real  that  can  be  given  as  entities  in 
which  I  believe  without  being  given  at  the  same  time  with 
the  contradictory  quality. 

I  hope  that  in  this  way  I  have  avoided  the  real  centaurs 
and  real  golden  mountains.     An  entity  to  be  real,  we  have 
said,  must  be  given  w'ith  the  quality  A,  and  must  not  at  the 
same  time  be  given  with  the  contradictory  quality  non-A. 
If,  now,  the  quality  A  in  terms  of  which  we  define  reality 
is   some   objective   quality   such   as   relatedness   or  [>erma- 
nence,  we  have  no  way  in  which  to  eliminate  the  real  cen- 
taurs and  real  golden  mountains.     For  we  can  have  before 
us  a  related  centaur  or  a  permanent  golden  mountain  with- 
out at  the  same  time  having  before  us  a  centaur  that  is  not 
related  or  a  golden  mountain  that  is  not  permanent.     I  do 
not  necessaril}-  think  of  a  golden  mountain  that  is  evan- 
escent at  the  same  time  that  T  think  of  a  golden  mountain 
that    is    permanent.      And   so   a   golden    mountain    that    is 
merely  thotight  of  as  permanent  will  ])e  real  provided  that 
reality  is  defined   in   terms  of   permanence  alone.      When, 
however,  we  make  belief  a  condition  of  existence,  the  status 
of  the  golden  mountain  is  qtiitc  different.     For  at  the  satne 
time  that  I  think  of  a  golden  mountain  in  which  I  believe, 
I  think  of  a  golden  mountain  in   which  I  do  not  l>elicve. 
At  the  same  time  that  the  golden  mountain  is  given  with 
the   quality   A,    it   is   given   with   the   contradictory   quality 
non-A.     And  so,   with  reality  defined  partly  in   terms  of 

92 


belief,  the  real  world  cannot  be  populated  at  will.  An 
entity  does  not  become  real  merely  because  I  pretend  that  it 
is  an  object  in  which  I  believe.  For  certain  entities  in  which 
1  pretend  that  I  believe  are  at  the  same  time  given  to  me  as 
entities  in  which  I  do  not  believe.  These  entities  that  are 
given  with  the  quality  A  are  at  the  same  time  given  with 
the  contradictory  quality  non-A;  and  so  they  are  entities 
that  are  forthwith  unreal. 

We  seem  to  eliminate  the  real  centaurs  and  real  golden 
mountains,  it  may  be  admitted,  when  we  introduce  the  con- 
cept of  belief  into  our  definition  of  existence.  But,  it  may 
be  said,  our  apparent  success  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
concept  "belief"  is  subsequent  to  the  concept  "existence." 
To  believe  in  an  entity,  it  may  be  said,  is  to  believe  in  the 
existence  of  that  entity.  The  entity  in  which  I  believe  is 
the  entity  in  whose  existence  I  believe.  Consequently, 
when  we' talk  about  belief,  it  may  be  held,  we  illicitly  pre- 
suppose a  knowledge  of  the  meaning  of  "existence."  To 
define  reality  in  terms  of  belief,  in  short,  ^is  to  define  reality 
in  terms  of'  a  concept  that  presupposes  "reality."  It  is,  it 
may  l)€  held,  a  circular  definition,  one  that  implicitly  makes 
use  of  the  verv  term  that  is  to  be  defined.  ^      ^ 

Yet  it  is  not,  I  think,  in  the  nature  of  things  that  "exist- 
ence"  i^   prior   to  "belief."      According   to   representative 
psychologists,  belief  is  for  the  naive  man  the  natural  and 
normal  condition.     Only  after  certain  disconcerting  expert- 
ences  does  he  come  to  doubt  the  entities  that  are  given  to 
him  and  to  question  their  existence.     Normally  the  feeling 
or  state  of  belief  precedes  the  raising  of  any  questions  about 
existence.     The  term  "l>elief,"  it  would  thus  seem,  may  be 
used  to  point  to  a  simple  and  non-cognitive  psychological 
condition,   a  psychological   condition  that  does  not   imply 
any  cognitive  distinguishing  between  unreality  and  reality. 
When  V^ertain  ol)jects  are  presented  to  us,  we  are  charac- 
terized bv  this  feeling  or  state  of  belief.     And  there  is  this 
belief   it'mav  be  said,  whether  there  is  any  consciousness  of 
existence  or  not.    Belief  may  thus  be  described  without  any 
presupposing  of  existence.    It  may  be  described  as  a  psycho- 
logical condition  that  is  to  be  distinguished  by  its  intrinsic 
psychological  characteristics.     "Belief,"  in  one  sense,  may 
be  defined  in  terms  of  existence,  in  terms  of  the  entity  to 
which  it  refers.    But  "belief,"  in  what  is  perhaps  a  different 

93 


sense  of  the  word,  may  be  described  in  terms  of  its  psycho- 
logical characteristics.  And  it  is  a  ''belief"  to  be  described 
in  this  latter  manner  that  we  are  meaning  to  use.  "Belief/* 
as  we  use  it,  is  not  a  concept  that  presupposes  existence. 
And  so  to  define  existence  in  terms  of  such  a  belief  is  not 
to  give  a  circular  definition  of  the  term  that  is  to  be  defined. 
^y  "an  entity  in  which  T  believe"  I  do  not  mean  an  entity 
in  whose  exisfence  I  believe.  By  ''an  entity  in  which  I  be- 
lieve" I  mean  an  entity  such  that  in  being  conscious  of  it  I 

am  characterized  by  a  specific  psvchological  condition  called 
belief." 

When  belief  is  descriljed  in  such  psychological  terms,  the 
connection  between  "belief"  and  "existence"  is  still  to  be 
determined.  "Existence"  is  a  term  that  has  not  vet  been 
brought  upon  the  stage.  And  when  it  is  brouglit  upon  the 
stage,  it  is  a  predicate  that  may  be  given  to  objects  in  which 
I  do  not  beHeve  as  well  as  it  mav  be  given  to  objects  in 
which  T  do  believe.  "Belief"  has  not  been  defined  in  terms 
ot  "reality,"  and  so  "entity  in  which  I  believe"  does  not 
imply  "real  entity."  "Belief"  is  one  term  and  "existence" 
IS  another.  And  so  an  entity  in  which  J  believe  need  not 
exist  unless  either  "belief"  is  defined  in  terms  of  "existence" 
or  "existence"  is  defined  in  terms  of  "belief." 

\A'hen  Descartes  attempted  to  doubt  every  entity  that  was 
presented  to  him.  he  found  that  there  was  one  entity  in 
which  he  could  not  l)ut  l)elieve.  His  own  doubting,  his  own 
mental  functioning,  was  something  that  he  found  he  could 
not  doubt,  something  in  which  he  could  not  help  but  believe. 
Here  vvas  an  entity  that  was  perforce  an  object  of  belief. 
Yet  if  belief  is  understood  to  be  a  purel}'  psychological  con- 
dition, if  belief  is  understood  to  be  something  that  is  to  be 
described  l\v  its  intrinsic  qualities,  then  an  entity  that  is 
necessarily  an  object  of  lielief  is  not  ipso  facto  an  entity  that 
is  real.  If  belief  is  not  described  in  terms  of  existence,  then 
an  entity  in  which  I  must  believe  is  not  necessarily  a  real 
entity.  "Reality"  is  in  such  a  case  a  concept  that  has  yet  to 
be  introduced.  And  when  it  is  subsequently  introduced,  it 
need  not  be  given  as  a  predicate  to  these  entities  in  which 
I  cannot  but  believe.  Descartes  does,  to  be  sure,  pass  from 
"entity  in  which  1  cannot  but  believe"  to  "entity  that  is  real." 
Because  he  can  not  doubt  his  own  thinking,  he  concludes 

94 


V'/i 


/ 


that  that  thinking  must  be  real.  Such  a  transition,  it  seems 
to  me,  is  implicitly  a  definition  of  reahty.  It  implies  a 
definition  of  reality  to  the  effect  that  entities  that  cannot  be 
doubted  must  be  real.  It  is  not  a  transition  to  which  in  the 
nature  of  things  we  must  agree.  It  is  a  transition  that  is 
valid  only  when  existence  is  defined  in  terms  of  belief,  or 
belief  in  terms  of  existence. 

A  definition  wholly  in  terms  of  belief  is  not  the  only  possi- 
ble definition  of  existence.  Entities  that  cannot  be  doubted 
are  not  entities  that  we  must  perforce  call  "real."  And  yet 
a  definition  that  makes  some  use  of  the  concept  "belief"  is, 
we  have  found,  necessary,  if  we  are  to  avoid  the  real  cen- 
taurs and  real  golden  mountains.  Only  by  having  recourse 
to  "belief"  can  we  eliminate  these  troublesome  entities. 
They  cannot  be  eliminated  if  we  define  reality  merely  in 
terms  of  the  objective  qualities— A,  B  and  C.  Of  the  enti- 
ties given  with  the  objective  qualities  A,  B  and  C,  only  those 
are  real,  we  must  say,  that  are  entities  in  which  T  believe. 
We  must  make  some  use  of  belief,  though  we  may  at  the 
same  time  define  reality  partly  in  terms  of  the  objective 

qualities  A.  B  and  C. 

Accordinglv,  of  the  entities  that  are  conceived  with  the 
qualities  A,  B  and  C,  those,  we  shall  say,  are  real  that  are 
entities  m  which  I  believe.     Now  such  a  definition  as  this 
will  do  verv  well  so  long  as  I  think  of  objects  merely  as 
objects  of  my  thought.      Suppose,  however,  a   second   in- 
dividual is  doing  the  thinking.     Then  when  he  thinks  of  a 
ghost  present  to  his  senses  that  pretends  to  be  an  entity  in 
which  he  believes,  he  will  at  the  same  time  be  thinking  of  a 
ghost  that  seems  not  to  be  an  entity  in  which  he  l)elieves. 
In  order  that  the  real  centaur  shall  not  be  admitted  among 
the  objects  of  his  thought,  the  real  for  him  must  be  defined 
as  that  which,  \vhen  conceived  with  the  qualities  A,  B  and  C, 
IS  an  entitv  in  which  he  believes.     But  the  entities  conceived 
with  the  qualities  A.  B  and  C,  in  which  he  believes  are  differ- 
ent from  the  entities  so  conceived  in  which  /  believe.    Conse- 
quently, the  content  of  reality  varies  with  the  individual  who 
is  doing  the  thinking.    That  is  to  say.  the  content  of  reality 
is  relative.     For  there  is  one  group  of  entities  that  are  real 
for  me  and  another  group  of  entities  that  are  real  for  you. 
It  is  of  course  not  a  new  thing  for  "real"  to  be  used  in 
such  a  wa}'  that  the  content  of  reality  must  var>'  with  the 

95 


individiia]  who  is  doing  the  thinking.  The  term  is  said  to 
have  been  used  in  just  this  way  by  Protagoras. ^^^  And  it 
has  been  used  in  just  this  way  by  James  and  some  of  his 
followers. ^^'^  Now  it  has  been  said  that  the  real  is  that 
which  appears,  that  w  liich  is  believed.  Now  it  has  been  said 
that  it  is  that  which  is  interesting.  But  that  which  appears 
to  one  man  is  different  from  that  which  appears  to  another. 
That  which  is  believed  by  me  is  different  from  that  which 
is  believed  by  you.  And  that  which  is  uninteresting  today 
was  interesting  yesterday.  With  such  delinitions  of  reality, 
consequently,  to  know  whether  an  entity  is  real,  we  must 
know  whose  thought,  and  what  instant  of  that  thought,  is 
in  question.  Now  in  so  far  as  they  put  a  certain  amount  of 
relativity  into  the  concept  of  reality,  1  believe  definitions  of 
this  sort  to  be  correct.  Reality,  it  seems  to  me,  must  be 
relative  to  the  individual  whose  thought  is  under  considera- 
tion if  the  real  centaur  is  to  be  avoided. 

When,  however,  we  define  reality  in  such  a  way  that  it 
is  relative  to  the  thinker,  we  encounter  a  serious  disad- 
vantage. Let  us  suppose,  for  example,  that  we  define  the 
real  simply  as  that  which  is  believed.  Then,  a^  we  have 
seen,  the  entities  that  are  real  for  me  are  quite  diflFerent 
from  those  that  are  real  for  you.  All  sorts  of  entities  are 
real  for  some  one  or  other.  Consequently,  to  call  an  entity 
"real"  is  to  assert  almost  nothing  about  it ;  it  is  to  assert 
merely  that  it  belongs  in  the  large  and  ill-assorted  group 
of  entities  that  are  believed  to  have  been  believed  by  some 
one.  We  might,  however,  be  willing  to  allow  the  term 
''real"  to  become  vague  and  meaningless,  if  the  term  "real 
for  me"  could  be  substituted  for  it.  But  the  latter  can  not 
be  substituted  for  it  without  doing  great  violence  to  com- 
mon speech.  For  when  I  say  that  the  earth  moves,  I  am 
asserting  that  the  earth's  motion  is  real  absolutely,  not  that 
it  is  real  for  me.  And  so  with  all  of  the  propositions  that 
can  be  transformed  into  existential  propositions.  In  all  of 
them  WQ  are  predicating  a  (luality  that  is  meant  not  to  be 
relative  to  the  individual  making  the  judgment. 

Consequently  it  seems  wise  to  keep  within  as  narrow 
bounds  as  possible  the  relativity  of  realitw  We  can  not 
keep  out  the  real  centaurs  and  at  the  same  time  prevent  tiie 


•^  ' 


I 


in 


Plato:    Theactetus,    168-170. 
'"James:    Principles  of  Psychology  (1890),  Vol.  2,  Ch.  21 


96 


concept  from  being  to  some  extent  relative  to  the  thinker. 
But  we  need  not  go  the  whole  way.     There  is,  as  we  have 
seen,  a  surd  element  in  the  concept  of  reality,^ and  to  deal 
with  this  we  must  have  a  recourse  to  "belief."     But  it  is 
not  necessary  to  treat  the  entire  concept  as  a  surd.     And 
it  is  unwise  to  do  so  in  view  of  the  prevalent  usage  to  the 
contrarv       If  the  whole  meaning  of   "real"   is  dependent 
upon  the  individuality  of  the  thinker,  "real"  becomes  quite 
meaningless.     But  if  the  surd  element  is  reduced  to  a  mini- 
mum, there  is  only  a  relatively  small  sphere  within  which 
the  ineaning  of  the  term  is  undetermined.     It  is  to  reduce 
this  surd  element  that  we  must  use  some  objective  qualities, 
such  as  permanence  or  independence,  in  the  definition  ot 
reality.     For  the  only  meaning  the  term  gets,  it  gets  from 
the  place  these  qualities  occupy  in  the  definition  of  it.     If 
reality  is  to  be  meaningful,  consequently,  we  must  define 
it  not  merely  in  terms  of  belief  but  in  terms  of  certain 
qualities  A,  B  and  C.     The  real  must  be  that  which  is  con- 
ceived to  have  the  qualities  A,  B  and  C,  and  at  the  same 
time  is  believed.     The  latter  requirement  w^e  can  not  avoid; 
the  former  we  neglect  at  the  peril  of  leaving  our  concept 

void  of  meaning. 

The  unreal  must  be  defined,  then,  1  think,  as  that  which 
appears  not  to  be  believed  by  me  when  conceived  with  the 
qualities  A,  B  and  C.  And  of  the  remaining  entities  those 
are  real  which  appear  to  be  believed  by  me  when  conceived 
with  the  qualities  A,  B  and  C.  This  form,  that  I  believe 
the  definition  of  reality  must  take,  is  rather  cumbersome. 
And  perhaps  its  very  cumbersomeness  enables  me  to  hope 
that  the  real  centaurs  and  real  golden  mountains  have  been 
avoided.  I  think,  however,  that  with  this  formula  these 
entities  have  truly  been  avoided.  And  I  see  no  other  way 
in  which  they  can  be  escaped  and  knowledge  made  possible. 

The  real,  "^then,  is  not  that  which  is  conceived  to  have 
the  quality  A,  but  that  to  which  the  quality  A  belongs. 
And  that\o  which  the  quality  A  belongs  is  that  which, 
when  conceived  with  the  quality  A,  is  believed.  When, 
consequently,  in  the  preceding  pages  the  real  has  been  said 
to  be  equivalent  to  that  which  is  permanent  or  that  which 
is  a  sense-datum,  we  can  not  hold  this  to  mean  that  the 
real  is  equivalent  to  that  which  is  conceived  to  be  perma- 
nent or  conceived  to  be  a  sense-datum.     At  least  we  can 

97 


not  hold  this  if  we  are  anxious  to  find  definitions  that  will 
not  allow  reality  to  be  added  to  at  will.  We  must  hold 
these  definitions  to  mean  that  the  real  is  that  to  which 
permanence  belong-s  or  that  which  is  really  a  sense-datum. 
And  that  which  is  really  a  sense-datum  is  that  which,  when 
conceived  as  a  sense-datum,  is  believed.  It  is  only  by  some 
such  transformation  as  this  that  the  surd  element  in  the 
definition  of  reality  can  be  explained.  Any  definition  of 
reality,  it  seems  to  me,  must  be  modified  in  some  such  way 
as  this  if  the  "real  centaur"  is  to  be  avoided.  Consequent- 
ly, when  in  the  preceding  pages  I  have  said  that  the  real 
may  be  defined  as  that  to  which  permanence  belongs,  I  have 
meant  that  it  is  possible  to  define  the  real  as  that  entity 
which  is  an  object  of  belief  when  it  is  conceived  to  be 
l>ermanent. 

The  real,  then,  is  that  which  is  l)elievecl  bv  me  when  it  is 
conceived  to  have  the  qualities  A,  B  and  C,  and  is  not  at 
the  same  time  disbelieved  by  me.  This  form  an  accept- 
able definition  of  reality  must  take.  But  the  qualities  that 
are  to  be  written  in  where  I  have  |)ut  the  symbols  A  and 
B  and  C  are  not  determined.  For  A  and  B  and  C  we  may 
read  "permanence"  or  "inde})en(lence"  or  "presence  in  sense- 
perception,"  or  the  like.  When,  consequently,  I  have  said 
that  it  is  possible  to  define  the  real  as  the  permanent,  1  have 
meant  that  it  is  possible  to  put  "permanence''  where  1  have 
put  these  symbols.  There  are  a  great  variety  of  qualities 
that  may  be  used  to  take  the  place  of  these  syml)ols  A,  B 
and  C ;  but  some  qualities  may  ])e  said  to  belong  to  real 
entities  much  more  meaning  full}'  tlian  mav  '^hers.  Some 
qualities,  that  is  to  say,  can  be  used  more  successfully  than 
others  to  lill  in  these  blanks  represented  by  the  letters  A. 
B  and  C.  h'or  some  qualities,  while  a])])arentl\-  they  fill  in 
these  blanks,  are  in  reality  quite  as  meaningless  as  the  letters 
whose  places  they  are  taking.  If  we  are  told,  for  example, 
that  a  real  entity  is  one  that  is  a  member  of  a  system  of 
interrelated  entities  and  are  not  told  what  constitutes  this 
relatedness,  w^e  are  quite  as  much  in  the  dark  as  if  we  are 
told  that  a  real  entity  is  one  that  has  the  quality  A.  A 
quality  that  is  to  be  used  as  a  substitute  for  these  symbols 
must  be  meaningful  and  specific ;  it  must  not  be  a  quality 
such  that  when  it  is  attributed  to  an  entity  we  feel  the 
entity  to  be  no  more  specifically  described  than  it  was  before. 

98 


/ 


CHAPTER    VI 

The  Author's  Definition  of  "Existence" 

AND  "Reality" 

The  historical  inquiries  we  have  made  have  shown  what 
a  large  measure  of  disagreement  there  is  as  to  the  meamng 
of  the  terns  "existence"  and  "reality."     Now  only  sense- 
data  are  said  to  exist,  now  only  entities  that  are  not  sense- 
data  are  said  to  exist,    Now  only  entities  that  have  a  posi- 
tion in  time  are  called  real,  now  only  entities  that  are  out 
of   time  are  called  real.     "Existence"  and  "reality     have 
been  defined  in  terms  of  permanence,  in  terms  ot  time  and 
space  in  terms  of  a  svstem  of  interrelated  entities,  in  terms 
of  activity,  in  terms  of  belief.     The  emities  that  are  real 
if  the  term  is  used  in  one  sense  are  unreal  if  the  term  is 
used  in  another  sense.     And  if  we  have  recourse  to  the 
meaning  of  the  term  as  it  is  used  in  common  speech,  either 
we  can  not  find  out  what  that  meaning  is  or  we  fand  a 
meaning  different  from  any  of  those  already  discovered. 
Wherever  we  look  we  merely  add  to  the  variety  of  mean- 
ings before  us.     We  find  ourselves  in  the  end  confronted 
by  a  whole  host  of  meanings  the  term  has  had,  no  one  ot 
which  stands  out  as  the  meaning  the  term  ought  to  have. 

And  vet  in  anv  one  writer,  or  at  least  in  any  one  con- 
text   there  must  be  some  one  sense  of  "existence     that  is 
being  used        For  there  are  sure  to  be  propositions  laid 
down  there  that  are  equivalent   to  propositions  asserting 
existence   or   non-existence.      And   these   propositions   are 
meaningful  onlv  if  existence  has  there  some  specific  definite 
meaning      Existence  can  not  be  used  in  such  a  way  that 
we  are  left  in  doubt  as  to  which  of  these  various  and  con- 
tradictory senses  is  intended.    It  must  be  used  in  one  defi- 
nite sense  and  not  used  vaguely.     Each  writer    that  is  to 
say  must  be  clear  as  to  which  meaning  the  term    existence 
has  for  him      The  question  can  not  be  left  undetermined 
if  propositions  with  an  existential  import  are  to  be  sig- 

"'  Iif  view  of  the  great  variety  of  meanings  the  term  has 
had,  however,  there  will  be  something  arbitrary  about  this 

99 


process  of  selection.  Whichever  sense  of  the  term  we 
choose  to  use,  there  will  be  other  senses  of  the  term  that 
we  might  have  chosen.  There  will  always  be  some  one  for 
whom  ''existence"  does  not  mean  what  it  means  for  us. 
And  whichever  sense  of  the  term  we  choose  to  use,  there 
\A\\  always,  I  think,  be  some  particulars  in  which  the  de- 
notation of  the  term  as  we  use  it  will  not  be  identical  with 
the  denotation  of  the  term  as  it  is  used  in  common  speech. 
There  will  always  be  some  entities  that  we  shall  be  calling 
"real"  that  in  ordinary  parlance  are  called  "unreal,"  or 
some  entities  that  we  shall  be  calling  ''unreal"  that  in 
ordinary  parlance  are  called  "real.''  The  meaning  "exist- 
ence" will  have  will  be  the  meaning  it  has  for  us,  not  the 
meaning  the  word  has  for  all  philosophers  nor  the  meaning 
it  has  in  ordinary  language.  And  what  is  true  of  the  term 
"existence"  is  true  of  the  term  "reality."  The  sense  in 
which  we  use  the  term  "reality"  will  show  what  we  mean 
by  "reality"  and  not  what  "reality"  must  mean.  We  may 
choose  to  define  "existence"  in  one  set  of  terms  and  "reality" 
in  another  set  of  terms.  Or  we  may  choose  to  call  "exist- 
ence" and  "reality"  synonymous.  But  however  we  define 
"existence"  and  however  we  define  "reality,"  whether  we 
define  the  two  terms  in  the  same  way  or  in  different  ways, 
our  definitions  of  both  terms  will  be  arbitrary.  They  will 
show  what  "existence"  means  for  us  and  what  "reality" 
means  for  us  and  not  what  "existence"  and  "reality"  mean 
for  the  world. 

When  we  have  once  decided  what  "existence"  means, 
we  shall  have  decided  what  entities  are  to  be  called  existent 
entities.  A  definition  of  existence,  in  other  words,  will 
have  determined  the  content  of  the  world  of  existence. 
Consequently,  if  the  definition  of  existence  must  be  arbi- 
trary, the  content  of  the  world  of  existent  entities  must  be 
arbitrary.  There  will  be  one  group  of  entities  that  exists 
in  the  sense  of  the  term  that  I  am  employing,  another  group 
that  exists  in  the  sense  in  which  some  one  else  understands 
that  term,  and  still  another  group  that  exists  as  existence 
is  used  in  our  ordinary  speech.  And  so  with  reality.  Just 
which  entities  constitute  the  real  world  depends  on  the 
meaning  that  is  given  the  term  "real."  And  since  the 
meaning  given  "real"  must  be  a  result  of  an  act  of  choice, 

100 


the  content  of  the  real  world  will  be  the  result  of  an  act  of 
choice.  In  one  sense,  consequently,  we  make  the  real  world. 
For  the  content  of  that  world  depends  on  a  choice  of  ours. 
We  may  not  make  the  world  in  the  way  in  which  the  Ego 
is  conceived  by  Fichte  to  make  the  world,  but  we  do  make 
the  world  in  this  other  sense.  Indeed,  we  must  make  the 
real  world  if  there  is  to  be  any  real  world  at  all;  otherwise 
the  concept  of  a  "real  world"  is  vague  and  meaningless. 

Any  definition  of  "reality"  or  "existence"  must,  accord- 
ingly, involve  an  ontology.  It  must  determine  in  an  arbi- 
trary fashion  the  content  of  reality  or  of  existence.  This, 
however,  is  just  what  is  denied  by  Marvin.  He  asks :  "How 
ought  we,  then,  to  define  the  word  'to  exist?'"  And  he 
replies:  "With  the  minimum  of  ontological  assumption; 
for  the  definition  of  existence  ought  not  itself  to  be  an 
ontology."^^-*  But,  natural  as  the  desire  is  to  maintain  a 
judicial  impartiality  when  we  define  existence,  the  facts 
will  not  allow  us  to  entertain  such  hopes.  We  cannot  pre- 
vent the  definition  of  existence  from  involving  an  ontology. 
For  in  whichever  sense  we  choose  to  use  the  term  "exist- 
ence," we  are  selecting  and  constructing  the  content  of 
existence  so  as  to  excltide  some  entities  that  have  been  said 
to  exist.  We  cannot  define  the  term  in  such  a  way  that  all 
of  the  senses  in  which  the  term  has  been  used  will  be  found 
acceptable.  And  to  define  it  in  such  a  way  that  nothing  is 
told  us  respecting  the  content  of  existence  is  to  give  no 
definition  at  all.  No  other  alternative  exists.  Conseqttently, 
any  definition  that  is  a  definition  will  involve  an  ontology. 
Marvin's  own  definition  is  of  the  kind  that  in  the  third 
chapter  of  this  essay  has  been  attributed  to  Hume  and  to 
Kant.  The  entities  that  exist  are  those  that  are  observed 
and  those  that  are  connected  with  entities  that  are  observed. 
In  other  words,  sense-data  and  entities  coimected  with 
sense-data  exist.  If,  however,  the  meaning  of  "connection" 
is  left  undetermined,  we  cannot  distinguish  the  entities  that 
are  connected  with  sense-data  from  those  that  are  not,  and 
so  we  have  really  a  definition  far  from  precise.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  meaning  of  "connection"  is  rendered 
definite,  as  it  is,  for  example,  when  Marvin  suggests  that 
entities  that  enable  us  to  predict  observed  facts  are  connected 

"*  Marvin:    The  Existential  Proposition;   Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc., 

vol.  8  (1911),  p.  477- 

lOI 


with  them,  then  our  definition  of  existence  is  selective. 
For  we  are  ruHng  out  of  existence  such  entities  as  things- 
in-themselves,  entities  that  cannot  be  said  to  enable  us  to 
predict  observed  facts.  We  are  determining  the  content 
of  existence  so  as  to  exclude  these  entities  that  have  often 
been  said  to  exist.  We  are  laying  down  a  definition  of 
existence  that  involves  an  ontology. 

A  definition  of  ''reality"  must  be  arbitrary.     But  it  does 

not  follow  that  a  definition  of  reality  is  an  absurdity.     Let 

us  agree  that  none  of  the  qualities  in  terms  of  which  reality 

may   be   defined   ''has   any   intritisic  connection   with   Be- 

jj^g  'M25     Nolle  the  less  it  is  possible  to  connect  them  with 

being  or  subsistence  so  as  to  form  a  meaningful  and  stable 

combination.     The  connection  will  be  merely  "extrinsic," 

yet    wt   shall     have    a    combination    that    is    equivalent    to 

"reality"   in   the   usage   of   some   individual.     And   if   we 

mean  by  a  definition  a  statement  that  gives  the  meaning 

a  term  has  at  some  time  had,  it  will  be  a  definition.     Indeed, 

in  spite  of  the   fact  that  a  definition  of  existence  means 

the  abandonment  of  an  impartial  attitude,  "existence"  must 

be  defined  if  it  is  to  be  a  meaningful  term.     The  definition 

of  "existence"  I  am  about  to  give  will  explain  only  what 

"existence"  means  for  me  and  not  what  "existence"  means 

for  all  men.     But  it  will  cause  "existence"  to  be  a  term 

with  a  specific  and  definite  meaning  when  it  appears  in  my 

writings.     And   to  the  extent  to   which   my   definition  is 

specific  and   unambiguous,   it  will   enable   one   to   tell   just 

which  entities  exist  and  just  which  ones  do  not  exist,  as 

I  am  using  that  term. 

For  me  "existence"  and  "reality"  are  synonymous.  The 
entities  that  exist  are  just  those  that  are  real.  When  I 
am  defining  "existence,"  consequendy,  I  am  at  the  same 
time  defining  reality.  Now,  an  entity  to  be  real  and  exist- 
ent, as  I  choose  to  use  these  terms,  must  l>e  in  time  and 
space.  That  is  to  say,  I  accept  the  view  that  only  entities 
in  time  and  in  space  are  real.  We  have  seen,  however,  that 
when  reality  is  defined  in  terms  of  time  and  space,  several 
ambiguities  remain  to  be  cleared  up.  Let  me  therefore  make 
my  definition  more  specific.     Let  me  say  that  an  entity  to 

'"W.  H.  Sheldon:    The  Demolition  of  Unreality;    Journal  of  Phi- 
losophy, etc.,  vol.  13  (1916),  p.  320. 

102 


be  real  must  have  some  rather  definite  position  in  time  and 
111  space;  it  cannot  be  vaguely  located  in  all  time  and  in 
all  space.     That  is,  it  must  have  definitive  ubeity  and  not 
circumscriptive  ubeity.     Time  and  space  themselves  I  shall 
not  call  real ;  I  shall  restrict  the  term  to  the  entities  that  are 
in  time  and  in  space.     Consequently,  the  time-space  con- 
tinuum, apart   from  the  entities  that  are  located  in  it,  is 
unreal.     There  was  one  other  ambiguity  that  we  found  in 
the  view  that  entities  in  time  and  in  space  are  real.     We 
have   still  to  be  told  whether  the   reference  is  to  entities 
with  a  location  in  some  space  or  to  entities  with  a  location 
in  the  one  objective  space.     It  is  the  latter  position  that  I 
shall  take.     When  I  say  that  an  entity  to  be  real  must  be 
in  time  and  in  space,  I  mean  that  it  must  be  in  the  one 
spatio-temporal  system  to  which  we  usually  refer.     I  shall 
not  call  entities  "real"  that  are  in  any  space  and  in  any  time ; 
they  must  be  in  the  one  space  and  time  that  is  conceived 
to  be  objective  and  not  in  some  space  and  time  that  is  con- 
ceived to  be  subjective. 

An  entity  to  be  real,  then,  must  be  in  time  and  in  space. 
Furthermore,  an  entity  to  be  real  and  existent  must  be  con- 
ceived to  be  one  such  that  more  of  the  subjects  having 
it  as  object  of  consciousness  believe  it  than  disbelieve  it. 
Let  us  suppose  that  ten  people  have  an  object  called  to  their 
attention  and  that  five  of  them  feel  neither  belief  nor  dis- 
belief with  respect  to  it.  Then,  if  three  of  the  others 
believe  the  object  under  consideration  while  two  of  them 
reject  it,  the  object,  provided  it  satisfies  the  other  conditions 
of  existence,  is  a  real  object.  If  an  object  does  not  pretend 
to  have  this  quality,  it  is  unreal.  W^hen  T  think  of  phlogis- 
ton, I  am  thinking  of  an  entity  that  seems  to  be  rejected  by 
the  majority  of  individuals  who  think  of  it.  So,  too,  with 
the  second  chair  that  I  see  when  I  press  the  corner  of  my 
eyeball.  This  chair  is  conceived  as  a  chair  that  is  not 
generally  an  object  of  belief.  Consequendy  this  chair  is 
immediately  to  be  dubbed  "unreal." 

To  be  real,  then,  an  entity  must  be  in  time  and  in  space 
and  it  must  be  an  entity  such  that  of  the  subjects  having  it 
as  object  of  consciousness  more  believe  it  than  disbelieve 
it.  Undoubtedly  much  remains  to  be  said  before  the  mean- 
ino-  of  these  requirements  becomes  clear  and  unambiguous; 

103 


and  besides,  there  is  a  third  requirement  that  I  shall  add 
later  in  this  chapter  when  I  come  to  consider  the  notion  of 
independence.  But  for  the  present  let  me  assume  that  these 
are  the  sufficient  conditions  of  ''reality"  and  "existence," 
as  I  choose  to  use  these  terms.  Let  me  assume,  that  is, 
not  only  that  entities  must  be  conceived  with  these  quahties 
to  be  real,  but  also  that  all  entities  to  which  these  qualities 
belong  are  real. 

We  must  now  be  careful  to  avoid  the  existing  centaurs 
and  real  golden  mountains.  It  cannot  be  all  entities  that 
are  conceived  to  be  entities  such  that  more  of  the  subjects 
having-  them  as  objects  of  consciousness  believe  them  than 
disbelieve  them  and  that  are  conceived  to  be  in  time  and 
space  that  are  real.  For  a  centaur  and  a  golden  mountain 
may  be  conceived  with  these  qualities.  Any  entity  may  be 
thought  of  along  with  these  qualities,  and  so,  if  reality 
were  defined  in  this  manner,  the  real  world  could  be  popu- 
lated at  will.  Xo,  a  real  entity  is  one  to  which  position  in 
time  and  space  belongs,  and  one  that  is  really  an  entity  such 
that  mr;rc  of  the  subjects  having  it  as  object  of  conscious- 
ness believe  it  than  disbelieve  it.  But  to  what  entities  does 
a  position  in  time  and  space  belong?  The  only  way  by 
which  we  have  been  able  to  determine  to  what  entities  the 
quality  A  "belongs"  is  by  having  recotirse  to  "belief."  The 
quality  A  "belongs"  to  an  entity  when  this  entity,  being 
conceived  with  the  quality  A,  is  an  entity  in  which  I  believe. 
Consequently,  those  entities  belong  in  time  and  space  in 
which  I  belie\e  when  they  are  conceived  to  be  in  time  and 
space.  And  so  a  real  entity,  as  I  am  using  the  term  "real," 
is  an  entity  that  (  i )  is  conceived  to  have  a  position  in  time 
and  space,  and  (2)  is  conceived  to  be  an  entity  such  that 
more  of  the  sul)iects  having  it  as  object  of  consciousness 
believe  it  than  disbelieve  it,  and  '(3)  is  an  entity  in  which 
T  believe.  Entities  in  which  I  do  not  believe  when  they  are 
conceived  with  these  qualities  are  unreal.  Those  remain- 
ing entities,  that  when  so  conceived  are  entities  in  which  I 
believe,  are  real ;   and  they  alone  are  real. 

It  is  in  this  sense  that  I  choose  to  use  the  terms  "reality" 
and  "existence."  When  I  use  them  in  this  sense  there  will 
be  many  entities  that  I  shall  be  calling  "real"  that  rithers 
have  called  "unreal,"  and  vice  versa.  I  shall  call  the  other 
side  of  the  moon  real,  though  it  is  called  unreal  by  one  who 

104 


defines  reality  in  terms  of  actual — and  not  possible — sense- 
data.  And  I  shall  call  Platonic  Ideas  when  conceived  as 
supra-spatial  unreal,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  they  are 
called  real  when  "real"  means  "intelligible."  It  is  also 
probably  true  that  some  entities  are  real  in  my  sense  of  the 
word  that  are  not  usually  called  real  in  ordinary  parlance. 
Some  violation  of  ordinary  usage  seems  necessary,  how- 
ever we  define  "existence"  and  "realitv."  For  in  common 
speech  these  terms  are  applied  very  loosely  and  unsystem- 
atically;  consequently,  a  systematic  and  precise  definition 
will  mark  out  a  group  of  entities  that  cannot  help  but  be 
(lifi^erent  in  some  particulars  from  that  group  of  entities 
ordinarily  called  ''real"  or  "existent." 

My  definition,  in  short,  only  gives  the  meaning  "exist- 
ence" and  "reality"  have  for  me.  Relativity  of  this  kind, 
however,  I  do  not  think  objectionable.  For  it  is  quite 
different  from  the  sort  of  relativity  that  is  introduced  in 
so  far  as  reality  is  defined  in  terms  of  belief.  Let  me  show 
this  by  comparing  the  two  concepts  "my  native  land"  and 
"the  thinker's  native  land."  "My  native  land"  is  relative 
to  me  in  that  one  must  know  something  about  me  to  know 
which  my  native  land  is.  But  having  once  determined  that 
1  was  born  in  the  United  States,  my  native  land  does  not 
depend  on  who  it  is  that  is  doing  the  thinking.  Whether 
a  Venezuelan  or  a  Hottentot  be  doing  the  thinking,  "my 
native  land"  is  still  the  United  States.  But  "the  thinker's 
native  land"  does  vary.  There  is  this  diff'erence,  I  think, 
between  defining  the  real  as  that  which  is  believed  and  giv- 
ing it  a  definition  that  is  the  definition  I  choose  to  give  it. 
For  when  it  has  once  been  decided  what  meaning  I  choose 
to  give  "reality,"  the  question  whether  an  entity  is  to  be 
called    "real"    is    one    that    can    be    decided    on    objective 

grounds. 

It  is  impossible,  then,  to  find  a  definition  of  "reality"  that 
will  make  acceptable  all  of  the  senses  in  which  the  term 
has  been  used.  Any  definition  that  we  hit  upon  will,  con- 
sequently, be  arbitrary.  That  is,  it  will  conflict  with  some 
meaning  that  has  been  given  the  term  by  metaphysicians  or 
with  the  usage  of  common  sense,  inchoate  as  that  is.  It 
will  not  state  the  meaning  that  the  term  "existence"  has  for 
all  of  us;  it  will  state  the  meaning  the  term  ha^  for  the 
individual   who   lays   this  definition  down  and   accepts   it. 

105 


%f< 


Wi^wS. 


Yet  there  will  be  compensations  for  its  lack  of  objectivity. 
For  if  it  is  really  a  definition,  a  proposition  that  enables 
us  to  pick  out  those  objects  that  are  to  be  named  real  and 
those  that  are  to  be  named  unreal,  it  will  be  a  touchstone 
that  will  permit  us  to  settle  some  of  the  problems  that  have 
been  troubling  philosophy  for  centuries. 

Let  me  first  consider  those  entities  that  are  not  objects  of 
our  perception,  but  which  stand  behind  those  objects  and 
may  be  said  to  correspond  to  them.     As  contrasted  with 
the  objects  of  perception  they  are  the  thiiigs-in-themselves. 
I  do  not  see  or  feel  or  touch  them,  but  the  objects  I  do  see 
and  feel  and  touch  stand  in  a  certain  correspondence  with 
them      At  times  these  trans-experiential  entities  are  con- 
ceived to  be  in  time  and  in  space ;   at  other  times  they  are 
in  time  but  not  in  space :   at  other  times  they  are  noumena 
both    non-temporal    and    non-spatial.     But.    however    con- 
ceived   these  things-in-themselves  have  had  their  existence 
questioned.     Now  it  has  been  asserted  that  there  are  such 
things  as  things-in-themselves.  now  that  such  alleged  enti- 
ties  do   not   really  exist.     How   are   these  contradictory 
acsertions  to  be  judged?     Why,  obviously,  the  ontological 
status  of  these  entities  depends  on  the  meaning  of     exist- 
ence"'     If  to  exist  means  to  l>e  an  object  of  sense-percep- 
tion   of  course  things-in-themselves  do  not  exist.     If  "to 
exist"  means  to  have  a  place  in  the  time-space  continuum 
then  things-in-themselves  when  conceived  as  non-temporal 
and  non-spatial  again  do  not  exist.    If,  on  the  other  hand, 
"existence"  is  being  used  in  the  sense  in  which  it  points  to 
active  entities,  or  to  the  causes  of  sense-perception,  things- 
in-themselves  may  very  well  be  real.     We  must  know  in 
what  sense  existence  is  being  used  before  we  can  mtelli- 
.r^ently    judge    whether    things-in-themselves    exist.      Anfl 
when  we  do  once  know  what  sort  of  existence  is  in  ques- 
tion   the   reality   or   unreality    of    these   trans-experiential 
entities  should  be  therebv  in  large  part  determined.    It  may 
not  be  entirely  determined,  for,  firstly,  the  sense  in  which 
"existence"  is  being  u^cl  may  be  a  rather  vague  sense,  one 
that  does  not  specify  with  any  definiteness  just  what  class 
of  entities  it  denotes,  or,  secondly,  we  may  not  know  just 
what  is  meant  by  things-in-themselves,  and  so  may  not  be 
sure  that  such  entities  have  the  <inalities  that  have  been 
asserted  by  definition  to  be  the  qualities  ul  existent  things- 

io6 


An  example  of  each  will  no  doubt  make  these  two  remain- 
ing sources  of  confusion  clearer.     If  "existence"  is  defined 
so  as  to  include  sense-data  and  entities  that  sense-data 
imply,  we  are  still  left  in  doubt  as  to  the  status  of  things- 
in-themselves,  for  we  do  not  know  whether  the  relation  of 
these  entities  to  sense-data  is  of  the  kind  that  the  definition 
vaguely  calls  "implication."    Or  if  "existence"  means  loca- 
tion in  time  and  space,  we  cannot  tell  whether  trans-experi- 
ential entities  exist  until  we  know  whether  the  trans- experi- 
ential entities  whose  existence  is  in  question  are  conceived 
as  outside  of  time  and  space  or  not.     But  while  the  deter- 
mination of  the  meaning  of  "existence"  is  not  the  sole 
requirement  for  the  solution  of  the  problem  as  to  the  exist- 
ence of  things-in-themselves,  it  is  an  absolutely  essential 
requirement,  though  one  that,  so  far  as  I  know,  is  never 
taken  into  consideration. 

So  much    lor  things-in-themselves.     Another  group  ot 
entities  that  have  offered  considerable  trouble  are  the  en- 
tities in  the  past  and  present  and  future  that  are  not  objects 
o*  sense-perception  and  not  the  things-in-themselves  behind 
the  objects  of  sense-perception.    Julius  Caesar.  King  Arthur 
and  the  Knights  of  his  Round  Table,  all  the  roses  that  blush 
unseen  the  events  that  will  occur  and  those  that  it  is  alleged 
will  occur  in  the  year  2000,— all  of  these  entities  belong  in 
this  class  whether  they  be  considered  as  objects  of  possible 
experience,  that  is,  as  sense-data  for  some  possible  subject, 
or  as  things-in-themselves  behind  such  possible  sense-data. 
If  we  define  "existence"  in  one  way,  some  of  these  entities 
mav  well  exist      If  we  define  it  in  another  way,  they  are 
all  'forthwith  unreal.    If  to  "exist"  is  to  be  an  actual  object 
of  sense-perception,  these  objects  are  of  course  unreal.    But 
suppose  we  say  that  an  entity  to  exist  must  be  one  such 
that  it  does  not  violate  the  law  that  there  shall  be  at  all 
times  the  same  quantity  of  matter.     Then,  so  far  as  this 
requirement  is  concerned,  some  of  these  objects  that  are  not 
perceived  mav  exist.     Whatever  definition  of    'reality     we 
li-dit  upon,  tlie  content  of  our  world  will  be  determined  in 
lan^e  part  bv  that  definition.     After  we  have  once  decided 
for^urselves  what  it  shall  mean  to  be  "real,"  we  shall  m 
large  measure  know  whether  things-in-themselves  are  real 
and  whether  future  objects  and  past  ones  are  or  are  not  real. 
What  we  have  just  been  considering  have  been  entities 

107 


that  I  am  not  perceiving.  Sometimes,  however,  we  talk 
about  objects  that  I  am  not  thinking  about.  If  I  am  not 
thinking  about  these  objects  at  all,  if  they  are  in  no  wise 
objects  of  my  consciousness,  I  do  not  see  how  I  can  hold 
any  opinion  at  all  about  their  existence  or  their  non-exist- 
ence. When  we  take  independence  in  this  very  radical 
sense,  I  do  not  see  how  we  can  help  but  hold  such  proposi- 
tions as:  "There  are  entities  of  which  I  am  in  no  wise 
conscious"  to  be  self-contradictory.  To  think  anything  at  / 
all  about  an  entity,  that  entiiy  must  in  some  sense  be  an 
object  of  my  consciousness.  I  may  not  have  its  content  m 
all  of  its  concreteness  before  me,  but  there  must  be  some- 
thing in  my  consciousness  that  gives  me  a  hold  on  this  entity 
and^'enables  me  to  call  it  "real"  or  ''unreal."  Let  me  sup- 
pose that  yesterday  I  was  thinking  of  Socrates  drinkmg  his 
cup  of  hemlock.  To-dav  the  definite  content  of  yesterday's 
thought  has  utterlv  vanished.  But  I  know  that  yesterday 
I  was  thinking  of  something.  All  that  I  can  think  of 
to-day  in  this  matter  of  Socrates  and  his  cup  of  hemlock 
is  an  "indefinite  something.  I  am  not  aware  of  the  content 
of  this  something,  specifically  and  distinctly,  but  I  am  aware 
of  some  of  the  properties  of  this  something.  I  know  per- 
haps that  it  is  not  a  picture  by  Rembrandt,  and  I  know  that 
it  was  in  all  its  concreteness  the  object  of  my  thought  yes- 
terday What  I  am  thinking  of  is  not  a  "nothing"  that 
is  without  anv  content;  it  is  an  indefinite  ''something/'  an 
entity  with  some  content  but  without  any  very  full,  definite, 
and  concrete  content.  The  question  now  arising  is:  ''Do 
these  indefinite  "somethings"  exist  o^  do  only  definite  ob- 
jects exists  This,  as  1  see  it,  is  the  question  to  which  the 
controversv  between  realism  and  subjectivism  reduces. 
These  indefinite  "somethings"  are  considered  so  very  im- 
portant that  the  theory  that  attributes  reality  to  them  is 
called  bv  the  general  name:  realism.  So,  tor  the  early 
Schoolmen  immaterial  universals  were  the  important  enti- 
ties, and  the  theory  that  attributes  reality  to  them  was  called 
by  the  general  name :   realism. 

Perhaps  I  ought  to  give  another  example.  I  am  not 
a  bacteriologist  and  it  does  not  take  me  long  to  think  over 
the  few  notions  I  have  on  that  subject.  So  I  go  on  to 
consider  how  many  facts  and  theories  are  kno^nl  to  bac- 
teriologists that  I  do  not  know.    I  am  thinking  about  these 

io8 


facts  and  theories  that  I  am  not  aware  of  in  all  their  definite- 
ness  as  I  am  aware  of  the  Copernican  hypothesis.    But  these 
facts  and  theories  that  I  am  thinking  about  have  some  con- 
tent. They  are  all  about  bacteria,  their  mode  of  life,  their  re- 
lation to  chemical  reactions,  their  efifect  on  the  taste  of  water, 
on  the  health  of  the  human  body.  And  they  have  the  quality 
of  being  facts  and  theories  that  one  could  learn  about  if 
one  read  through  the  books  on  the  subject  in  a  well  equipped 
library   and   conversed   with   the   contemporary  leaders   in 
bacteriological   research.     But  then   I   think  of  the  many 
facts  in  this  field  that  are  not  known  and  indeed  never  vvill 
be  known  in  any  specific  definite  fulness  of  content.     For 
example,  the  number  of  bacteria  there  are  in  the  world  at 
this  present  moment  is  without  doubt  a  fact  that  will  never 
be  known  definitely.     I  think  about  this  fact  and  others  like 
it  and  what  I  am  thinking  about  again  has  some  content. 
These   facts  too  are   facts  about  bacteria,  and   facts  that 
have  the  quality  of  never  being  concretely  and  definitely 
objects  of  consciousness.     About  the  number  of  bacteria  I 
know  something,  I  know  the  number  to  be  very,  very  large, 
and  I  know  that  the  specific  number,— whether  the  figure 
in  the  unit  column  is  a  four  or  a  seven,— will  never  be 
known.     I  am  thinking  about  an  object  with  some  content, 
but  one  that  will  never  be  an  object  of  consciousness  with 
any  full  and  specific  content. 

Objects  such  as  these,  I  say,  are  the  objects  that  realism 
asserts   exist  and  that  subjectivism   asserts   do   not  exist. 
The  quarrel  between  the  two  is  not,  as  realists  often  think, 
over  entities  that  are  hard  and  not  subject  to  remodelling 
at  the  hands  of  the  thinking  Ego;  even  a  solipsist  can  con- 
sider an  object  inevitable  during  the  time  that  it  is  definitely 
in  consciousness.     Nor  is  it,  as  subjectivists  often   think, 
over  entities  that  are  not  being  thought  about.     For  an 
entity  that  is  in  no  sense  an  object  of  my  consciousness  is 
simply  unthinkable,  beyond  the  possibility  of  consideration ; 
and  realism— what,  at  least,  I  think  realism  ought  to  be— 
is  not  a  self-contradiction,  it  docs  have  some  meaning.    But 
entities  that  are  only  vaguely  and  not  definitely  and  specific- 
ally objects  of  my  consciousness,  they  are  the  mischief- 
makers.     Now  shall   we  be   realists   or  shall   we  be  sub- 
jectivists?    Shall  we  say  that  these  indefinite  "somethings" 
are  real  or  shall  we  say  that  only  definite  entities  are  real  ? 

109 


The  decision  we  reach  will  depend  on  the  sense  in  which 
we  are  using  the  term^  'Veal-."  If  I  lay  down  as  part  of  my 
definition  of  existence  the  requirement  that  an  entity  to  be 
real  must  be  in  considerable  detail  an  object  of  my  con- 
sciousness, then  I  become  a  subjectivist  forthwith.  If  I  use 
''existence''  in  a  sense  that  does  not  exclude  such  indefinite 
entities,  I  am  a  realist.  Personally,  I  choose  to  use  **exist- 
ence"  in  a  sense  in  which  the  term  points  not  only  to  entities 
that  are  in  their  full  detail  objects  of  my  consciousness, 
but  also  to  entities  that  are,  specifically,  objects  of  some 
consciousness,  though  /  am  not  aware  of  them  except 
vaguely.  That  is,  I  shall  define  ''existence"  so  as  to  make 
myself  an  objective  idealist. 

An  entity  is  often  said  to  be  real  if  it  is  not  dependent 
on  my  consciousness  of  it.^"^    And  an  entity  is  independent 
on  mv  consciousness  of  it  if  it  persists  when  I  am  not  think- 
ing of  it.     What  shall  I  say  about  the  planet  Mars?     An 
hour  ago  I  was  not  thinking  about  the  planet  Mars.    Conse- 
quently if   Mars  existed  an  hour  ago  and  has  perdured 
through  the  intervening  hour,  Mars,  according  to  this  de- 
scription of  "existence,"  is  real.    Now  the  question  of  liars' 
existence  in  the  past  and  persistence  up  to  the  present  is  a 
question  confronting  me  now.     Shall  I  call  the  Mars  of 
an  hour  ago  real  or  shall  I  call  it  unreal?     In  answering 
this  question  the  notion  of  existence  I  am  discussing  gives 
us  no  help.     It  may  be  held  that  such  a  notion  of  existence 
assumes  that  there  arc  some  entities  that  are  to  be  called 
"existent,"  and  so  assumes  the  possibility  of  the  Mars  of  an 
hour  ago  being  real.     Now  the  Mars  of  an  hour  ago  is  an 
object  of  my  present  consciousness;  it  was  not  an  object  of 
consciousness  for  a  subject  contemporaneous  with  it.    And 
so  I  could  not  hold  the  Mars  of  an  hour  ago  real  if  an  entity 
to  be  real  had  to  be  the  object  of  a  consciousness  contem- 
poraneous with  it.     Such  a  requirement  would  make  it  im- 
possible for  this  past  Mars  to  be  real,  and  so  would  make 
it  impossible  for  there  to  be  any  "existent"  entities  accord- 
ing to  the  notion  of  "existence''  we  have  undertaken  to 
elucidate.     Consequently  the  most  that  we  can  get  out  of  ^ 
this  notion  of  existence  is  the  assertion  that  an  entity  to  be 
real   need   not  be   the  object   of   a  consciousness   contem- 
^  Perry  denies  that  the  realist  defines  reality  so.— New  Realism,  p.  117. 


110 


poraneous  with  k.     Unless  we  draw  from  it,  j  addition    ^ 
the  inference  that  an  entity  to  be  real  must  be  perdurmg 

'^  wtt  iTave  just  given  is  one  interpretation  of  inde- 
i:>endence   on   consciousness.      But   independence   on   con- 
Sousness   is   ambiguous,    and   the    -terpreta.on    of    the 
nhrase  I  have  just  given  is  not  the  most  usual  one.     We 
aXd  u;  to^another  meaning  of  the  phra.  >f  we  come 
back  to  our  example  of  Socrates  drmkmg  1ms  cup  of  hem 
lock     Yesterday  I  was  thinkmg  oi  him.    To-day  1  haxe  not 
bet  thinking  Ji  h,m,  and  indeed  do  not  e-Uy  reca    w,  t 
it  was  that  I  was  thinkmg  ot  yesterday.     Now  a  real  entity, 
let  us  re  ll      s  one,  it  i^  said,  that  is  independent  on  con- 
ic ousnes      It  is  one  that  is  there  when  I  am  "Ot  thinkmg 
about  H      And  so  Socrates  and  his  cup  of  hemlock  are  real 
tfXev  are  there  now  when  I  am  not  thinking  about   hem. 
if  I  am  no    thinking  about  them  at  all,  surely  I  can  t  say 
Lt  thev  a  e  there      I  can't  even  talk  about  an  entity  that 
s  in  twise  an  Object  of  my  consciousness  without  -ser- 
n<.  a   self-contradiction.      It  is  not  merely  that  an  ego- 
"entnc  predicament  prevents  -  from  going^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
nhipcts  of  mv  consciousness  to  entities  that  1  can  nevertne 
les's  asser  t7be  there.    What  lends  plausibility  to  the  notion 
oTan  elo-centric  predicament  is  the  fact  that  some  entities 
e^-  vaguely  Ld  indefinitely  objects  o    my  conscio..- 
ness,  that  they  look  beyond  themselves,     ^  to  ^P^f '   ^^ 
being  manifestly  incomplete,  unfimshed    and  vag^J'^    ^ 
^en  1  am  not  thinking  of  Socrates  and  his  cup  of  hemlock 
1^  all    lean  say  nothing  about  them.     But  suppose  I  am 
otliLrg  :7them  definitely,  but  am  -gt:^---- 

1  a  "something-;  ^X::^'^^:^ ^^^^^^^  ^ 
determmed.     Let  tnis  oe  wudL  i  u^nnlnrk      Then 

!Si«  ^'      lion 'o;".xis,.„«."  if  Socr.«s_  is  .here^ow 

.ague    ;--f  -£,i„„7hat  some  of  the  indefinite  objects 
:Tmrconsd:u:ne::  exist.     It  implies  a  meaning  of  the 

III 


term  'Veal"  that  does  not  exclude  all  of  these  indefinite  ob- 
jects from  the  group  of  entities  denoted  by  it. 

For  the  epistemological  dualist  any  thing-in-itself  will 
serve  as  an  example  of  an  indefinite  ''something."  For 
when  I  have  an  "idea"  of  a  thing-in-itself,  that  thing-in- 
itself  can  not  be  wholly  outside  the  scope  of  my  conscious- 
ness. If  it  were,  1  could  not  be  aware  of  any  of  its 
properties,  not  even  of  its  correspondence  with  my  idea.  It 
would  be  unthinkable.  These  trans-experiential  entities, 
consequently,  are  not  wholly  trans-experiential.  Their  full 
and  definite  content  is  not  experienced;  but  vaguely  they 
are  known — some  of  their  qualities  are  objects  of  conscious- 
ness. And  so  these  things-in-themselves  belong  to  the  class 
of  indefinite  ''somethings."  They  can  only  be  real  if  some 
of  these  indefinite  "somethings"  can  be  real. 

Perhaps  I  am  overbold  in  daring  to  deal  so  cavalierly  and 
in  such  brief  compass  with  such  important  subjects  as  the 
realist-subjectivist  controversy  and  the  notion  of  self-trans- 
cendent reference.     But  if  I  have  not  met  all  objections  I 
have  at  least  stated  my  opinion  that  the  entities  under  dispute 
really  are  these  indefinite  "somethings"  and  not  entities  that 
are  in  no  sense  objects  of  my  consciousness.    And  feeling  as 
I  do,  1  could  not  help  listing  this  class  of  entities  among  the 
classes  of  entities  whose  reality  depends  on  the  definition 
of    "real"    that    is    implied.       What    common-sense    thinks 
about  the  reality  of  these  indefinite  "somethings"  is  rather 
hard  to  determine.      In  general,  I  suppose,  the  realist  is 
justified  in  claiming  the  support  of  the  man  in  the  street. 
Nevertheless,  if  an  object  is  very  inchoate  and  lacks  all 
content  I  think  in  ordinary  parlance  it  will  be  called  "un- 
real."    The  God  of  a  ''negative  theology"  is,  I  think,  in 
the  ordinary  usage  of  terms  at  the  present  time  called  "un- 
real ;"  and  such  a  God  is  called  "unreal"  because  such  a  God 
can  not  be  grasped,  has  too  little  content.     A  supra-spatial 
God,  on  the  other  hand,  that  has  the  positive  qualities  of 
all  goodness  and  almightiness,  is  "real"  according  to  com- 
mon parlance,  though  just  as  far  removed  from  perception 
and  just  as  surely  not  a  member  of  the  coherent  system  of 
experience.      "Existence"   must   be   given   a   more   definite 
meaning  than  that  which  can  be  drawn  from  the  customary 
use  of  the  word  before  we  can  determine  the  ontological 
status  of  these  vague  and  indefinite  objects  of  conscious- 


112 


ness      But  when  a  sufficiently  definite  meaning  is  given  this 
term    the  status  of  these  objects  will  stand  out  clear.  ^ 

All  of  the  important  philosophical  questions  I  have  just 
mentioned  are  questions  of  existence.      They  arise     rom 
the  assertion  of  the  existence  and  counter-assertion  of  the 
non-existence  of  one  or  another  class  of  entities.    And  they 
can  be  resolved,  and   indeed   intelligently  discussed,   only 
when  we  know  what  "existence"  means.     Now  it  has  been 
my  thesis  that  "existence"  does  not  mean  the  same  thing 
or  anything  near  the  same  thing,  to  all  of  us.     We  can  not 
take  the  term  as  we  find  it  used  and  extricate  a  definite 
meaningful  collection  of  terms  that  will  be  equivalent  to  it. 
In  tho'^e  contexts  in  which  the  term  does  have  a  defimte 
meaning,  the  meanings  it  has  differ  radically  inter  se  from 
context  to  context  and  from  writer  to  writer.     Consequent- 
ly when  we  find  a  context  in  which  "existence"  is  given  a 
definite  meaning,  we  can  not  assert  that  the  meamng  found 
there  is  the  meaning  of  "existence;"  we  can  only  say  tha 
it  is  the  meaning  of  "existence"  for  the  writer  laying  it 
down,  and  in  the  context  in  which  it  occurs.     Each  of  these 
many  definitions  of  "existence,"  none  of  which  is  f/t.  defi- 
nition of  "existence,"  determines  the  content  of  the^existen- 
tial  universe.      Each  writer,   in  using  "existence     m  the 
cense  in  which  he  chooses  to  use  it,  is  peopling  the     real 
world  to  suit  himself.     Consequently  in  one  sense  the    real 
world  is  not  objectively  there;  its  contents^  depend  on  the 
sense  in  which  we  choose  to  use  the  word  "real. 

Since  the  earliest  times  of  which  we  have  record,  philoso- 
phers have   been   engaged   in    investigating   the   nature   ot 
realitv      They  have  for  the  most  part  regarded  their  task 
as  a  purely  objective  one.     They  have  felt  that  reality  was 
there  and  that  their  task  was  simply  to  discover  it  and  to 
pick  out  its  essential  characteristics.    They  have  made  judg- 
ments about  existence  and  reality ;  and  they  seem  to  have 
regarded  these  judgments  as  genuine  discoveries,   discov- 
erfes  to  be   set   forth  in  what  Kant  would  call  synthet 
propositions.     Yet  if  our  thesis  is  correct,  these  judgi^ent 
Lve  implied  an  arbitrary  and  non-necessary  definition  o 
reality.     Thev  have   not  been  judgments    he   My  of 
which  is  objectively  discovered.    They  have  been  judgmer^s 
that  have  followed  from  a  definition  ot   reality  that  has 
IrtoraJly  been   assumed.      Consequently   an   inquiry   into 

113 


the  nature  of  reality  is  in  an  essential  particular  a  mere 
begging  of  the  question.  The  metaphysician  does  not 
simply  discover  the  nature  of  reality;  he  finds  it  to  be  what 
the  particular  definition  he  has  tacitly  assumed  requires  it 
to  be.  To  be  sure,  in  following  out  the  implications  of  a 
given  definition  of  reality,  the  metaphysician  is  dealing  with 
what  are  genuinely  objective  facts.  But  in  starting  from 
one  definition  of  reality  rather  than  from  another,  he  is 
introducing  into  his  results  an  element  that  is  by  no  means 
objective.  There  has  in  the  past,  however,  been  an  almost 
universal  failure  to  distinguish  between  these  two  elements. 
And  so  a  considerable  part  of  historical  metaphysics  has 
involved  a  confusion  between  definitions  and  propositions 
of  fact. 

Let  us,  however,  recognize  this  necessary  distinction,  and 
let  us  set  ourselves  to  the  task  of  defining  reality.  How 
then  shall  we  use  the  term  '*real"?  We  ought  not  to  use  it 
in  a  sense  entirely  different  from  any  in  which  it  has  ever 
been  used  before.  To  do  so  would  be  to  cut  ourselves  off 
from  any  possible  readers  and  to  prevent  ourselves  from 
being  taken  seriously.  But  some  specific  definition  of 
'"existence"  is  essential.  For  since  so  many  of  our  judg- 
ments are  existential  judgments,  unless  "'existence"  is  given 
some  si>ecific  meaning,  these  judgments  are  vague,  indefinite 
and  worthless.  And  without  some  specific  definition  of 
existence,  moreover,  the  ontological  status  of  those  classes 
of  entities  that  have  been  troubling  philosophy  must  remain 
undetermined. 


t*" 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

{To  accompany  Chapter  i  and  Chapter  6), 


Bradley,  F.  H. : 
Bradley,  F.  H. : 
Brentano : 

Cohen,  M.  R. : 


Dewey,  J. : 
Eckstein : 

Friedrichs : 

Holt,  E.  B. : 
Hume : 
Kant: 


Lovejoy,  A.  O. : 
Manan,  W.  T. : 
Medicus,  F. : 

Moore,  G.  E. '• 
Owen,  R.  B. : 


Perry,  R.  B. : 

Russell  B.: 
Sheldon,W.H.: 


Appearance  and  Reality. 
Essays  on  Truth  and  Reality. 
Psychologic  vom  empirischen  Standpunkte, 

The^Use  of  the  Words  Real  and  Unreal, 
Journ<il  of  Philosophy,  etc,  Vol.   13, 

(1916)  p.  635.  . 

Essays  in  Experimental  Logic 
Der  Begriff  des  Dasems  bei  Julius  Berg- 
mann,  Erlangen,  1902.  ^.-^ 

Beitrage  zu  einer  Geschichte  und  Theone 

des  Existentialurteils,  Prenzlau.  1906. 
The  Concept  of  Consciousness. 
Treatise  of  Human  Nature.  . 

Der  einzig  mogUche  Beweisgrund  zu  einer 
Demonstration    des    Dasems     Gottes. 
IVerke,  ed.  bv  Hartenstem,  Bd  2,  p.  114. 
Existence  and  Formal  Logic;  Jon^^^fof 
Philosophy,  etc.yol  8,  (1911)  P-^^o 
The  Existential  Proposition;  Journal  of 
Philosophy,  etc,  Vol.  8,  (191  OP;  477- 
Bemerkungen  zum  Problem  der  Existenz 
Siematischer  Gegenstande;  Kantstu. 

dien,  Vol  19^  (i9i4)P-i-         ,    ^    c; 
The  Nature  of  Judgment;  Mmd,  N.  b. 

Vol.  8,  (1890)  p.  17^-  ,     ,  J 

The  Predicate^Real  and  Unreal ;  Journal 

of  Philosophy,  etc.  Vol.  13,  (iQi^)  P- 

A  Realistic  Theory  of  Independence;  in 

The  New  Realism,  p.  9^- 
Principles  of  Mathematics  Vol.  i. 
The  Demolition  of  Unreality;  Journal g 

Philosophy,  etcVol  13,  (1916)  P-  3i»- 


114 


115 


VITA. 

tS^'.'^'a?/^^'^*''.^'''  ""'^^  ^<^™  '"  Baltimore  on  July  i, 
p1^fdin'<^  r  '"'^""■"^fh^  P"l>lic  schools  of  Baltimore  and 
wh're    in    oifT  "'  J^'^/S""]"^--^-  ^  went  to  Harvard 
Znl  /        ^  ^'  ""'"'^  '^^  ^"g^""^^  Of  bachelor  of  arts 

cum  lamkm  Economics.     It  was  under  the  influence  of  a 
fellow-student  at  Harvard,   one  who  was  always  earnest 

"vltrn"'"'  ''"'-"''  '•'"•"''^^^^  °^  •^^  enthSa^r:: 
now  anarchism    now   socialism,   now   Nietzsche  and  now 

n,rnT  7'r'i  ^'^'^  ^  ^T^  ^"  ^°"^'^"  '"^■■e  earnestly  t°e 
tZ  '^Hn  ,  ''  '"!'  '°  ^^^'  ^'"^  ini,K)rtance  of  ethics.^  At 
John.  Hopkms  where  I  was  a  graduate  student  in  phi- 
osophy  under  Professor  Lovejoy.  from  1914  to  ioi6  I 
learned  to  appreciate  the  interest  and  significance  of  the 

se'emsT:  Z  ^'^'^T'^^"^'  ^"''  "-'-P^^y-s.  Ethics  Im 
seems  to  me  the  most  important  branch  of  philosophy;  but 
metaphysics  has  come  to  engross  my  attention  to  a  very 
consideraole  extent.  During  the  summer  season  of  10,^ 
aiiddunng  the  year  1916-1917.  I  studied  at  Columbia  unde? 
.nd  h'p  %  '■'^'  l^'oo^"^'-'^?'^-  Montague.  Bush,  Costello, 
Honf^;  1™"'";  /"  September,  1917,  I  returned  to  John 
rWr.  R  '-T  ^  have  completed  my  work  for  a  doctor's 
degree.  Besides  my  principal  field  of  study,  philosophv.  I 
have  done  graduate  work  in  political  economy  and  political 
science.  ^ 

I  am  particularly  indebted  to  Professor  Lovejoy  under 
whose  direction  my  studies  in  philosophy  have  been  carried 
out  He  has  tried  hard  to  make  me  critical  and  circumspect 
m  dealing  with  philosophical  problems  and  to  make  me 
keen  and  acute  in  analysis.  I  am  also  grateful  to  the  mem- 
bers of  the  departmeut  of  philosophy  at  Columbia  and  to 
niy  tellow-students  at  Columbia  and  at  Johns  Hopkins  for 
having  helped  to  make  my  four  years  as  a  graduate  student 
most  instructive  and  most  enjoyable. 


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116 


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